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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is provided by Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(B).

ISSUES FOR REVIEW

•

All the issues in this matter concern whether the Executive Director of the
Department of Environmental Quality (ED) erred in upholding the permitting decisions
by the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality (Director) 1 authorizing the

•

construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude Processing Project (Expansion) at the
Holly Marketing and Refining (Holly) Woods Cross Refinery, Davis County (Refinery)
and if the ED decided correctly:

•

I. First Issue
Whether the Director made a defensible dete1mination that the Expansion, which
would be constructed in the Salt Lake non-attainment area for the 24-hour fine particulate

•

matter (PM2.s) National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS), was not a "major
modification" and therefore not subject to Utah Admin. Code r.307-403 .

•

Sub-Issue 1: If the Director's calculation of the "potential-to-emit" (PTE) PM2.s
for a subset of the Refinery boilers and heaters based on a suspect "emission factor" 2025 times smaller than emission rates he had previously deemed the most reliable is

•
•
•

legally erroneous, represents an inappropriate departure from prior practice, and lacks
foundation in the administrative record (Record) .

1 "Director"

refers collectively to the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality and
Utah Division of Air Quality ("DAQ") .

•
Sub-Issue 2: Whether the Director improperly authorized a credit of 2.19 tons per
year (tpy) of PM2.s for the closure of the Propane Pit Flare (PPF) where the credit eclipsed

•

the PM2.s emissions from Holly's remaining, much larger flares and from all the flares at
three local refineries and when the Record contained no supporting calculations or
monitoring data, but only inconsistencies.

•

Sub-Issue 3: Did the Director's PTE determination for fluidized catalytic
cracking unit 25 (FCCU25) based on a 0.3-lb PM,o/1000-lb coke-burned permit limit
adequately represent the maximum capacity of the unit to emit PM2.s although the

•

Director did not restrict FCCU25's coke-bum rate, failed to calculated PTE based on "the
most pollutant-generating" crude Holly is authorized to process, relied on data from the

•

existing FCCU which utilizes different control technology and processes a different
feedstock, and neglected to consider that the new feedstock for FCCU25 would produce

•

more coke.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the legal adequacy of the Director's compliance with his permitting
responsibilities, this Court will apply Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4), recognizing the

•

agency has "substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules" and
upholding "factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by
substantial evidence viewed in light of the record as a whole." Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-

•

301.5(14)(c); Murray v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, i!l9, 308 P.3d 461 (agency
finding of fact reviewed for substantial evidence). Specifically, this Court will assess
whether the Director's PTE calculations and determination of the emission decreases

•

2

•

•
•

from the PPF closure are based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, adequately
supported by the Record, "contrary to [his] prior practice" and unjustified and unfair or
arbitrary and capricious. Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4)(d), (4)(g), (4)(h)(iii)-(iv).

•

The assessment of the Director' s compliance with Rules 307-401 and 307-403
presents a mixed question of law and fact reviewed to determine if the "agency has
erroneously ... applied the law." Provo City v. Utah Labor Com 'n, 2015 UT ~9, 345 P.3d

•

1242; id. ~10 ("[T]he characteristic that distinguishes a mixed question from a question of
fact is the existence of an articulable legal issue."); id. ~16 ("A court cannot resolve" this
issue "without applying a legal definition ... to the facts of the case."). As a result, the

•

appellate court will "review the administrative body's findings of fact under the
substantial evidence standard," while it will "review the law applied to these facts for
correctness." Provo City, ~17; see also Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality

•

Board, 2009 UT 76, ~14, 226 P.3d 719 ("[M]ixed findings of fact and law, and the
agency's interpretation of the operative provisions of statutory law it is empowered to
administer are reviewed under an intermediate standard that considers whether the

•

agency's determination was rational"); id., ~13 ("When reviewing an agency's
interpretation oflaw, we review for correctness[.]").

•

Despite any discretion given to the Director's decision, his best available control
technology (BACT) analysis must be supported by substantial evidence, Sierra Club,
~13, and must further the goals of ensuring that the best control technology is adopted,

•

id., ~45 ("[W]hile the Board has discretion to interpret its own regulations .. .it must do so
with an eye to ... ensuring that the best available control technology is adopted."), and
3

•

•
protecting short-te1m ambient standards. Sierra Club, ~48.
The ED' s November 17, 2014 Final Order is owed no deference. The ED

•

necessarily limited her review to the same administrative record that is before this Court,
Utah Code Ann. §19-1-301.5(8)(a), to which she applied the same standard ofreview that
this Court will apply to agency factual dete1minations. Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-1-

•

301.5(14); 19-l-301.5(13)(b). Because this is an "on-the-record" case, there was no trial
below, no witness testimony and no observation of facts "that cannot be adequately
reflected in the record available to appellate courts[.]" Adoption ofBaby B., 2012 UT 35,

•

~42, 308 P.3d 382.
Therefore, this Court is positioned to undertake an independent evaluation of the

•

Director's permitting decision based on the administrative record and the standard of
review articulated above. See Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1580
(10th Cir.1994) ("In reviewing the agency's action," on the record, "we must render an

•

independent decision using the same standard of review applicable to the District Court.
Once appealed, the District Court's decision is accorded no particular deference."). This
is particularly true because the Director's decision must be reviewed on the basis he

•

articulated at the time he made his decision and any post-hoc rationalizations for the
permitting decision are unpersuasive. Id. 1575.

•
•
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•

•
B. Preservation
This issue was preserved as follows: 1) Sub-Issue 1 (IR008584-95,2 IR00859798); 2) Sub-Issue 2 (IR008595-97, IR009062-63, IR009151); and, 3) Sub-Issue 3

•

(IR008598-601, IR009077-78, IR009081, IR009151, IR009162) .

II. Second Issue
Whether, in authorizing the Expansion, the Director met his permitting obligations

•

under Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8 .

Sub-Issue 1: If, after acknowledging that the flares would be a considerable
source of air pollution, particularly of SO2 and NOx, during upset conditions at the

•

Refinery, the Director complied with Utah Admin. Code r.301-401-8(l)(b)(vii), 8(1)(a)
and 8(5) although he did not impose AO limits on flare emissions or otherwise ensure
that the Expansion would not interfere with the maintenance or attainment of short-term

•

NAAQS.

Sub-Issue 2: Did the Director meet the requirements of Utah Admin. Code r.301401-8(1)(b)(vii), 8(1)(a) and 8(5) although he did not impose short-term limits on the

•

Expansion emission units.

Sub-Issue 3: If the Director's confusing references to the applicability of Subpart

•

Jato the Expansion, particularly the flares, and his refusal to specify which of the
particular terms and conditions of this complex provision apply to the Refinery, meet the
requirements of Utah Admin. Code r.301-401-8(l)(b)(vi) .

•

2 Utah Physicians attached and incorporated the Mark Hall Comments found at
IR008579-602. IR009137.
5

•

•
Sub-Issue 4: Whether, given the evidence in the Record, with the South Flare
shut down for reconstruction and all Refinery gases routed to the North Flare, the Record

•

adequately supports the Director's contention that the apparent modification of the North
Flare and increase in emissions from the unit did not trigger Subpart Ja or Utah Admin.
Code r.307-401-8(1)(a).

•

A. Standard of Review
This Comt will assess Issue 2 under the same standard of review it will apply to
Issue 1, with the exception that Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii) is not relevant to

•

Issue 2.

•

B. Preservation
This issue was preserved as follows: 1) Sub-Issue 1 and 2 (IR009078-80,
IR009089-91, IR009155-57, IR009158-60); 2) Sub-Issue 3 (IR009152-54); and, 3) Sub-

•

Issue 4 (IR009154).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8 (2012)
Utah Admin. Code r.307-403-3, 4 & 10 (2012)

•

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Nature of the Case
Anyone living along the Wasatch Front has experienced our air pollution crisis,

•

particularly wintertime "inversions" that settle on the Salt Lake Valley for extended
periods, causing concentrations of fine particulate matter (PM2.s) to skyrocket and giving
Utah the dubious distinction of having the nation's worst air quality. We have felt our

•

6

•

•
•

eyes and lungs bum, fretted over whether to let our children outside to play, agonized
about parents and grandparents with heart problems - even taken them to the emergency
room as their symptoms worsened - and watched those with asthma struggle to breathe.

•

Monitors quantify this public health emergency. Since 2009, the greater Salt Lake
area has been formally designated as not attaining the nation's 24-hour PM2.s NAAQS.
The Salt Lake City non-attainment area includes Salt Lake, Davis, Weber, Tooele and

•

Box Elder counties. IR008482.3 Because the state could not show that the area would
attain the standard by 2015, the Salt Lake non-attainment area will be designated as a
"serious" PM2.s non-attainment area as a matter oflaw by December 2015. 42 U.S.C. §

•

7513(b)(l), (c)(l).4
Our air pollution is serious. In 2013, air quality along the Wasatch Front exceeded
the 24-hour PM2.s standard for at least 4 7 days - sometimes by 100%. This means that

•

for more than a month, our community - including its most vulnerable populations, the
young and the old - were subjected to levels of air pollution considerably higher than
concentrations deemed unsafe and unhealthy at exposures lasting only 24 hours. E.g.

•

IR00913 9-40.
Salt Lake County is further designated as not meeting the 24-hour PM10 and the

•

SO2 NAAQS and in recent years, air quality there has exceeded the 8-hour ozone

3

http://www.epa.gov/pmdesignations/2006 standards/final/region8 .htm
In the Interior West- made up of Utah ,Idaho, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico,
Arizona, Nevada, Wyoming, Texas, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and
Oklahoma - only Utah (with seven counties) and Arizona (with two counties) do not
meet the 24-hour PM2.s NAAQS. www.epa.gov/pmdesignations/2006standards/state.htm.
4

•
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•

NAAQS, while Davis County is a "maintenance" area for ozone. IR009225; IR008482;

•

IR008566-67; IR009140.
The health consequences of our dirty air are significant. The findings of 3,000
published research papers underscore key concepts now accepted by the medical
community worldwide. First, there is no safe level of exposure to particulate pollution

•

and no threshold below which negative health effects disappear. People literally die from
exposure. For every 10 µg/m 3 increase in PM2.s concentrations, community mortality
rates rise 14%. IR009140. Therefore, Utah Physicians estimates that 1,400 to 2,000

•

premature deaths occur every year in Utah from PM2.s. IR009142.
Air pollution has the same extensive, broad-based health consequences as cigarette

•

smoke because the signature physiologic response is the same - low-grade arterial
inflammation, narrowing of blood vessels and increased propensity for clot formation,
resulting in immediate increases in blood pressure, followed within hours by higher rates

•

of heart attacks and strokes. IR009140-41.
The inflammation caused by PM2.s affects other organs. Particulate pollution
penetrates every cell in the body, but is particularly well-documented in the brain. There,

•

air pollution causes poor neurologic outcomes throughout the age spectrum, including
loss of intelligence in children, higher rates of autism, and attention deficit disorders, as
well as multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer' s, and accelerated cognitive decline in the elderly.

•

IR009142. Virtually every lung disease is caused or exacerbated, and growth of lung
function during childhood can be irreversibly stunted by air pollution exposure.
IR009143. Cancers, including childhood leukemia, lung, breast, prostate, cervical, brain

•

8

•

•
•

and stomach cancer, occur at higher rates among people exposed to more air pollution,
while cancer survival rates are reduced. IR009143.
The blood vessel inflammation caused by air pollution also affects the placenta,

•

arguably representing the most significant public health impact of air pollution. Women
who breathe more air pollution have higher rates of adverse pregnancy outcomes, their
newborn babies showing increased birth defects, genetic damage, and a life-long disease

•

burden that includes higher rates of metabolic disorders, reactive airway disease,
cardiovascular disease, cancer, Alzheimer's and all diseases consequent to immunosuppression. IR009143-44. The alteration of genetic material triggered by pollution can

•

be seen within minutes, underscoring that short-term spikes in air pollution harm
developing fetuses. IR009144.
At the center of Utah's Wasatch Front are five refineries, including the Holly

•

facility. These refineries contribute to our air pollution problem by directly emitting
PM2.s, as well as the "precursor" pollutants that form fine particulate matter during our

•

inversions - sulfur oxides (SOx), nitrous oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds
(VOCs). These facilities represent a host of additional health risks. For example, when
toxic substances are microscopically attached to fine particles, the health consequences

•

are enhanced. Refinery particulate pollution is high in concentrations of attached
hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) including heavy metals and polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAI-Is). IR009144.

•

Children living near petrochemical industries have higher P AH levels than adults,
contributing to more DNA damage and endangering a more vulnerable population.
9

•

•
Industrial-based pollution is more toxic to DNA than traffic-based pollution. Rates of
leukemia are doubled in populations living in the vicinity of oil refineries. Benzene, a

•

primary component of refinery emissions, is carcinogenic and harmful to a developing
fetus, causing low birth weight, delayed bone formation, bone marrow damage and low
white blood cell and platelet counts. Exposure to benzene near the national standard is
associated with spe1m aneuploidy. Exposure to petrochemicals, specifically benzene,
gasoline, and hydrogen sulfide, is significantly associated with increased frequency of
spontaneous abortion. IR009144-45.

•

Even infinitesimal levels of exposure to PAHs, which are "endocrine disruptors,"
may cause "endocrine or reproductive abnormalities, particularly if exposure occurs

•

during a critical developmental window ... [L]ow doses may even exert more potent
effects than higher doses." As a result, there are no safe doses for PAHs. IR009145.
In this context - a public health crisis affecting millions of Utahns - the Director

•

issued a permit authorizing Holly to expand its facilities. At a time when the Clean Air
Act requires the Director to reduce PM2.s, NOx, SO2 and VOC emissions dramatically
and bring the Salt Lake Valley into compliance with the NAAQS as "expeditiously as

•

practicable," 42 U.S.C. §7513(c), he approved project increases in the refinery' s annual
emissions of PM2.s by 9.19 tons and PM,o by 9.54 tons, IR008566, annual emissions of
the PM2.s and ozone precursors SO2, NOx and VOCs by 38, 83 and 32 tons respectively,

•

and annual emissions of CO by 343 tons. IR008565. Annual refinery HAPs emissions
will increase by 9.3 tons a year, IR002834, bringing the refine1y's total yearly emissions

•
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•
•

of benzene to 1.46 tons, hexane to 5.41 tons, toluene to 1.21 tons, and xylene to 1598
pounds. IR008493.
Moreover, the Director determined that each year the refinery will release

•

significant uncontrolled emissions of PM2.s precursors, including 240 tons of SO2, 8 tons
ofNOx and 16 tons ofVOCs. IR008561. In the case of SO2, these emissions will eclipse
the relevant permit limit on the en tire Holly facility - 110 tons of SO2 each year,

•

IR009245 - by more than 200%. Although these emissions threaten Utah's ability to
comply with the NAAQS, the Director failed to impose emission limits or monitoring and
recordkeeping requirements on the flares in order to constrain these substantial predicted

•

"upset" emissions of SO2, NOx or VOCs. E.g. IR009245-46; IR009249-50 .
As a result, at a time when the Director must find every possible emission
reduction from every polluting sector, the Director has failed to undertake the analysis

•

and review of the permit applications and the assertions they contain mandated by law
and necessary to protect public health. In essence, the Director's permitting decision is
not sufficiently rigorous and is not supp01ted by the Record. The result is a permit that

•

fails to give the citizens of Utah the legal protections to which they are entitled, does not
require the control of emissions at the refinery to the extent the law demands, and fails to

•

protect the public from air pollution.
II. Proceedings Below

Because it wanted to expand its refining capacity from 40,000 to 60,000 barrels a

•

day (bpd) and to "accommodate ... the processing" of thick and dirty heavy black and
yellow waxy crudes, Holly submitted a revised Notice oflntent (NOI) to the Director in
11

•

•
July 2012. IR002798-3590. The Director issued an Intent to Approve (ITA) the NOI on
June 5, 2013, IR008449-79, along with a Source Plan Review analyzing the proposal.
IR008480-8575. Utah Physicians filed two sets of comments on the Director's plan to
authorize the expansion. IR004007-44; IR009046-9173. The Director responded to
these and other comments. IR009174-9222. On November 18, 2013, the Director issued
an approval order (AO) to Holly, authorizing the construction of the Expansion.
IR009223-54.
On December 18, 2013, pursuant to Utah Code §§19-1 -301.5, Utah Physicians for

•

a Healthy Environment and FRIENDS of Great Salt Lake (collectively "Utah Physicians")
filed a Request for Agency Action (Request) seeking administrative review of the AO.

•

ADJ009257-9373. On December 20, 2013, Utah Physicians moved for a stay of the AO.
ADJ009557-96. The matter was assigned to an administrative law judge ("ALJ"),
ADJ009601 , who recommended denial of the stay in a March 25, 2014 proposed order,

•

ADJ010798-820, Exhibit C, that was adopted by the ED on March 8, 2015. ADJOl 103539, Exhibit D.
On March 11, 2015, after briefing and argument, the ALJ issued another proposed

•

order suggesting dismissal of Utah Physicians' Request. ADJO 1153 6-648, Exhibit E. On
March 31, 2015, in a two page decision, the ED adopted the proposed order.
ADJOl 1651-53, Exhibit F. Utah Physicians timely appealed both ED orders to this
Court.

•
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III. Statement of Facts
A. NSR Permitting
"The Clean Air Act. .. aims to 'protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air

•

resources' by prescribing National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which state
and regional authorities are required to either maintain or progress toward." Sierra Club,
2009 UT 76, ,ii. A key component of the Act that Congress deemed necessary to achieve

•

and maintain the NAAQS and protect public health and the environment is the New
Source Review (NSR) permitting program. Under NSR, before commencing
construction or making modifications, stationary sources must obtain one or more of the

•

following permits: a non-attainment NSR (NNSR) permit, 42 U.S.C. §§7501-15;
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) permit, id. §§7470-79; or a minor NSR
permit. Id. §7410(a)(2)(C). The permits specify what air pollution control devices must

•

be used, what emission limits must be met, and how the facility must be operated. EPA
NSR Workshop Manual H.1. 5 Overall, permit conditions establish limits on the types and

amounts of air pollution allowed, operating requirements for pollution control devices or

•

pollution prevention activities, and monitoring and recordkeeping requirements. Id.
NSR serves two purposes: First, that the addition of new and modified industrial

•

sources does not degrade air quality. EPA NSR Factsheet at 1, Exhibit G. In areas with
unhealthy air - where NNSR applies - new emissions may not slow progress toward
cleaner air, while in areas with clean air, PSD areas, new emissions may not worsen air

•

5

http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ttnnsr01/gen/wkshpman.pdf, included on CD.
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•
quality. Id. Second, the NSR program assures citizens that new or modified sources will
be as clean as possible and advances in pollution control will be implemented as

•

industries expand. Id. The NSR program accomplishes its goals by requiring sources to
"obtain pe1mits limiting air emissions before they begin construction. For that reason,
NSR is commonly referred to as the 'preconstruction air permitting program.'" Id.

•

Utah's NSR permitting programs were approved by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and incorporated into Utah's State Implementation Plan (SIP).
EPA determined that Utah's permitting regimes complied the NNSR, PSD and minor

•

NSRprogram requirements. 42 U.S.C. §7410. EPA approved and incorporated by
reference into federal regulation Rule 307-401, 40 C.F.R. §52.2320(c)(28)(i)(B), and

•

Rule 307-403, as necessary components of Utah's SIP. 40 C.F.R. §52.2320(c)(59)(i)(A).
Rule 307-401 applies to all sources and all modifications, whether or not they are
"major" and whether or not they are in non-attainment areas. 6 Utah Admin. Code r.307-

•

401-3. Rule 307-403 applied to, inter alia, major modifications to major sources in nonattainment areas. Id. r.307-403-2. 7
B. The Director's Non-Attainment NSR Determinations

•

Because Utah has failed to show that it will attain the 24-hour PM2.s NAAQS by
the statutory deadline, the greater Salt Lake area - already deemed a moderate nonattainment area - will be designated a "serious" non-attainment area by December 2015.

•

6

There are certain exemptions not relevant to the present matter to this requirement.
"In a non-attainment area" is a simplification. NNSR requirements apply only to
particular pollutants depending on which NAAQS the non-attainment area is failing to
meet. Id. r.307-403-2(1).
7

•

14

•

•
•

42 U.S.C. §7513(b)(l), (c)(l); IR009225. This delay brings urgency to the Director's
obligation to reduce emissions of air pollutants in order to achieve the PM2.s standard as
"expeditiously as practicable." 42 U.S.C. §7513(c). To further this goal, the Clean Air

•

Act constrains any project in a non-attainment area that constitutes a "major
modification" - or that results in, inter alia, an increase in PM2.s emissions of 10 tons per
year (tpy) or more. Utah Admin. Code r.307-101-2 ("major modification" is a change
"that would result in a significant net emissions increase of any pollutant" and
"significant" is a "net emissions increase or. .. potential of a source to emit" that "would
equal or exceed" 10 tpy of PM2.s); id. r.307-403-2(1) (r.307-403 applies to "major

•

modifications"). Congress reasoned that no project may interfere with prompt
compliance with the NAAQS or delay relief from harmful levels of air pollution to which
the citizens living in a non-attainment area are entitled.

•

Rule 307-403 authorizes the Director to approve a major modification in a nonattainment area, "if and only if' he determines: 1) LAER (lowest achievable emission
rate) has been applied, Utah Admin. Code r.307-403-3(3)(a); 2) emission offsets,

•

"enforceable by the time a ... modified source commences construction," have been
secured, id. r.307-403-4(2) & 403-3(3)(c); and, 3) after public comment and based on an

•

analysis of "alternative sites, sizes, production processes, and ... control techniques" for
the modification, that the project's benefits "significantly outweigh the environmental
and social costs[.]" Id. r.307-403-10. Because the application of Rule 307-403 depends

•

upon his conclusion, the Director must accurately determine, before construction
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•

commences, whether an emission increase is significant and if a project is a major
modification.

•

Because the refinery is located in the Salt Lake PM2.s non-attainment area, the
Director calculated the PTE PM2.s of the Expansion's modified and constmcted units,
including the FCCU25 and the NSPS boilers (Boilers#8-#1 l) and 11 heaters. IR002833.

•

PTE is "the maximum capacity of a source to emit a pollutant(.]" Utah Admin. Code
r.304-101-2.
The Director approximated the PM2.s emissions rate of Boilers#8-# 11 and the 11
"non-NSPS" heaters using a constant created for inventory purposes that had never been
used to predict emissions forNSRpermitting. E.g. IR008483; IR008911-12; IR009043;

•

IR007239-42. The inventory constant is 20 to 25 times smaller than the emission rate
the Director applied to the other Refinery boilers and heaters, IR008549; IR008558, 20 to
25 times less than the emission rate based on the manufacture's data and guarantees,

•

IR008502; IR002902; IR002920; IR003053, 1120th to 1125th of the emission rate that
represents BACT and the "lowest emission rate" in the nation, IR002902-3; IR002920,
and 20 to 25 times smaller than EPA's published AP-42 emission factors, the emission

•

factor Holly used in the NOi to calculate emissions from the "NSPS" boilers and heaters.
IR002847; IR003043-46; IR003048-50.
The Director authorized Holly to take "credit" for retiring the PPF. Based on a

•

reckoning of "actual" emissions from the unit, IR008564; IR008369, the Director
determined Holly could subtract 2.19 tpy PM2.s from the emission increases resulting
from the Expansion. IR008564. 2.19 tpy is considerably greater than the annual PM2.s

•
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•
•

emissions from the larger North and South flares , IR002852; IR003176; IR003 l 64,
which are estimated to be zero in both upset and non-upset conditions, IR002865;
IR002996; IR003029; IR003069, and is greater than the SIP-estimated PM2.s emissions of

•

1.44 tpy from all the flares at Holly, Tesoro and Big West combined. IR008153. There
are no calculations or monitoring data in the Record to the support the 2.19 tpy.
IR003035. The AP-42 emission factor on which Holly bases its calculation of PM2.s flare

•

emissions varies from 0-274 micrograms per liter (µg/L). AP-42, 13.5-4. The Record
does not indicate how the company used the variable AP-42 emission factors to calculate
actual PPF emissions. IR003035. The 2.19 tpy credit is based on an unexplained

•

increase in emissions, IR003035, that occurred after the PPF was replaced and redesigned
to reduce PM2.s emissions. IR008564.
The Director calculated the PM2.s PTE for FCCU25 at 8.15 tpy, IR008367, or 97%

•

of the Expansion's total PTE. IR008568. FCCU25 will process Utah black waxy crude,
a substantial departure from the Canadian Select processed at the existing FCCU,
IR007166; IR002839; IR007168, and will produce more carbon bum-off. IR008598-99;

•

IR002937; 40 C.F.R. §60.l0la; id. §60.104a. To assess PTE, the Director relied on an
AO limit of 0.3-lb PM1 0/l 000-lb coke burned, IR009243, without restricting or accurately

•

estimating the maximum rate of coke bum-off. IR009242-43; IR008052.
After adding and subtracting, the Director determined that the Expansion would
cause an 8.35 tpy increase in PM2.s emissions - slightly under the significance level of 10

•

tpy. IR008568. Therefore he concluded the Expansion was not a major modification and
not subject to Rule 307-403.
17

•
C. The Director's Minor Source NSR Permitting

The Director must comply with Rule 307-401-8 whether the Expansion is a major

•

or minor modification. The rule, by its own tenns, see Sierra Club, ~13 ("We review
administrative rules in the same manner as statutes, focusing first on the plain language
of the rule."), applies equally to minor or major modifications. Utah Adm in. Code r.307-

•

401 -3.
Under Rule 307-401-8, the Director may issue an AO only ifhe determines that
the "degree of pollution control for emissions .. .is at least BACT." Utah Admin. Code
r.307-401-8(1)(a); id. r.307-401-8(5). BACT is an "emissions limitation .. .based on the
maximum degree ofreduction for each air contaminant which . .. is achievable[.]" Id.

•

r.307-401-2(1); Sierra Club ~48. The goals ofBACT emission limitations are: "(l) to
achieve the lowest percent reduction, (2) to protect sh01i-term ambient standards, and (3)
to be enforceable as a practical matter." Sierra Club, ~48 (citing NSR Manual, B.6-.9);

•

NSR Manual B.56 ("BACT emission limits .. .must. ..demonstrate protection of short-term
ambient standards (limits written in pounds/ hour) and be enforceable as a practical
matter ( contain appropriate averaging times, compliance verification procedures and

•

recordkeeping requirements).").
In addition to his obligation to protect sh01i-term NAAQS by imposing
appropriate BACT emission limitations, the Director has an independent duty to ensure

•

that emissions from any modification will not interfere with the attainment or
maintenance of the NAAQS. Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8(1)(b)(vii); id. r.307-4018(5).

•
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•

EPA established short-term NAAQS because spikes in air pollution of a shmter

•

duration are as haimful to public health as long-te1m exposure to lower levels of
pollution. Short-te1m NAAQS include standards prohibiting concentrations of SO2 and

•

NOx, from exceeding designated levels monitored over a one-hour period. 75 Fed. Reg.
35520 (June 22, 2010); 75 Fed. Reg. 6474 (February 2, 2010). The 24-hour PM2.s and
PM10 NAAQS, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086 (January 15, 2013), and the eight-hour ozone standard,

•

73 Fed. Reg. 16436 (March 27, 2008), also protect against high levels of these air
pollutants averaged over shorter periods of time.
The Director applied BACT to various Expansion emission units, including 11

•

process heaters, Boiler# ll, FCCU25, and the South Flare. IR008495-8518. 8 The
resulting SO2 and NOx emission limitations are typically expressed by daily and yearly
(365-day rolling) averages and not as hourly limits. IR009245; IR009248. The

•

limitations on FCCU25 SO2 and NOx are averaged over a rolling 7-day and 365-day
period. IR009242-43. The SO2 limit on the FCCU25 scrubber is averaged on a daily and
yearly basis. IR009245. The source-wide limitations on both SO2 and NOx are averaged
daily or on a 365-day rolling basis. IR009245; IR009248. SO2 emissions from the South
and North flares are not limited by the permit, IR009186-87; IR009241-51, and only

•

annual "non-upset" NOx flare emissions are restricted by the AO. IR009249. NOx
emissions from the heaters and boilers are determined on a three-hour basis, but
compliance is gauged by a stack test performed once in three years. IR009249-50 .

•

8

The Director is also required to derive and impose BACT on the North Flare.
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•

•
Compliance with the PM10 emissions from the "NSPS" heaters and boilers are evaluated
by a yearly stack test. IR009248.
The Director admits that the two Holly flares will be a significant source of air
pollution. Each year, emissions from each flare due to "upsets" will amount to 120 tons
of SO2, 21 tons of CO, 4 tons ofNOx and 8 tons ofVOCs. IR008561; IR002865. The
Director proposed to limit flare emissions by removing exemptions for flares from the
emission caps for SO2 sources, IR008568, PMJO sources, IR008569, and NOx sources.
IR008569. The final AO contains "no limits on the flares." IR009186-87. The AO does
not require a calculation of flare SO2, CO, VOCs or PM10 emissions in order to determine
whether the sources covered by emission caps are complying with the relevant emission
limitations. IR009245-48. For NOx, the AO limits only annual "non-upset" emissions by

•

including only "non-upset" flare throughput rates in the calculation of emissions.
IR009249. The AO does not limit any "upset" flare emissions for any pollutants.

•

IR009241-51. "[F]lares are in place as control device for upset conditions." IR009186.
Holly modeled the impact of the Expansion on NAAQS, IR002993-96, and
showed an increase in NO2 concentrations equal to 95% of the one-hour NAAQS.

•

IR00003596. Holly's modeling did not include any "upset emissions" from the flares,
IR009214, did not determine maximum sho1t-te1m emissions and instead used as inputs
average annual emissions that masked any spikes in air pollution. IR002993-96. The

•

Director acknowledged that the Refinery experiences significant variability in day to day
emission and production levels. IR009187.

•
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•
•

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Families living along the Wasatch Front are held hostage by air pollution. During
frequent wintertime inversions, they are told to stay indoors and not to exercise. They

•

cough, get headaches and struggle to breathe. The fine particles, individually invisible
but concentrated enough to block the sun, enter the body, causing inflammation and
increased blood pressure, heait attacks and stroke. PM2.s damages lungs, retards lung

•

function and penetrates and impairs the brain. Developing fetuses are prone to genetic
damage and lifelong diseases as they are exposed to the air pollution their mothers
breathe.

•

By 2015, the year the law promised them relief, the citizens of Utah were still
trapped in unhealthy air. The State's plan to reduce emissions was not adequate and the
date of compliance with the NAAQS was pushed off until 2020. In December 2015, Salt

•

Lake, Davis, Weber, Box Elder and Tooele counties will be re-designated a "serious"
non-attainment area and the State will have to develop a new plan with stricter measures

•

to secure the necessary emission reductions. Utahns will face at least five more years of
unhealthy air. In the meantime, they are entitled to all the protections the Clean Air Act
provides and all the steps toward healthy air the law guarantees.

•

When a major source like the Refinery proposes a project that will increase
emission of PM2.s in the Salt Lake serious nonattainment area, much is at stake - the
expeditious compliance with the NAAQS and the corresponding health benefits that legal

•

promise entails. The Director must determine if the project is a major modification and
therefore if Rule 307-403 applies. The purpose of this assessment is clear. In an area
21

•

•
already plagued by unhealthy levels of air pollution, where emissions must be reduced as
expeditiously as possible, air pollution increases are not permissible.
Although an accurate calculation of projected PM2.s increases is fundamental to
implementation of the NSR program, the Director did not make a defensible
determination. First, to deem the Expansion a minor modification, the Director used an

•

emission rate 20 to 25 times smaller than the emission rates derived from several sources
the Director has deemed reliable and referenced again and again for his NSR permitting.
Second, the Director approved an emission reduction for the retirement of a flare that

•

Holly claims, without showing its monitoring data, assumptions or calculations, emitted
more PM2s each year than both of Holly's other, larger flares combined and more than all
the flares at the Holly, Tesoro and Big West refineries put together. Third, the Director

•

determined the PTE for FCCU25, the largest source of PM2.s emission increases, from a
rate of 0.3-lb PM10/l000-lb coke-burned, without restricting or accurately estimating the

•

maximum hourly rate at which coke may be burned in the unit. This means that the
FCCU25 PM,o emissions are not subject to a hard ceiling and the Director' s calculation
of PTE without a limit on coke-bum rate will necessarily be inaccurate.

•

The next line of defense safeguarding Wasatch Front air quality is Rule 307-401,
which covers minor modifications. Again, the Director misapplied the law, failing to
assure that the Expansion would not impede the attainment or maintenance of the

•

NAAQS. The Director acknowledged that during upset conditions, Holly' s flares would
be a significant source of air pollution - for example, emitting double the Refinery-wide
SO2 emission cap - but did not restrict these emissions. The Director decided not to

•
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•
•

impose short-term limits on the Refinery to protect the short-term NAAQS, claiming that
modeling showed such restrictions were unnecessary. Actually, Holly modeled neither
upset flare emissions nor maximum short-term emission rates, and instead relied on

•

average annual rates, underestimating impacts to short-te1m NAAQS. Still the
company's analysis showed that the Expansion threatened the one-hour N02 NAAQS.
The Director also neglected his permitting obligations by failing to clarify the application

•

ofNSPS Subpart Jato the Expansion and refusing to specify the exact conditions of this
complex rule that apply to the Refinery.
As explained below, although the Director has discretion to carry out the Clean

•

Air Act, the people of Utah have a right to every emission reduction the law requires.
Unless and until the Director carries out his NSR obligations with the requisite rigor and
basis, Utahns are not receiving the relief to which they are entitled.

•

ARGUMENT
I. The Director's Calculation of Increases in PM2.s Emissions from the Expansion Is
Fatally Flawed.

•

Because the law requires it and because PM2.s air pollution from the Expansion
will be added to our already seriously unhealthy air, it is critical that the increase in
emissions be calculated accurately and supported by the Record. As EPA states, PTE "is

•

of primary importance in establishing whether a ... modified source is major." EPA NSR
Manual A.4. Despite the importance of the undertaking, the Director's calculation

reflects an erroneous application of the law, is not supported by the Record, is "contrary

•
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•

•
to [his] prior practice," and unjustified and unfair as well as arbitrary and capricious.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(d), (4)(g), (4)(h)(iii)-(iv).

•

A. The Director's Departure from Prior Practice and Inconsistent Reliance on the
NEI Constant is Unlawful.
Abruptly diverging from prior practice, reversing positions in the middle of

•

permitting, embracing inconsistent methods in a single AO and deviating from a previous
AO determination, the Director improperly adopted a National Emission Inventory (NEI)
constant of 0.00042 lb/MMBtu - a number designed for calculating a national inventory
of air pollution- to estimate PM2.s PTE for an arbitrary subset of Holly's boilers and
heaters. E.g. IR008558-9; IR008419. 9 The Director's application of the NEI constant to
some, but not all, heaters and boilers, represents a radical departure from the

•

manufacturer's own specifications, EPA's AP-42 emission factors, Holly's BACT
analysis and the Director's 2010 AO and BACT. The NEI constant represents an
emission rate 1/20th-1/25th of the manufacture's guarantee and the standard AP-42

'

emission factor, is 20-25 times lower than what Holly called the "lowest emission limits"
in the nation and results in an estimate of total PM2.s emissions 29 times smaller than NOI
calculation. Therefore the Record does not support the adoption of this outlying emission

•

rate and confirms that the resulting PTE does not reflect the maximum capacity of the

•

heaters and boilers to emit PM2.s.

9

0.43 lb PM2.s/MMscf equals 0.00042 lb/MMBtu.

•
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1. The Director Deviated from His Prior Practice and Arrived at an Emission Rate

Out-of-Sync with Sources He Deemed Reliable.
Neither Utah, the other 49 states, nor EPA has ever used a NEI constant to
calculate PTE for NSR. E.g. IR00891 l-12; IR009043; IR007239-42. The Director' s own

•

forms and guidance establish what the "NSR Section" - the Director's permitting branch
- has long considered appropriate methods for calculating emissions, directing applicants

•

to use manufacturer specifications or AP-42 emission factors. 10 DAQ NSR Form 19,

Natural Gas Boilers and Liquid Heaters commands: "Supply calculations for all criteria
pollutants[.] Use AP-42 or Manufacturers' data to complete your calculations." Exhibit

•

Hat 3; Form 2 - Process Information at 2 (same). DAQ's Emission Calculation Sheets -

Boiler Emissions Natural Gas states: "Emission factors are from EPA AP-42[.] Most
newer boilers have smaller emission rates, if you have manufacturer's emission rates you
should use them. Please include the manufacturer's literature as a reference for why you
are using different factors." Exhibit I at 2; Boiler Emissions Fuel Oil (same). The DAQ
AP-42 Guide confirms: "EPA's AP-42 is the recommended source of air pollutant

•

emission factors for both criteria and toxic emissions." 11 Similarly, the recent Emission

Estimation Protocol for Petroleum Refineries confirms that for combustion sources, if
"direct emission monitoring or site-specific emission factors are not available . .. default

•

emission factors may be the only way to estimate emissions" and "emission factors in

10

•

An emissions factor is supposed to be a representative value that relates the quantity of
a pollutant emitted with an associated activity .
11 www.deq.utah.gov/ProgramsServices/programs/air/emissionsinventories/
ap42guide.htm
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•
AP-42 are the recommended default emission factors, and AP-42 should be consulted to
obtain the appropriate emission factors for criteria pollutants such as SO2, NOx, PM, and

•

CO." IR008715; DAQ's NOI Guide at i., v. & 2 (linking to "AP-42: EPA's Air Pollutant
Emission factors"). 12
Consistent with this longstanding approach, the Director and Holly identified
PM10/PM2.s emission rates ranging from 0.010 lb/MMBtu to 0.0075 lb/MMBtu for the
Refinery Boilers#8-11 and various process heaters based on the sources the Director's
own materials deem reliable - manufacturer's data and EPA's AP-42 emission factors -

•

and consistent with BACT and the "lowest emission rates" across the country.
The Director and Holly acknowledge that the manufacturer's guaranteed
PM10/PM2.s emission rate for Boilers#8-#l 1 is 0.010 lb/MMBtu. IR008502

•

("[M]anufacturer's data indicates a guaranteed emission factor of 0.010 lb/MMBtu");
IR003053 ("PM10/PM2s emissions based on manufacturer supplied emission rate of 0.010
lb/MMBtu" for Boiler#l 1); IR002920 (same). Holly concludes that a 0.010 lb/MMBtu
emission rate for Boiler# 11 represents BACT, IR002920, an emission limitation based on
"best available control technology," Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-2(1) (BACT
definition), and states that 0.0075 lb/MMBtu is the "lowest [boiler] emission rate[]
identified in the past four years." IR002920; IR002829 ("Emission estimates ... based on

12 "In some cases" source-specific stack tests may be used as emission factors. NOI
Guide at 2; IR008013 (EPA AP-42 Guide stating "source-specific tests or continuous
emission monitors can determine" emissions better than emission factors and giving as
alternative "emissions information from equipment vendors, particularly emissions
performance guarantees or actual data from similar equipment").

•
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•

manufacturer data, EPA . .. AP-42, fuel type, and anticipated operating hours."); IR00284 7
(same); IR003045 (using AP-42 to calculate boiler emissions); IR003049. Holly and the
Director also decide that EPA' s AP-42 emission factor for natural gas boilers - 0.0075

•

lb/MMBtu - is the most appropriate emission rate for all the other Refinery boilers .
IR008549 (applying emission rate of 7.65 lb/MMscf); IR008558.
For the process heaters, reliable sources also zero in on an emission rate -0.0075

•

lb/MMBtu. In the NOI, Holly calculates PM10/PM2.s emissions from its "new" NSPS
heaters using AP-42 emission factor 0.0075 lb/MMBtu. 13 E.g. IR003045-46; IR00304850. Holly concludes that the PM10/PM2.s emission factor that best represents BACT is the

•

rate based on manufacturer data - 0.0075 lb/MMBtu. IR002902. Holly "lists the lowest
emission rates identified in the past several years" for process heaters - all of which
hover around 0.0075 lb/MMBtu. IR002902-3. In the NOI, Holly applies AP-42 to

•

calculate process heaters/furnace PM2.s emissions. E.g. IR002847; IR003045-46;
IR003048-50. Holly and the Director also decide that EPA's AP-42 emission factor for
natural gas boilers - 0.0075 lb/MMBtu - is the most appropriate emission rate for all
other Refinery heaters. IR008549; IR008558.
Finally, the Director determined in a previous permitting decision-the 2010 AO -

•

that Boilers#9-#10 -which have been constructed- have a PM10/PM2.s emission rate of
0.005 lb/MMBtu. IR008193 (5 lb/MMscf). 14 At the time, he also determined that this
emission rate reflects BACT. Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8(1)(a) .

•

13 Sometimes expressed as 0.008 lb/MMBtu.
14 lb/MMscf is converted to lb/MMBtu by dividing by 1020. AP-42, Table 1.4-2.
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•
Thus, before departing from the position that manufacturer data and AP-42 were
the best way to calculate PTE, the Director and Holly both concluded that a
representative emission rate for the NSPS boilers and heaters, based on information long
deemed reliable, was between 0.010 lb!MMBtu and 0.005 lb/MMBtu. Holly put
complete confidence in manufacturer data to derive the appropriate emission rate - and

•

backed this up with a survey of the "lowest emission rates" in the country to settle on a
boiler emission rate of 0.010 lb/MMBtu and a heater rate of 0.0075 lb/MMBtu. The
Director applied the emission rate of 0.005 lb/MMBtu to the existing Boilers#9-10 based

•

on his determination of BACT. The rates from all these credible sources are similar in
magnitude, further underscoring their reliability.

•

Then, in sudden disregard for sources he deemed most dependable, manufacturer
guarantees and AP-42, and contrary to his 2010 AO determination and Holly' s BACT,
the Director departed from his previous position to capitulate to the 0.00042 lb/MMBtu

•

inventory constant - a mere 4% or 1125th of the manufacture-specified value for boilers
and 5% or 1120th of the guarantee for heaters. IR008502; IR002902; IR002920;
IR003053 . The inventory constant is also 20-25 times lower than what Holly deemed the

•

"best available" and "lowest" emission rate in the U.S, IR002902-3 ; IR002920, and 2025 times less than EPA's AP-42, the emission factor Holly relied on in the NOI to
calculate emissions from the "NSPS" boilers and heaters, IR002847; IR003045-46;
IR003048-50, and the basis for the emission rates applied to the remaining boiler and

•
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•
•

heaters. The Director also bypassed his own 2010 AO dete1mination ofBACT emission
rates for Boilers#9-10 and refused to require stack testing of this existing equipment,
calculating a PTE for existing boilers 8% or 1113th of his 2010 AO determination.
IR008193.
The consequences of this new math are significant. Relying on manufacturer data
and BACT, the Director's PM10/PM2.s PTE for the NSPS boilers and heaters is 19.81
tpy- alone almost twice the 10 tpy threshold that makes the Expansion a major
modification. Using the NEI constant, that number is 0.69 tpy - 3.5% or I/29th - of the
total representing the rates from manufacturer's data, AP-42, BACT and the 2010 AO .

•
•
•

Original PM10/PM2.5 Emissions "New"

Unit

(tpy) IR002834

(tpy) IR008367

Boiler#l 1

3.91

0.16

27Hl

3.25

0.18

24Hl

1.97

0.11

25Hl

1.48

0.08

20H3

1.38

0.08
0.08 16

Boilers#9-# 10 7.82 15

•
•

19.81

Total
.

Emissions

PM2.5

·r

-· - ::
... - _· ·- ·- ·- .f

.,,..

---,-

0.69
_p.•1- ~

15 IR002842.
16 IR008410.
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•
These numbers evidence an arbitrnry departure from established practice,
particularly when there is no basis in the Record to embrace an emission rate so out-of-

•

sync with the rates derived from a host credible sources - manufacturer's data, AP-42,
BACT and permit limits from other sources that reflect the lowest emission rates in the
nation. While the manufacturer's data, EPA's AP-42 emission factors, Holly's BACT
analysis and the 2010 AO all arrive at emission rates of a similar magnitude, the NEI
constant is a complete outlier, deviating radically from the emission rates both Holly and
the Director embraced at one time, and have continued to apply to the "non-NSPS"
boilers and heaters. Because the so-called NSPS boilers and heaters are not necessarily
"new," there is nothing to distinguish them from the non-NSPS boilers and heaters that
the Director believes have an emission rate considerably higher than the NEI constant.

•

IR008558 ("Holly Refinery and DAQ are less confident this older equipment can verify
these lower NEI emission factors."). Indeed, there is nothing in the Record to explain

•

why the PM2.s emission rates for one set of boilers and heaters at the refinery would be
20-25 times lower than the PM2.s emission rates for another set.
Thus, the Director's adoption of the NEI constant is subject to remand. The

•

Director's action is "contrary to [his] prior practice" and he has not "justifie[d]" the
departure "by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency." Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii). The Director's unlawful reliance

•

on future stack tests to support a calculation that must accurately reflect PTE before
construction commences subverts r.307-403 and the protections it provides. Given that
the NEI constant is so much smaller than the rates derived from sources the Director

•

30

•

•
•

deems credible, he has failed to derive a legally defensible PTE that represents "the
maximum capacity of a source to emit a pollutant[.]" Utah Admin. Code r.304-101-2.
2. The Director Did Not Provide a Fair or Reasonable Basis for His Inconsistency or
Deviation from Prior Practice. 17
The Director attempts to justify his abandonment of manufacturer' s specifications,
the 2010 AO, BACT and AP-42, but this effort fails. He contends that "NEI emission
factors can be used for estimating PTE emissions as long as Holly ... can demonstrate

•

compliance with these emissions factors through stack testing[.]" IR009216; IR00855859; IR009215-19; IR008545. However, these stack tests will not occur until well after

•

the Expansion is complete. IR008545; IR009248. As a result, the Director subverts Rule
307-403's "preconstruction" permitting process. In particular, emission offsets must be
"enforceable by the time a . . .modified source commences construction," Utah Admin.

•

Code r.307-403-4(2), and the Director must analyze "alternative sites, sizes, production
processes, and environmental control techniques" to determine if purported benefits of
the Expansion "significantly outweigh the environmental and social costs imposed as a

•

result of [the] ... modification" Id. r.307-403-10. For example, the purpose of "analysis
of alternatives," which considers, inter alia, siting the Expansion outside of the nonattainment area, and the requirement that offsets be enforceable at the commencement of

•

construction, would be frustrated if the Director tried to comply with them after the
Expansion is constructed and operating.

The ED's findings are found at ADJOl 1622-23. Pertinent Record evidence includes
England reports, IR007238-58; IR008024-44, the Director's RTC, IR009215-18, and the
SPR. IR008558-59.
17
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The Director also contends that should stack tests "indicate that the equipment
cannot meet the 0.00051 lb/MMBtu for PM10," Holly "would be required to either install

•

additional control equipment to comply with this limit, or submit an application to
reevaluate the project. .. for Major NSR applicability." IR009216; IR009215-19. This
explanation lacks merit. Under r.307-403, post-construction application of "Major NSR"

•

is too late. Holly's own BACT analysis concludes that there is no further way to reduce
PM2.s emissions from the heaters or boilers. IR002902 ("the only control technology" which was adopted - "is ... good combustion practices and use of low sulfur. .. fuel");

•

IR002919; IR008502. Therefore there is no "additional control equipment" to install.
Finally, in determining whether the NEI constant actually represents boilers and

•

heaters PM2.s emissions, the most the Director can say is "EPA believes that the current
AP-42 factors for condensable emissions are too high based on some limited data from a
pilot-scale dilution sampling method[.]" IR008558; IR009215-19. This lukewarm

•

statement - which cannot overcome the vast deviation from the relevant manufacturer's
data, 2010 AO, BACT and AP-42 - is not supported by the Record.
First, EPA experts did not advocate using NEI data as the basis for an emission

•

factor, noting the lack of "detailed supporting information," explaining that even if the
NEI numbers were more reliable, they would still have to be averaged with other data,
expressing concern that the sampled population would not be representative and pointing
to recent NSPS boiler standards as a better estimate of emissions. IR008911-12;
IR009043 (explaining an emission factor would not be valid without an underlying test
report). The Record further explains why EPA lacks faith in the NEI constants, listing

•
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•
•

the significant unce1tainty associated with the "England" factors and acknowledging that
the EPA had not reported any of the details that supposedly suppmt the agency's NEI
numbers, such as the statistical significance, associated unce1tainty or number oftests

•

that purport to back them up. IR007248 .
Second, England, Holly's own expert and author of a report on a "dilution"
sampling method that was the basis for the NEI constant, IR00891 l, acknowledged that

•

his emission estimates were not ready for use, cautioning that they: 1) "should not be
considered representative of all units within the same source category," 2) "should be
used with considerable caution;" 3) "do not necessarily represent results from a random

•

sample of an entire source category;" and, 4) "may best be used in conjunction with test
results from other units within the same source category ... to develop more robust,
reliable emission factors." IR008998-99; IR009000-01; IR007248 (showing considerable

•

uncertainty for the dilution method). 18
Third, while the Director calls these selected boilers and heaters "new," nothing in

•

the Record suggests that they are. IR008558. Actually, this equipment is subject to
NSPS, id., and therefore could be constructed or modified. 40 C.F.R. § 60.1. For
example, the mothballed FCCU25 comes "from an idled New Mexico refinery,"

•

IR002821, but has been called "new" and is subject to NSPS Subpart Ja. IR002868 .
Fomth, the Director's reliance on an unapproved PM2.s "emissions factor" based
on severely limited "NEI" data violates federal and state law. See 42 U.S.C. §7430

•

At IR008022-44, the author of these statements attempts to rehabilitate his study and
discount his previous warnings.
18
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•

•
(requiring EPA approval of emissions factors not established by EPA); IR008020
(because "AP-42 emission factors may have effects on most aspects of air pollution

•

control. .. these factors are always made available for public review and comment before
publication."). And, unlike AP-42, they have never been vetted or subject to public
notice and comment. Thus, the Director has failed to show that his departure from
previous practice is reasonable and fair. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii).
B. The Director Failed to Provide a Defensible Calculation of Emission Decreases
from Closure of the Propane Pit Flare.

•

In assessing whether the Expansion is a major modification, the Director also
authorized Holly to claim a credit for closing the PPF and therefore to subtract 2.19 tpy
from the Expansion's PM2.s emission increases. IR008564; IR008369. 19 However, the

•

absence of support and significant inconsistencies that sun-ound this number mean that
the Director's reliance on the 2.19 tpy PM2.s credit cannot be sustained.
First, 2.19 tpy of PM2.s represents an enormous level of emissions coming from a

•

hydrocarbon flaring device like the PPF, particularly in comparison to the South and
North flares, which are also hydrocarbon flaring devices, IR004473, and considerably
larger than the PPF. IR002852 (South Flare non-upset flow 17,000 scf/h); IR003176

•

(PPF 280 scf/h); IR003164 (North Flare 21 ,960 scf/h). Holly estimates that under both
upset and non-upset conditions, PM10/PM2.s emissions from the South and North flares

•

are zero (0.0). IR002865; IR002996; IR003029; IR003069. The draft PM2.s nonattainment State Implementation Plan (SIP) calculates the "actual" 2008 PM2.s emissions

19 The ED's findings are found at ADJOl 1639-40.

•
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•
•

for all Holly, Tesoro and Big West refinery flares combined as 1.44 tpy. IROO8153 .
Therefore, the "actual" emissions from the PPF eclipse the emissions from the North and
South flares and are even greater than the State's estimate of all the PM2.s emissions from
all the flares at the three local refineries, including Holly. This casts doubt on the
reliability of the 2.19 tpy PM2.s emission credit and the Director's claim that the credit
reflects actual emissions. 20

•

Second, according to the Director, the 2.19 tpy credit is accurate because Holly
used AP-42 emission factors to determine "actual" PM2.s emissions from the PPF based
on continuously monitored throughput for 2008-2009. IROO8564; IROO9218;

•

ADJOl 11O1; ADJOl 12O4 (DAQ relied on calculations "based on monitored throughput
data of propane to the flare and AP-42 emission factors."). While AP-42, 13.5, gives a
vast range of emission factors, spanning from Oto 274 µg/L depending on whether the

•

flares are not smoking or are smoking heavily, AP-42, 13.5-4, Exhibit J, the PPF "actual"
PM2.s emissions were the same for the years 2009 to 2011. This suggests the unlikely
scenario that the PPF was smoking at a consistent yearly average, somewhere between 0-

•

2 74 µg/L, for three years in a row.
Third, the AP-42 emission factors calculate soot, not PM2.s. Id. Yet, nothing in

•

the Record explains how the emission factor for soot was used to calculate PM2.s.
Without a foundation in the Record, the Director is not free to assume that all flare soot is

20 The 2.19 tpy credit is exaggerated. Using AP-42 emission factors, Utah Physicians
back-calculated the propane the PPF would have had to bum to generate 2.19 tpy PM2.s.
The answer was more than 8 million dollars' wo11h of propane each year, with constant
flaring, visible night and day. IROO8596-97.
35

•
PM2.s. Also, AP-42 factors for flares are based on gas that is 7% propane, AP-42, 13.5-5,
but the Director does not explain how "actual" emissions were derived from emission

•

factors applied to gas that is presumably 100% propane.
Fourth, the Director claims that new PPF installed in 2009 added "air assist (to
control smoke production)." IR008564; AP-42, 13.5-3 ("Soot is eliminated by adding

•

steam or air"). He also maintains that "emission estimates" for the new PPF "compared
to the flare prior to replacement did not change because reported emissions (prior to and
after replacement) were based on AP-42 ... emission factors [and] bringing the flare into

•

compliance did not adjust emissions." IR008564; IR007270-71; IR009182. However,
according to the Record, PM2.s emissions from the PPF actually increased in 2009 (from

•

1.78 tpy in 2008), when the Consent Decree required replacement of the PPF, IR007270,
and remained exactly the same-2.6 tpy - for 2009, 2010 and 201 I. IR003035. Again, it
is difficult to explain how "actual" emissions based on real monitoring data and variable
emission factors could remain static and the Record does not do so.
Fifth, Holly explains that under the Consent Decree it agreed to "[e]liminate the
routing of continuous or intermittent, routinely-generated refinery fuel gases to" the PPF.

•

IR004385; IR007951 (Consent Decree "requirement" for PPF to "eliminate all routinelygenerated gas"), but see IR009182. The Consent Decree also imposes on Holly the
obligation to "implement good air pollution control practices to minimize emissions from

•

its Flaring Devices as required by 40 C.F.R. §60.1 l(d)." IR004384. When pressed, Holly
defended the PPF's high and undocumented PM2.s emissions, claiming "[t]hat the
propane pit flare may have been flaring continuously to equate with the ... baseline is of
36

•

•
•

no consequence - it is likely that given the obvious inefficiencies ... the flare was flaring
continuously to manage the amount of gas released from the pit." ADJOl 1204.
Therefore, Holly admits that the claimed 2.19 tpy PM2.s credit likely runs afoul of the
Consent Decree and federal requirement that Holly minimize emissions.
These substantial discrepancies, at a minimum, underscore that the Record must
include a sound basis for the 2.19 tpy credit. But there is none. E.g. IR003035. Despite

•

the importance of an accurate determination of net PM2.s emissions and therefore any
credit attributable to the closure of the PPF, the Record is devoid of any specific emission
factors, conversions, equations, calculations, assumptions or monitoring data to
substantiate Holly's claimed PPF emissions. IR003035; DAQ NOI Guide ("Give
calculations of the emission estimates .... Include equations, all relevant emission factors,
and references. Explain all assumptions ... made in your calculations."). Although the

•

Director insists that the PPF PM2.s emissions were based on "actual throughput data,"
IR009218, neither he nor Holly provides those data. IR003035. As a result, for lack of
foundation, the 2.19 tons of PM2.s credit is not supported by the Record and the Director' s

•

reliance on it to conclude the Expansion is a minor modification is invalid.

•

•
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C. The Director's Estimate of the FCCU25 PM2.s Emissions Does Not Reflect the
"Maximum Capacity of the Source to Emit" PM2.s.

•

When Holly decided "to switch its crude oil feedstock source from ... Select
Canadian Crude to Utah Black Wax Crude (BWC)," IR007166, it proposed to bring a
mothballed fluidized catalytic cracking unit (FCCU25) from New Mexico, IR002821, to
process BWC in the Salt Lake non-attainment area. IR002816; IR002810. This "central"
change, constituted a "revision in the planned nature of the crude oil feed to the refinery."
IR002839. "Given the differences between these feedstock sources," Holly sought

•

authorization to install new equipment and modify existing equipment so that it could
now refine BWC. IR007168.
For example, because it will process BWC, FCCUC25 will not be equipped with a

•

hydrotreater to control emissions as the BWC "heavy residual bottoms fraction" makes
hydrotreatment "infeasible." IR002937. In keeping with this assessment, Universal Oil
Products (UOP), world leader in FCCU technology, concluded that BWC has a relatively

•

high tendency to produce coke in a FCCU. IR008598-99;21 IR004250 ("Coke is a high
carbon residue that is the final product of thermal decomposition in the condensation
process in cracking."). Feedstock with a higher "coke-bum rate" will produce more coke

•

in an FCCU, resulting in a proportional increase in PM2.s emissions. Id.; 40 C.F.R.
§60.l0la; id. §60.104a.

21The Director discounted this information, but did not endeavor to derive the degree to
which BWC would produce coke in FCCU25, IR009219, while acknowledging "different
feedstocks can result in slightly different emission profiles[.]" IR009194.

•

38

•

•

Because PM2.s emissions from FCCU25 comprise 97% of the Expansion's total
PTE, an accurate calculation of the emission increases from this unit is crucial. However,
the Director's calculation is legally and factually flawed. PTE must reflect "the

•

maximum capacity of a source to emit a pollutant[.)" Utah Admin. Code r.304-101-2. A
limitation on the capacity of the source to emit will be considered in a PTE calculation
only if the limit is "federally" and "practically enforceable." Id.; EPA NSR Manual A.4-

•

A.5. Where limitations are not enforceable, PTE is based on a unit's full capacity and
year-round operation. Id. A.9; r.304-101-2.
Here, the Director relied on an AO limit of 0.3-lb PM10/l000-lb coke burned,

•

IR009243, and Holly's "engineering calculation" of a "maximum" coke-bum rate of
6200-lbs/hr, IR003047, to arrive at a PTE PM2.s of 8.15 tpy. IR008367. However, the
8.15 tpy does not reflect the maximum capacity ofFCCU25 to emit PM2.s because there

•

is no federally and practically enforceable limitation that restricts the coke-bum rate or
the amount of coke/hr that Holly may burn. The AO does not put a 6200-lbs of coke-

•

burn/hr or similar limit on FCCU25. IR009242-43. The AO does not require Holly to
track the coke burned in FCCU25. IR009242-43. The AO does not even require a reality
check or any verification that FCCU25 will meet the 6200-lbs/hr rate that is the basis of
the PTE calculation. 22 IR009242-43. For these reasons alone, the 8.15 tpy does not meet

•

22 As established above, r.307-403 does not permit verifications of PTE after construction
but rather demands accurate PTE calculations before construction.
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•
the definition of PTE. After all, nothing in the AO constrains Holly from exceeding the
6200-lb/hr coke-bum rate. 23

•

Given that FCCU25 will process BWC and its heavy residual bottoms, it is almost
certain that the 6200-lb/hr coke-bum rate will be surpassed. Because PTE represents the
maximum capacity of a source to pollute, the Director' s PTE must estimate emissions

•

during the worst-case scenario, when the FCCU25 is emitting the maximum PM2.s it is
capable of releasing while still complying with applicable federally and practically

•

enforceable permit limitations. Here, where there are no restrictions on the feedstock that
FCCU25 may process, PTE must be calculated for "the most pollutant-generating" crude
Holly is authorized to put into the unit - the crude that will generate the most coke. As
EPA instructs:
Where raw materials or fuel vary in their pollutant-generating capacity, the most
pollutant-generating substance must be used in the potential-to-emit calculations
unless such materials are restricted by federally enforceable operational or usage
limits. Historic usage rates alone are not sufficient to establish potential-to-emit.

•

NSR Manual c.2 (Appendix).
Said another way, there is nothing in the Record to suggest that the 6200-lb/hr

•

coke-bum estimate reflects emissions from FCC25 for "the most pollutant-generating"
feedstock Holly is authorized process. 24 Indeed, the Director is remiss. Although r.307401-5(2)(a) requires Holly to describe "the nature ... and quantities of raw materials" it

23 The ED' s findings are found at ADJO 11610-11. Relevant to the inquiry are IR009219;
IR009192; IR009208; IR008052; IR009229.
24 By acknowledging "different feedstocks can result in slightly different emission
profiles," IR009194, the Director is obligated to determine PTE for the feedstock that
will generate the most PM2.s.

•
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•

proposes to process and although he cannot make a defensible permitting decision
without it, the Director does not attempt to dete1mine the impact that the "revision in the
planned nature of the crude oil feed to the refinery," IR002839, "the differences between

•

the[] feedstock sources," IR007168, will have on the PTE ofFCCU25. Rather, he rejects
the notion that he must determine the maximum capacity of FCCU25 to emit pollutants
by considering, inter alia, emissions from its "most pollutant-generating" feedstock.

•

IR009194 ("While it is true that different feedstocks can result in slightly different
emission profiles, attempting to address every possible specific chemical profile would be
impossible."). As a result, the PTE is legally insufficient and lacks a basis in the Record .

•

The Director defends his PTE by claiming that the capacity ofFCCU25 -which he
lists as an "annual average capacity of 8,500 bpd," IR009229, functions as a limitation on
PTE. IR009192; IR009208. However, the Record makes no link between the 8,500 bpd

•

capacity and a coke-burn rate of 6200-lb/hr. After all, the 8.15 tpy PTE is accurate only if
it is based on the maximum capacity of FCCU25 to emit PM2.s and therefore only if

•

FCCU25 never exceeds the 6200lb/hr coke-burn rate. And yet, the Director does not
explain why the unit's annual average barrel-per-day capacity will prevent FCCU25 from
exceeding the 6200-lb/hr rate. In contrast, the formula for calculating coke-bum rate is

•

based on a host of factors that have nothing to do with capacity. 40 C.F.R §60.104a. As
the UOP analysis and 40 C.F.R §60.104a show and as the Director admits, IR009194, the
composition of the feedstock has a direct influence on coke-burn rate. IR008599-600. PTE

•

must also reflect the maximum capacity of a source to emit pollutants, so reference to
"annual average" is not helpful.

Instead, the Director must provide the "maximum
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•

capacity" of FCCU25 and then explain how that capacity would prevent FCCU25 from
exceeding the estimated 6200-lb/hr coke-bum rate.

•

Finally, any reliance the Director placed on Holly's "calculation supp01ting the
coke-bum estimate," IR009219, is misplaced. First, the calculation is based on the 2013
operation of the existing FCCU4, IR008052, likely processing Select Crude and not on an
estimate of FCCU25 processing "the most pollutant-generating" feedstock.

Second,

FCCU4 has a hydrotreater, IR008052, and FCCU25 does not. IR002937. Holly admits
that "hydrotreating .. .lowers coke load," but makes no attempt to adjust or substantiate an

•

adjustment to its calculation to reflect that FCCU25 has no hydrotreater. IR008052.25
Third, a defensible PTE may not be based on "[h]istoric usage rates alone[.]" NSR Manual

•

c.2. Rather, PTE must represent the maximum capacity of FCCU25 to emit PM2.s as it
processes "the most pollutant-generating" feedstock. Because Holly's estimate of the
coke-burn rate depends upon historic operations at a FCCU with a hydrotreater that was

•

not processing the BWC that is incompatible with a hydrotreater, these past data points are
not sufficient to establish potential-to-emit.
II. In Approving the Expansion, the Director Did Not Meet the Requirements of Rule
307-401-8.

•

Congress created the minor source NSR program to ensure that, inter alia,
emissions from a minor modification to a major source, whether in an attainment or a

•

non-attainment area, would not interfere with the achievement or maintenance of the

25 Holly implies that the hydrotreater might reduce coke load by 10%, but the company
lacks conviction and provides no basis for the suggestion. IR008052.

•
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•

NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(C) (requiring a program "to provide for the enforcement
of the measures .. .and regulation of the modification ... of any stationary source ... as
necessary to assure that national ambient air quality standards are achieved"). As defined
by the Clean Air Act and reflected in r.307-401-8, the purpose of Utah's minor source
NSR is to protect the national air quality standards, including short-term NAAQS. Rule
307-401-8 also imposes BACT on minor modifications. As an extension of Utah's minor

•

source NSR program, the resulting BACT emission limitation must further the goal of
preventing a project's emissions from impeding progress toward attaining the NAAQS or
threatening compliance with the standards. Thus, whether he is permitting a minor or

•

major modification or deriving a BACT emission limit, the Director must restrict
emissions and apply the measures necessary to assure that NAAQS, including the shortterm standards, are achieved. 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(C) .

•
•

A. While Acknowledging the Flares Are a Considerable Source of Air Pollution,
Including S02 and NOx, the Director Fails to Protect Short-Term NAAQS from
Flare Emissions.

The two Holly flares are a significant source of air pollution. Each is predicted to
release an annual total of 120 tons of SO2, 21 tons of CO, 4 tons ofNOx and 8 tons of
VOCs during various upset events. IR008561; IR002865. During these episodes, the two

•

units have the potential to emit 240 tons of SO2 and 8 tons ofNOx, and to overwhelm
corresponding daily source-wide emission limitations imposed on the Refinery's
operations. SO2 and NOx are PM2.s precursors subject to a 1-hour NAAQS. Annual

•

upset SO2 emissions from the flares are more than double the SO2 PTE for the entire
refinery and are twice the 110.3 tpy SO2 emissions cap on the entire plant. IR009225;
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•

IROO9245. The yearly S02 emissions from the flares alone will exceed the refinery's S02
PTE and S02 emissions cap by more than 200 percent.

•

1. The AO Does Not Limit Flare Emissions.

The Director proposed to limit flare emissions by removing exemptions for flares
from the emission caps for S02 sources, IROO8568, PM 10 sources, IROO8569,26 and NOx
sources. IROO8569. However, he admits that the final AO contains "no limits on the
flares." IROO9186-87. The AO does not require a calculation of flare S02, CO, VOCs or
PM10 emissions in order to determine whether the sources covered by emission caps are

•

complying with the relevant emission limitations. IROO9245-48. For NOx, the AO puts a
source-wide limit on flare emissions by calculating annual "non-upset" emissions based

•

on "non-upset" flare throughput rates. IROO9249. 27 Although "the flares are in place as
control devices for upset conditions," IROO9186, the AO does not limit any "upset" flare
emissions for any pollutants. IROO9241-51.
2. The Director Failed Rule 307-401-8 by Neglecting to Protect Short-Term NAAQS
from Unregulated Flare Emissions.
The Record confirms that the AO does not restrict the vast majority of the flare
emissions, including the predicted annual emissions of 240 tons of S02, 42 tons of CO, 8
tons ofNOx and 16 tons ofVOCs the Director defines as upset emissions. IROO8561;
IROO2865. Because they will spike during upset conditions at the Refinery, these

•

uncontrolled emissions will have a considerable effect on short-term concentrations of

26 IROO9247-48. But upset and non-upset PM10 emissions from flares are estimated to be

zero. IR0O2865; IROO2996.
27
The AO includes a 20% opacity limit on the flares. IROO9241.

•
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SO2 and NOx, easily outstripping the daily Refinery-wide SO2 limit of 0.31 tons,
IR009245, and the daily facility-wide 2.09-ton NOx emission limitation. IR009248.
As a result, the Director cannot claim that he has met his obligation to protect

•

short-term NAAQS and comply with Rule 307-401-8(1)(b)(vii). As the Director is also
required to undertake BACT analysis for the flares, he has not fulfilled the added duty to
derive BACT emission limitations or controls that likewise protect short-term NAAQS.
Despite the magnitude of the unregulated flare emissions, there is nothing in the Record
to demonstrate how the AO will protect the short-term NAAQS. Although the Record
confirms that the unregulated flare emissions will be a substantial source of short-term

•

emissions and will reach levels considerably higher than the "controlled" Refinery
emissions, IR008561, IR002865, the Director did not impose AO limits or derive BACT
controls that adequately resolve these "upset" emissions. IR009 l 86-87; IR00924 l-5 l.

•

He did not take steps to ensure that the Expansion will not interfere with the attainment or
maintenance of the one-hour SO2 and NOx NAAQS and so violated Rule 307-401-

•

8(1)(b)(vii). Id.
3. Holly's Modeling Does Not Reflect Maximum Short-Term Emission Rates.
The Director claims that Holly conducted air quality modeling demonstrating "no

•

•

violation of short-term NAAQS would occur[.]" IR009187; IR009190.28 The Director
admits that Holly's modeling did not include any "upset emissions" from the flares.

28 The ED's findings are found at ADJOl 1583-85. Record evidence includes IR00910991; IR009186-87; IR009209; IR009186-87; IR001153-54; IR003591-97; IR002993-96;
IR009214; IR003017.
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IR009214. Translating the emission rate values for the flares from grams/second to
tons/year confirms that these rates do not include predicted upset emissions. For

•

example, the short-term and annual NOx emission rate of 0.1675 g/s for the South Flare,
IR002996; IR002999, converts to 5.82 tpy, which is the estimated non-upset annual
emission rate of South Flare, IR003069, and does not include the additional upset NOx

•

emissions of 4.0 tpy. IR008561; IR002865. Similarly, the modeled SO2 emission rate 0.0030 g/s, IR002996 - translates to 0.1043 tpy, which is the estimate of the South

•

Flare's annual SO2 non-upset emissions, IR003069, and does not include the predicted
120 tpy of SO2 the South Flare will release during upset conditions. IR00856 l;
IR002865.
By omitting the considerable upset flare emissions from its "short-term" modeling,
Holly failed to show that its emissions will not cause or contribute to a violation of shortterm NAAQS. Modeling flare upset emissions may not be required by law. IR00921415. The Director may not claim, however, that Holly's modeling demonstrates protection
of the shmt-term NAAQS unless that modeling considers the impact of the significant
flare emissions that he predicts will occur during upset conditions.

•

The ED further states that "Holly's emission modeling analysis contemplated ...
maximum emissions ... on a lb/hr basis, thereby ensuring that any short-term spikes in
emissions were accounted for ... and would not cause exceedances." ADJOI 1584 (citing

•

IR002993-96). Examination of the inputs Holly used for its short-term modeling,
IR002993-96, shows that the ED is incorrect. The emission rates Holly modeled do not
represent "maximum emissions" or "sh01t-term spikes" at all. The inputs for Holly's

•
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short-term model represent annual PTE or annual AO emission limits in tons per year
spread evenly over the approximately 31.5 million seconds there are in a year. By using
these values, Holly assumes that there will be no variation in emissions and that
emissions from any given unit will hold steady over every second of the year.
Comparing Holly's "PTE Emission Rates - Short-Term" model, IR002994-96,
with its "PTE, NO2Annual Emission Rates" model, IR002997-99, provides the first
evidence that Holly's short-term modeling does not represent maximum emission rates.
In both models, for each emission "source," the inputs in the columns labeled "NOx g/s"
are identical. The two models rely on the same NOx emission rates. There is no

•

difference between the NOx values used for the short-term and annual models. In reality,
maximum short-term emission rates, which represent spikes in emission rates, are
substantially higher than annual emissions averaged over 365 days. Holly's short-term

•

model merely reflects annual emission rates, which smooth out any variability, and not
the sharp increases in emissions that occur on a short-term basis.

•

The second clue is that, when converted to tons per year, the inputs for the shortterm model equate to annual emission limits or estimates of annual emissions (PTE). For
example, the purported short-term SO2 emission rate for the FCCU25 and FCCU4

•

scrubbers - 0.5091g/s, IR002994-95 - equals 17.7 tpy, which is the AO annual emission
limit on these units. IR009245. The modeled short-term SO2 and NOx emission rates for
the South Flare, IR002996, translated to tons per year, equal the estimate of the South

•

Flare's annual non-upset SO2 and NOx emissions. IR003069. This again shows that the
inputs for the short-term model reflect annual emission rates held constant over the year,
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•
thereby masking any spikes in emissions. The short-term model does not represent the
maximum emission rates that result from the operations of the facility over the short-

•

term.
Thus, Holly's short-term model does not consider emission spikes or variability in
emissions. As a result, the model cannot demonstrate that, despite the emission increases

•

authorized by the AO, the short-term NAAQS will be maintained. This is pa1iicularly
true because Holly's faulty modeling shows that the Expansion presents a real threat to
the short-term NAAQS. Without including upset flare emissions and with modeling

•

maximum short-term emissions, Holly concludes that 95% of the NO2 NAAQS will be
consumed as a result of the project - leaving a very small margin before the standard will

•

be exceeded. IR003596. According to the model, the total predicted concentration of
NO2 as a result of the Expansion is 178 µg/m3, just under the one-hour NO2 NAAQS of
188 µg/m 3 . Id. Modeling of either the considerable upset flare emissions or maximum
short-term emissions would almost certainly confirm an impermissible violation of the
NAAQS.
Nor may Holly assume that there is no variability in the emissions from any of the

•

Refinery units or that maximum sh01i-term emissions can be estimated by equating them
to annual emissions. The Director has acknowledged that emissions from the refineries,
including Holly, are highly variable, explaining that " [a]fter reviewing several years' ...

•

of operational records . .. for emission estimates/calculations and production levels," the
Director "agreed with refinery officials that there was significant variability from day to

•
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•

day and from year to year. Therefore, the refineries were allowed maximum never-to-be
exceeded daily limits of PM10, SO2, NOx based on the apparent variability." IR009187. 29
The Director's own modeling guidance also prohibits Holly from making such an

•

assumption, stating that the basis of a modeling analysis of maximum short-term
concentrations30 must be sh011-term emission rates based on short-term limits specified in
the AO:
Modeled emission rates should be representative of the averaging period(s) for
which impacts are being determined. The emission rate used in the modeling
analyses to establish maximum short-term concentrations (24 hours or less) should
be representative of the pending AO's permitted maximum allowable emission
level for that time period[. ]31

•

IR007802; NSR Manual C.45 (for NAAQS compliance demonstrations, "the emissions
rate for the proposed ... modification must reflect the maximum allowable operating
conditions as expressed by the federally enforceable emissions limit, operating level, and

•

operating factor for each applicable pollutant and averaging time.").
Thus, the Director admits that refinery emissions are variable. He may not argue,

•

therefore, that Holly need not model maximum short-term emission rates to determine
potential exceedances of the NAAQS. His own guidance underscores that, particularly
where variability exists, compliance with the one-hour NAAQS must be based on

•

•

maximum one-hour emission rates determined by federally enforceable permit limits .

29 This statement predates the designation of the one-hour SO2 and NOx NAAQS.
30 These are the concentrations that would be compared to the short-term NAAQS.
31
The Record cannot show that Holly "routinely operates at a significantly lower
emission rate." There are no federally enforceable sh011-term operating limits on the
Refinery. Holly's modeling did not address upset emissions from the flares which
indicate that the Refinery operates at a higher emission rate during these frequent upsets.
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4. Rule 307-107 Does Not Regulate Upset Flare Emissions.
The Director maintains that "the flares are in place as control device for upset

•

conditions," IR009186, and "[fJlare emissions during malfunction/upset conditions are
regulated through R307-107 (ITA Condition I[].3)." IR009211; IR009186-87; IR009227
(Holly "shall comply with UAC R307-107" which addresses "breakdowns"). However,

•

Rule 307-107 does not apply to upset emissions from the Holly flares. Therefore, the
Director is mistaken to maintain that Rule 307-107 "regulates" flares or protects short-

•

term NAAQS from upset flare emissions.
Rule 307-107, Utah's "Breakdown Rule," provides that emissions from "upsets"
or "malfunctions" are not be exempt from determining compliance with AO terms and
conditions. A source must report to the Director any "breakdown," including information
on the quantity of emissions released as a consequence of the "incident." Utah Admin.
Code r.307-101-2(1). The rule revolves around the meaning of"breakdown," which

•

means "any malfunction ... start-up [or] shutdown, which will result in ... emissions in
excess of those allowed by approval order or Title R307." Id. r.307-101-2. Under Rule
307-107, a source need only report a "breakdown" and a "breakdown" occurs only when
an incident results in excess emissions or emissions in excess of the terms and conditions
ofanAO. Id.
As the Director acknowledges, at the Refinery, there are no limitations on upset

•

flare emissions, IR009186-87, and no AO emission limits apply when the flares are
operating under "upset" conditions. IR009245-50. Therefore, the Breakdown Rule will
never apply to the Refinery flares because there can be no "excess emissions" and

•
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•

therefore no "breakdown" when the flares are operating under upset conditions. Any
emissions from the flares would not be in excess of those allowed by the AO, because the
AO allows unlimited "upset" emissions from the flares. Without excess emissions, there

•

is no breakdown, no reporting requirement and Rule 307-107 does not apply. Because
Rule 307-107 does not serve to prohibit or limit upset flare emissions, it does not
"regulate" them and does not protect short-term NAAQS from upset flare emissions.

•

B. The Director Fails to Protect Short-Term NAAQS from Refinery Emissions .

For the same reasons that he has failed to protect short-term NAAQS from the
upset flare emissions, the Director has neglected his duty to ensure that the Refinery

•

emissions do not impede attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS. The Director has
not imposed short-term emission limits on the Refinery emission limits. His oversight is
particularly telling because there are no hourly source-wide short-term emission limits,

•

which the Director deemed necessary to protect the NAAQS : "Protection of the
NAAQS . . .is not achieved on an emission unit-by-emission unit basis ... but rather on a

•

source-by-source basis." IR009186.32 The source-wide emission limitations on SO2 and
NOx are expressed in tons per day and a 365-day rolling average, not with hourly
averaging times. IR009245; IR009248. Combined with upset flare emissions, Refinery
emissions that are not subject to short-term limits will exceed the NAAQS.

32 Of course, many emission units make up a single source.
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C. The AO is Invalid Because it Is Mired in ·confusion and Conflicting Statements
and Does Not Specify Applicable Subpart Ja Terms and Conditions.

•

New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) Subpart Ja applies to Refinery flares
that have been constructed, reconstructed or modified since June 24, 2008. 40 C.F.R.
§60.lO0a(b). Under r.307-401-8(5), the Director may not issue an AO unless and until he

•

determines that the source will comply with, inter alia, the NSPS. Utah Admin. Code
r.307-401-S(l)(b)(vi); r.307-210. In addition, citizens are guaranteed the right to
comment on a proposed AO and have their comments addressed by the Director, r.307-

•

401-7, and to enforce an AO' s terms and conditions in court. 42 U.S.C. §7604.
Despite these decrees, it remains unclear if and how Subpart Ja applies to the
Refinery and its South and North flares. For example, the Director's list of "applicable

•

programs" does not specify that Subpart Ja applies to the flares. IR008483-89. While the
Director claims that ITA section III states that NSPS Subpart Ja does pertain to both the
North and South flares, IR009183, 33 that section references Subpart Ja "for Petroleum

•

Refineries for Which Construction, Reconstruction, or Modification Commenced After
May 14, 2007." IR008477. The date that triggers the application of Subpart Ja for flares

•

is June 24, 2008. 40 C.F.R. §60.l00a(b).34
The Director also claims "the North Flare is not being modified as part of' the
Expansion and so is "outside the scope of this permit action," IR009183, suggesting he

•

33

There are statements in the Record suggesting that Subpart Ja applies to Refinery
emission units, including the flares. E.g. IR0085 l 7; IR009246; IR002866-67; IR00286869. These statement are not clear or specific and do not explain what the Director
considers to be "new."
34
But see IR009186-87.

•
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has not made a dete1mination whether Subpait Ja applies to this flare. The Director
suggests that he will impose on each "new fuel gas combustion device" - without
defining the terms - the Subpait Ja sh01t-term 162 ppmv I-hS limit for the fuel gas,

•

IR008572, but does not include that limit in the AO. IR009241. He instead lists a daily
60 ppmv H2S concentration averaged over 365 days. IR009246. 35 The Director also
refuses to include in the AO the particular Subpart Ja terms and conditions applicable to

•

the refinery, disagreeing with a comment contending that he must do so. IR009212. The
AO reflects this approach, for example, by failing to list the exact provisions of Subpart
Ja applicable to the flares, such as the a short-term 162 ppmv I-hS limit for the fuel gas .

•

Particularly given the significant confusion around the applicability of the
provision, the Director's decision to leave Subpait Ja terms and conditions out of the AO
is untenable. Utah Physicians challenges any practitioner to decipher Subpart Ja and
determine with any assurance how it applies to the Refinery and flares. The rule includes
ten extensive sections, replete with equations, definitions, technical terms, cross

•

references, options and alternatives. 40 C.F.R. §60.100a-109a. Unless the Director
specifies the applicable provisions, terms and conditions in the AO, it is impossible for
citizens to know - much less comment on - what the Director means if he maintains that

•

Subpart Ja applies to the Refinery, whether he has met his r.307-401-8(5), 8(l)(b)(vi) and
r. 307-210 obligations or even if Holly and the Director agree on the application of the

provision to the source. The Director's approach effectively prohibits the public from

•

35

The AO should include both the Subpatt J a short-term limit and this long-term limit.
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•
exercising the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision as it is almost impossible to enforce
a permit as vague as the AO in the context of confusion that surrounds the proper

•

application of Subpart Jato the Refinery.

D. The Record Does Not Support the Director's Determination that the North Flare
Has Not been Modified by the Expansion or Is Exempt from BACT.

•

The Director insists that "the North Flare is not being modified as part of" the
Expansion and thus that any application of Subpait Jato the flare is outside the present
permitting process. IR009183. The Record does not support this position. Actually,

•

Subpait Ja applies to any flare that has been modified since June 24, 2008. 40 C.F .R. §
60.lO0a(b). "Modification" is defined as including "any new piping ... physically
connected to the flare for venting or emergency relief' or an alteration "to increase the

•

flow capacity of the flare." 40 C.F.R. § 60.lO0a(c). Here, the Director acknowledges that
the South Flare "will be reconstructed and reconfigured as part of the heavy crude
processing project." IR002825. In 2013, Holly clarified that "the decommissioned south

•

flare will be replaced with a new flare" and "currently, all gases are routed to the north
flare." IR007168. In 2008, during various shut-down events, the average flowrate to the

•

South Flare was 40,080 scf/h, while the average flowrate of the North Flare was 21,960
scf/h. IR001261 -67. To route all South Flare gases to the smaller North Flare - as the
reconstruction of the South Flare had entailed - requires an alteration to increase the flow

•

capacity of the North Flare, and likely new piping, thereby triggering Subpart Ja. 40
C.F.R. § 60.l00a(c)

•
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•

For the same reasons, the modification to the North Flare means that the Director
must apply BACT. Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8(1)(a). BACT is "an emissions
limitation ... based on the maximum degree of reduction for each air contaminant which

•

would be emitted from any proposed ... modification[.]" Id. r.307-401-2(1). A
modification is " any planned change in a source which results in a potential increase of
emission." Utah Admin. Code r.307-101-2. As a result of the Expansion, both the

•

refinery and the N011h Flare will be "changed" and will experience a potential increase in
emissions. IR007168; IR009225. Therefore, BACT applies to the North Flare. 36
CONCLUSION

•

Based on the legal deficiencies identified above, Utah Physicians asks that the AO
be revoked, vacated and remanded with instrnctions that the Director undertake a
defensible calculation of the emission increases and decreases to determine whether the

•

Expansion is a major modification subject to Rule 307-403. Revocation and remand is
also warranted because the Director has failed to assure that the Refinery will not impede

•

•
36

•

The Director's statements that the North Flare has not been modified and therefore is
not subject to BACT, IR009189; IR007999; IR008516-17, are not compelling. He does
not explain how the larger flare could be shut down and all its gases rerouted to the
smaller flare without the N011h Flare undergoing a physical change or change in
operations resulting in an emission increase.
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•
attainment or maintenance of the short-term NAAQS and has not properly applied
Subpart Jato the Expansion.

•

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of September, 2016.
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Tab A
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
AO-Approval Order
BACT - Best Available Control Technology

•

CO - Carbon monoxide
EPA - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FCCU - Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit
H2S - Hydrogen Sulfide

•

HAPs - Hazardous Air Pollutants
ITA - Intent to Approve
NAAQS - National Ambient Air Quality Standards

•

NOi - Notice oflntent
NSPS -New Source Performance Standards
NSR - New Source Review

•

NO2 - Nitrogen Dioxide
NOx - Nitrous Oxides
NNSR- Non-attainment New Source Review

•

PAHs - Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
PM10 - Coarse Particulate Matter (10 Micrometers in Diameter or Smaller)
PM2.s - Fine Particulate Matter (2.5 Micrometers in Diameter or Smaller)

•

PSD - Prevention of Significant Deterioration
PTE - Potential to Emit
SO2 - Sulfur dioxide

•
•

SOx - Sulfur Oxides
SPR - Source Plan Review

•
SSM - Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction
UAPA - Utah Administrative Procedures Act

•

VOCs - Volatile Organic Compounds

UNITS

bpd - barrels per day
lb/hr - pounds per hour
lb/MMBtu - pounds per million British thermal units

•

ppmv - parts per million by volume
scf - standard cubic feet
tpd - tons per day

•

tpy - tons per year
µg/m 3 - micrograms/cubic meter

•
•
•
•
•

Tab B

•

Determinative Law

R307-401-8. Approval Order.
(1) The director will issue an approval order if the following conditions have been
met:

•

(a) The degree of pollution control for emissions, to include fugitive emissions
and fugitive dust, is at least best available control technology. When determining
best available control technology for a new or modified source in an ozone
nonattainment or maintenance area that will emit volatile organic compounds or
nitrogen oxides, best available control technology shall be at least as stringent as
any Control Technique Guidance document that has been published by EPA that
is applicable to the source.
(b) The proposed installation will meet the applicable requirements of:
(i) R:307-403, Permits: New and Modified Sources in Nonattainment Areas

•

and Maintenance Areas;
(ii) R:307-405, Permits: Major Sources in Attainment or Unclassified Areas
(PSD);
(iii) R:307-406, Visibility;

•

(iv) R307-410, Emissions Impact Analysis;
(v) R:307-420, Permits: Ozone Offset Requirements in Davis and Salt Lake
Counties;
(vi) R:307-210, National Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources;

•

(vii) National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards;
(viii) R:307-214, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
(ix) R:307-110, Utah State Implementation Plan; and

(x) all other provisions of R:307.

•

(2) The approval order will require that all pollution control equipment be
adequately and properly maintained.
(3) Receipt of an approval order does not relieve any owner or operator of the
responsibility to comply with the provisions of R307 or the State
Implementation Plan.

•

•

(4) To accommodate staged construction of a large source, the director may
issue an order authorizing construction of an initial stage prior to receipt of

detailed plans for the entire proposal provided that, through a review of general
plans, engineering reports and other information the proposal is determined
feasible by the director under the intent of R307. Subsequent detailed plans will
then be processed as prescribed in this paragraph. For staged construction
projects the previous determination under R307-401-8(1) and (2) will be
reviewed and modified as appropriate at the earliest reasonable time prior to
commencement of construction of each independent phase of the proposed
source or modification.
(5) If the director determines that a proposed stationary source, modification
or relocation does not meet the conditions established in (1) above, the director
will not issue an approval order.
R307-403-3. Review of Major Sources of Air Quality Impact.
Every major new source or major modification must be reviewed by the director
to determine if a source will cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS.
The determination of whether a source will cause or contribute to a violation of
the NAAQS will be made by the director as of the new source's projected startup date. He will make an analysis of the proposed new source's operation data
using the best information and analytical techniques available.

•
•

•
•

****
(3) If the director finds that the emissions from a proposed source in a
nonattainment area would contribute to an existing violation of a national
ambient air quality standard at the time of the source's proposed start-up date,
approval shall be granted if and only if:
(a) the new source meets an emission limitation which is the Lowest
Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) for such source and
(b) the applicant has certified that all existing major sources in the State,

•

owned or controlled by the owner or operator (or by any entity controlling,
controlled by or under common control with such owner or operator) of the
proposed source, are in compliance with all applicable rules in R307, including
the Utah Implementation Plan requirements or are in compliance with an
approved schedule and timetable for compliance under the Utah
Implementation Plan, R307, or an enforcement order, and that the source is
complying with all requirements and limitations as expeditiously as practicable.
(c) emission offsets to the extent provided in R307-403-4, 5 and 6 are
sufficient such that there will be reasonable further progress toward attainment
of the applicable NAAQS.

•

•
•

•

(d) the emission offsets provide a positive net air quality benefit in the affected
area of nonattainment .
(e) there is an approved implementation plan in effect for the pollutant to be
emitted by the proposed source.
(4) A source which is locating outside a nonattainment area or the Salt Lake
City and Ogden maintenance areas for carbon monoxide and which causes the
significant increments in (1) above to be exceeded in the nonattainment or
maintenance area is subject to the requirements of (3) above.
R307-403-4. Offsets: General Requirements.

•

(1) Emission offsets must be obtained from the same source or other sources
in the same nonattainment area except that the owner or operator of a source
may obtain emission offsets in another nonattainment area if:
(a) the other area has an equal or higher nonattainment classification than the
area in which the source is located; and

•

(b) emissions from such other area contribute to a violation of the national
ambient air quality standard in the nonattainment area in which the source is
located or which is impacted by the source.

(2) Any emission offsets shall be enforceable by the time a new or modified
source commences construction, and, by the time a new or modified source
commences operation, any emission offsets shall be in effect and enforceable
and shall assure that the total tonnage of increased emissions of the air
pollutant from the new or modified source shall be offset by an equal or greater
reduction, as applicable, in the actual emissions of such air pollutant from the
same or other sources in the area.

•
•
•

(3) Emission reductions otherwise required by the federal Clean Air Act or
R307, including the State Implementation Plan shall not be creditable as
emission reductions for purposes of any offset requirement. Incidental emission
reductions which are not otherwise required by federal or state law shall be
creditable as emission reductions if such emission reductions meet the
requirements of (1) and (2) above .
(4) Sources shall be allowed to offset, by alternative or innovative means,
emission increases from rocket engine and motor firing, and cleaning related to
such firing, at an existing or modified major source that tests rocket engines or
motors under the conditions outlined in 42 U.S.C. 7503(e) (Section 173(e)(1)
through Section 173(e)(4) of the federal Clean Air Act as amended in 1990).

•
R307-403-10. Analysis of Alternatives.

The owner or operator of a major new source or major modification to be
located in a nonattainment area or which would impact a nonattainment area
must, in addition to the requirements in R307-403, submit with the notice of
intent an adequate analysis of alternative sites, sizes, production processes, and
environmental control techniques for such proposed source which
demonstrates the benefits of the proposed source significantly outweigh the
environmental and social costs imposed as a result of its location, construction,
or modification. The director shall review the analysis. The analysis and the
director's comments shall be subject to public comment as required by R307401-7. The preceding shall also apply in Salt Lake and Davis Counties for new
major sources or modifications which are considered major for precursors of
ozone, including volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides.

•

•

•

•
•

•
•
•

•

Tab C

•
•

BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
In the Matter of:
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN101230041-13
Holly Refining & Marketing Company Woods Cross, LLC
Heavy Crude Processing Project
Project No.N10123-0041

•

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND PROPOSED ORDER
REGARDING PETITIONERS'
MOTION REQUESTING STAY OF
APPROVAL ORDER
Administrative Law Judge Bret F. Randall
March 25, 20 14

This matter is before me pursuant to appointment by the Executive Director of the Utah
Depa11ment of Environmental Quality dated January 9, 2014. The appointment charges me to

•

conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code
Ann., § 19-1-301.5 and Utah Adm in . Code R305-7.

Procedural Background

•

On November 18, 2013 , the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality ("Director")
issued approval order DAQE-AN 101230041-13 (Project Number N 10123-0041) (the "AO" or
" Permit") to Holly Refining and Marketing Company, Woods Cross LLC (" Holly"), authorizing
the construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude Processing Project (" Expansion Project").
On December 18, 201 3, Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and FRIENDS of
Great Salt Lake (collectively "Utah Physicians") filed a Request for Agency Action seeking

•

administrative review of the AO, pursuant to Utah Code§§ 19-1-301.5 and 63G-4-201(1)(b), (3)
and Utah Admin. Code R305-7-203.
On December 24, 2013, Utah Physicians filed a motion and supporting memorandum
requesting a stay of the AO, pursuant to Utah Admin . Code R305-7-217 and Utah Code Ann.§

•
•

19-1-301.5. However, because Utah Physicians had not been granted party status and no ALJ
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•
had yet been appointed to this matter, the ti me for responding to the motion to stay did not begin
to run at that time.
On January 16, 2014, I entered an Order on Petition to Intervene, provisionally granting

•

intervention to Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and Friends of Great Salt Lake
(collectively, "Petitioners"). On the same date, I entered a Notice of Further Proceedings.
Petitioners fi led a Corrected Motion and Memorandum Requesting Stay on January 2 1,

•

20 14 ("Stay Motion"). I deemed that the date of the filing of the corrected motion for stay
triggered a new response period for Respondents. The Stay Motion is the subject of the present
Proposed Order.

•

Pursuant to the Utah Code, whenever a motion to stay is fi led in a permit review
adjudicative proceeding, "the administrative law judge shall: (i) consider a party's motion to
stay a permit during a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and (ii) submit a proposed

•

determination on the stay to the executive director." Section 19- l-301.5(1 5)(c), Utah Code Ann.
Following briefing on the Stay Motion, I granted Respondents' motion for oral argument,
with oral argument being held on March 6, 201 4. All parties appeared and participated in oral
argument, which was of record through a court reporter.
Having heard argument on the Stay Motion, and being fully advised in the premises, and
pursuant to Section 19- 1-30 1.5( 15)(c), Utah Code Ann., this tribunal enters the following
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and proposed determination that the
Executive Director of the Utah Depa1tment of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") deny Petitioners'
Stay Motion for the reasons set forth herein.

•
•
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•

•
FINDINGS OF FACT

•

Regulatory Background

I.

Air pollution is harmful to human health and to the environment. [JR at 009 140-

48; 1Rat009139-45 ; 1R at009144-45; 1Rat009 145-47.]

•

2.

In enacting the Utah Air Conservation Act, the Utah Legi slature declared: " It is

the policy of this state and the purpose of [the Utah Air Conservation Act] to achieve and
maintain levels of air quality ,,vh ich will protect human health and safety, and to the greatest

•

degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the comfort and
conven ience of the people, promote the econom ic and socia l development of this state, and
fac ilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state." Section 19-2-1 0 I (2), Utah Code

•

Ann .
3.

The Utah Legislature further declared that the "purpose" of the Utah Air

Conservation Act is to "(a) provide for a coordinated statewide program of ai r pollution

•

prevention, abatement, and control; (b) provide for an appropriate distribution of responsibilities
among the state and local units of government; (c) fac il itate cooperation across jurisdictional
lines in dea ling with problems of air pollution not confined within single jurisdictions; and (d)

•

provide a framework within which air qual ity may be protected and consideration given to the
pub Iic interest at alI levels of plann ing and development within the state." Section 19-2-1 0 I(4),
Utah Code Ann.

•

4.

Similarly, in enacting the Clean Air Act, the Congress found, among other things:
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air po llution brought about by
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles,
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including

•
3

•
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•
injury to agricu ltural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; [and]
(3) that a ir pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments ... .
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a).
5.

Congress also stated that the " primary goal" of the Clean Air Act is to "encourage

•

•

or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ... for pollution
prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c).

Permit Chronology
6.

In May of 2012, Holly Refining & Marketing Company - Woods Cross, LLC

("Ho lly") submitted a notice of intent ("NOl'') to DAQ requesting an approval order to expand
its Woods Cross refinery and modernize certa in equipment in a way that allowed Holly to

•

process an additional 20,000 barrels per day of black ..yax crude from the Uintah Basin in eastern
Utah (" May NOi"). [May NOi at IR000049-00I 108.]
7.

In response to DAQ's request to provide additional information, Holly re-

•

submitted its NOi in July of 20 12 ("July NOi" ). [July NOi at 1R002798-003590.]
8.

Following its technical and legal evaluation of the July NOi and related evidence,

DAQ released for public comment an Intent to Approve ("First ITA"), dated November 28,

•

2012. The First !TA included a draft Approval Order. [First ITA at IR00 1967-00 I 996.]
9.

During the initial 60-day public comment period, DAQ received comments from

Western Resource Advocates on beha lf of Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment ("UPHE")

•

and Friends of Great Salt Lake (" Friends") [IR004007-004035], Blaine Rawson on behalf of
Mark J. Hall [IR004202-0042 l 7], Alexander Sagady on behalf of UPHE [IR009046-009 l 35],

•
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•

•
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") [IR00400 1-004005], and Holly [IR003757-

•

003910].
10.

In April 2013, Holly submitted a new netting analysis in a revised N Oi. [Rev ised

NOi at IR007335-007395.]

•

1 I.

In addition to certain other changes, the Revised NOI estimated PM 2.5 emissions

from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers based on the EPA's Nationa l Emission Inventory
(''NEI") data. [Id.]

•

12 .

Following its technical and legal evaluation of the Revised NOI and related

evidence, DAQ released, on June 5, 2013, for a second public comment period an Intent to
Approve document ("Second ITA") and a Source Plan Review ("SPR"). [Second ITA at

•

IR007498-007499, SPR at IR008480-008575.]
13.

On July 25, 2013, DAQ received comments on the draft approval order from

Western Resource Advocates on behalf UPHE [IR007842-007997], Blaine Rawson on behalf of

•

Mark J. Hall [IR008579-008602], A lexander Sagady on beha lf of Petitioners [IR009046009135], the EPA [IR007840-00784 I], and Holly [IR0076 I 3-007836].
14.

•

Following its review and evaluation of the foregoing information and comments,

on November 6, 2013, DAQ requested additional information from Holly that DAQ believed
was necessary in order to full y consider the pending comments a nd evidence. Holly responded
to DAQ' s request for additional information on November 7, 2013. [IR008021 , IR008022-

•

0052.]
15.

After considering the supplementa l information provided by Ho lly, on November

18, 2013 , DAQ issued Holly a new approval order authorizing the construction of the
Modernization Proj ect ("Holly AO"). [Ho lly AO at IR009223-009254.]

•
5

•
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16.

Concurrently therewith, DAQ issued a Response to Comments Memorandum

("Response Memorandum") that addressed the comments made during the public comment
periods, expl ained DAQ's response to those comments, and, where appropriate, described how

•

the comments had been incorporated into the Holly AO. [Response Memorandum at 1R009174009222.]
17.

On December 18, 20 13, Petitioners ti led their Request for Agency Action. On

•

January 22, 2014, Petitioners tiled their Amended Motion and Memorandum Requesting a Stay
of the Approval Order. Oral argument was held on the Stay Motion on March 6, 2014.
DAO's Permit Review

18.

In their Stay Motion, Petitioners challenge three po1i ions of the Holly AO: (I ) the

use of the NE] emission factors to estimate PM 2.5 emissions from Holly's new gas-fired heaters
and boilers; (2) the calculated coke burn rate for Holly's proposed Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit

•

("FCC Unit 25"), and (3) the calculated reduction of PM2.5 emissions from the removal of
Holly's existing propane pit flare. [Stay Motion, p. 15-37.]
19.

DAQ determined that use of the NEI emission factors to calculate PM25

•

emissions from the new heaters and boilers was appropriate because ( I) there was substantial
evidence in the record supporting the accuracy of these emission factors to estimate PM
emissions from gas-fired heaters and boilers, as explained in the two reports from Glenn England

•

[See Glen England Reports at IR007238-007258, IR008024-008044; see also Response
Memorandum at IR0092 15-0092 16]; (2) DAQ had imposed a stack testing requirement in the
Holly AO to verify that the emission factors were an accurate representation of actual emissions

•

[Response Memorandum at IR008 I 29-008 131] ; and (3) DAQ imposed a limit derived from the
NEI factors into the final Holly AO that is binding on Holly during all operations of the Woods
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•

•
Cross refinery [Holly AO, Section 11.8.7.a.2 at IR009248; see also Response Memorandum at

•

lR0092 17] .
20.

DAQ determined that regardless of whether there were other alternative emission

factor calculations for heaters and boilers that yielded higher estimates, Holly would be subject

•

to an enforceable PM 10 emission limit of 0.0005 I lb/MM Btu, derived from the NEI emission
factors. [See Response Memorandum IR008 I 30.] DAQ reasoned that any failure by Holly to
comply with that emission limit would result in compliance violations, which would ensure that

•

Holly would not contribute a significant increase of PM as a resu lt of the expansion. [Id.]
21.

DAQ determined that 40 C.F.R. § 60.14 did not require the use of the older AP-42

emission factors, as Petitioners argued, to calculate Holly' s PM 2.s emissions from the heaters and

•

boilers because that regulation only applies to determining applicabi lity of the New Source
Performance Standards, "which [is] separate from the New Source Review regulations that are
relevant to this permitting process." [Response Memorandum at IR008130.] Moreover "EPA

•

guidance states that sources other than the AP-42 emission factors may be used in determining
emissions for PSD/NSR emissions ... including ' [e]mission factors from technical literature."'
[Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting EPA New Source Review Workshop Manual,

•

Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, draft dated October
1990 at A.22).]
22.

•

With respect to the PM 2_5 em ission reduction of 2. 19 tons per year ("tpy") from

the decommissioning of Holly's propane pit flare, which Petitioners claimed was inaccurately
high, the Revised NOI reflects that Holly and DAQ calculated this emission reduction using the
actual emission inventory data on file at DAQ for the years 2008 and 2009. [Rev ised NOI at
IR007339; Response Memorandum at IR0092 18 ("flare emi ssions came from the UDAQ

•
7

•
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•
inventory record for reported actual emissions from 2008-2009 based on 259 MMBtu/hr and
actual throughput data").]
23.

As to the coke burn rate for Holly's proposed FCC Unit 25, which Petitioners

•

claimed was inaccurately low, the emission calculations Holly provided to DAQ indicate that the
rate was calculated based on actual emission data from the current FCC Unit 4, a larger unit than
the proposed FCC Unit 25, and thus was a conservatively high estimate of expected em issions

•

from the FCC Unit 25. [IR008052; see also Holly AO at IR009227-009229 (The FCC Unit 4
processes 8,880 barrels per day ("bpd") while the proposed FCC Unit 25 can only process 8,500
bpd.]
24.

Regard less of the coke burn rate, DAQ concluded that the FCC Unit 25 is subject

to a specific PM 10 limit of 0J0lb/ 1000 lb. of coke burned, which is limited by the 8,500 bpd
operating capacity, and is also subject to the overall PM JO emission cap of 47.5 tpy and 0.13 tons
per day ("tpd") for combustion sources. [Response Memorandum at IR0092 I9.] " If these
limitations are not met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies the problem with
additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these limits." [Id.]
25.

DAQ rejected Petitioners' calculation of coke burn based on the Universal Oil

Products yield estimates because they "provided no documents or primary data to support or
detail [] which estimate, if any, was used to derive the suggested range of coke burn estimates."

•

[Response Memorandum at IR0092 I 9.] "Based on UDAQ's technical experience and
expertise," DAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is a fair and reasonable estimate of the
quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25." [Id.]

8
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•

•
Impacts of Modernization Project Construction

•

26 .

T he Conrad Jenson Declaration submitted with Holly's opposition to the Stay

Motion ("Jenson Declaration") is the most recent evidence of Holly's present construction
schedule. In light of the procedural history recited above, the earlier construction timetable

•

estimates are deemed to be updated by the facts as set forth in the Jenson Declaration, which are
credited and treated as true for the purposes of this proposed order.
27.

•

be fully installed and operational until the fall of 2015. [Exhibit A to Holly's Opposition to
Petitioners Motion Requesting Stay of Approval Order~ 9.]
28.

•

According to the Jenson Declaration, Holly's first phase of construction will not

" [D]uring the construction of Phase I, there will not be any increase in emissions

until completion of Phase l in the fall of2015." [Id. ~ 10.]
29.

As confirmed by the pa1ties during oral argument, this permit review adjudicative

proceeding is expected to be fully briefed by July 9, 2014. [See Corrected Stipulated Order

•

Regarding Response to Request for Agency Action and Subsequent Deadlines, dated February
19, 2014.] Oral argument likely will be scheduled before the end of July 2014 and a
recommended order w ill likely be prepared for the Executive Director as soon as possible after

•

oral argument, certainly by the end of September 2014. [See Stay Motion Hearing Transcript at
p. 14-1 6.] During thi s time, it is undisputed that there w ill be no increase in emissions from the
Holly refinery due to the Modernization Project, and no emissions for at least a year beyond the

•

proposed adjud icative proceeding timeline. [Jenson Declaration~ 1O.]
30.

Ho lly has already incurred approximately $48,000,000 in costs for preliminary

activ ities in preparation for construction. [Id. ~ 6.]

•
9

•
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•
31.

Holly commenced construction on the Expansion Project after receiving the Holly

e

AO. [Id.~ 7.]
32.

The overall costs of the Modernization Project are anticipated to be approximately

$700 to $800 million, with approximately $300 million allocated to Phase I and the remaining
approximate $400 to $500 million allocated to Phase II. These estimated costs represent
design/engineering, materials, and construction costs. [Id.
33.

~

1 I.]

•

If the Holly AO is stayed and construction stopped, it is undisputed that Holly

would experience significant demobilization and remobilization costs. According to the Jenson
Declaration, the demobilization costs include hourly pay rates for the remaining contract workers

•

who will need to secure construction equipment and the construction site safely during the stay
period. It also includes costs of equipment storage. Remobilization costs would include similar
expenses for restarting work that had been stopped. If construction is stayed, Holly's main
contractor would charge a minimum of $625,000 per month for such delays. These figures do
not account for lost profits or additional harm of further delay on the overall project schedule.

[Id.~ 13.]
34.

•

Delays in the Project are directly correlated with lost revenue that Holly would

have generated if it were able to process the increased number of barrels of crude on schedule.
For every month Holly is unable to process additional crude, it anticipates a loss of
approximately $10,000,000. [Id.~ 15.]
35.

During Phase I and Phase II of construction, Holly anticipates up to 500 people at

any given time on site fulfilling construction jobs related to the project. [Id.
36.

~

17.]

•

After Phase I of the Modernization Project is completed, Holly anticipates a 25%

increase in permanent jobs at the Woods Cross refinery. After completion of Phase II, Holly

•
10
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•

•
anticipates another 25% increase in permanent jobs. This is a 50% overall increase in permanent

•

jobs at the refinery. [Id.
37.

~

18.]

Overall, the Modernization Project will create a public benefit through job

creation, increased state and local taxes, and capital infusion and investment in Davis County, as

•

well as benefits from increased crude production within the state of Utah. These benefits wi ll be
delayed or may be lost if Ho lly is forced to stop construction on the Project. [Id.
38.

•

~

19.]

The Modernization Project may also result in a number of calculated emission

reductions at the Holly refinery, including a reduction in NOx by 21.53 tpy, a reduction in SO2 by
150.69 tpy, and a reduction in VOC by 17.02 tpy. [IR007575.] DAQ has determined that these
pollutants are precursors to PM 2.s and major contributors to wintertime inversions in the Salt

•

Lake Valley. [Utah State Implementation Plan, § IX.A, dated December 4, 2013, § 1.6.]
According to the recent Utah State Implementation Plan for PM2.5, reductions in these pollutants
would have the secondary effect of reducing wintertime PM 2.s levels. [Id. ]

•

39.

Based on the evidence, these emission reductions are the result of voluntary

pollution control strategies that Holly has proposed for the Modernization Project and that are
incorporated in the Holly AO. [See SPR at IR008564, JR008568-008569; see also IR007335.]

•

These reductions fall into five different categories:
a. Holly will install a new wet gas scrubber as part of the new FCC Unit 25 and
will route its existing gas streams that presently are em itted after treatment in

•

an existing su lfur recovery unit ("SRU") through that wet gas scrubber,
reducing overall SO 2 emissions [See Jul yNOI IR0028 12, 002821 , 002823 002824.];

•
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•
b. Holly w ill remove both its propane pit fl are and the frozen earth propane pit
storage facil ity, whic h wi ll reduce NOx and YOC emissions, respectively [See

•

July N Ol at IR002828, 003035];
c.

Ho lly will replace fo ur gas-driven compressor engines wi th electric engines,
which will reduce NOx emissions [See Revised NOi at IR007335];

d. Holly will add selective catalytic reduction techno logy to three current heaters

•

and boilers, further reducing NOx emissions [See Source Plan Review at
IR00855 I; Holly AO at IR009248]; and
e. Holly will be subj ect to overall, refinery-wide emissions limitation reductions

•

for PM 10, NOx, and SO2. [See Holly AO at IR009225.]
40.

Based on the evidence of record, if the Ho lly AO is stayed or remanded, these

emission control strateg ies will e ither be de layed or wi ll not be imp lemented because they are

•

approved and authorized by the Holly AO. [See SPR at IR008564, IR008568-008569; see also
IR007335 .]

•

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

This is a permit review adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Code § 19-1-

301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7.
2.

The Stay Motion is governed by Section 19-1-30 1.5( 15), Utah Code Ann.,

providing:

(a) The fi ling of a request for agency action does not stay a permit or delay the
effective date of a permit.
(b) A permit may not be stayed or delayed unless a stay is granted under this
Subsection (15).
(c) T he administrative law judge shall:

•
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•

•
(i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit during a permit review
adjudicative proceeding; and

•

(i i) submit a proposed determination on the stay to the executive director.
(d) The adm inistrative law judge may not recommend to the executive director a
stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, unless:

•

(i) al l parties agree to the stay; or
(ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that:
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless
the stay is issued;

•

(B) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs
whatever damage the proposed stay is likely to cause the party restrained
or enjoined;
(C) the stay, if issued, wou ld not be adverse to the public interest;

•
•

and
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents
serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of fu1ther
adjudication .
3.

In order to prevai l on the Stay Motion, Petitioners must satisfy all four of the

statutory elements li sted above. Fai lure to satisfy even one element is fata l to the Stay Motion.
See Utah Med. Prods. Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 23 1 (Utah 1998).
4.

Petitioners' burden to satisfy the four factors listed above is more stringent under

Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 than under the analogous state (or federa l) procedural stay
standards. Utah Code Section 19-1-301 .5 represents statutory language enacted by the Utah

•

Legislature. By contrast, the law governing interlocutory relief in state and federal courts is
primarily judge-made common law, guided by procedural rules. In Utah, the rules of civ il
procedure do not rise to the level of statutory law but are promulgated and regulated by the Utah

•

Supreme Court. Section 78A-3- I 03, Utah Code Ann. The express statutory language provides

13
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•
governing stays in permit review adjudicative proceedings states that the ALJ "mav not"
recommend a stay of a permit "unless" the moving party establishes all four statutory elements.
By contrast, Rule 65A of the Utah Rule ofCivil Procedure begins with a neutral presumption

•

and simply provides that a court "may issue" an injunction upon a showing of four elements. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) ("A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a
showi ng that .... "). This permissive language is consistent with the touchstone of interlocutory

•

relief in state and federal courts: the broad discretion afforded state and federal judges. See
Southwest Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176, 11 91 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The district

COU1t's discretion in [granting an injunction] is necessarily broad ...."); Purkey v. Roberts, 20 12

•

UT App 24 1,121 , 285 P.3d 1242 (" Ultimately, the decision of whether to issue an injunction
remains within the discretion of the trial cou1t."). It is also worth noting that the federal coU1ts
of appeals have articulated differing versions of the discretionary, balancing tests applicable to

•

interlocutory orders. However, these legal tests relate to a trial judge's discretion and are
therefore not directly applicable here in light of the clear and unambiguous requirement in the
Utah Code that the moving party prove the application of all four statutory standards.
5.

•

Based on the foregoing and without limiting the potential discretion of the

Executive Director in granting preliminary injunctive relief in permit review adjudicative
proceedings, it is clear that the Utah Legislature employed mandatory language that is not found

•

in the analogous federal and state procedural rules and case law. As a result, the state and federal
cases governing stays and injunctive relief, while important to consider, also apply less stringent
legal standards than the Utah Legislature has directed be appl ied to the Stay Motion. Analysis of

•

the following factors is therefore undertaken in light of the more stringent statutory standard
establ ished by the Utah Legislature.

•
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•

•
•

Irreparable Harm
6.

Irreparable harm being the sine qua non of interlocutory relief, the moving party

has a particularly heavy burden to prove it. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite

•

C01p., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the irreparable harm factor is the "single
most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction") (internal quotations and
citation omitted); accord, Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421,427 (Utah 1983); see also New

York v. NRC, 550 F.2d 745, 753 (2d Cir. 1977). Irreparable harm must be non-speculative and
imminent: there must be evidence supporting a conclusion that irreparable harm will, in fact,
occur if the relief is not granted. See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Medical Corp., 952 F .2d

•

th

802 (4 Cir. 1991 ) .
7.

In the context of a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the irreparable harm

must necessarily relate to the period of time between the date of the motion for stay and the final

•

determination on the merits. This conclusion is particularly important in the instant proceeding,
where no evidentiary hearing or trial is provided.

In an analogous situation, Judge Posner wrote:

"When persons harmed by administrative action bring a suit for injunction in a federal district

•

court, it is not because they want, or are entitled to, a trial." Cronin v. United States Dep 't of

Agriculture, 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). Rather, he continued, such persons are entitled
to judicial review of the agency action, applying the standard touchstones of administrative law.

•

Id. After considering the legal standards that might be applied to that case, involving a Forest
Service decision to a llow for the cutting of timber on federal land, Judge Posner concluded:
"But all this assumes that the decision whether to grant or deny the preliminary injunction is
preliminary to a fu ll hearing on the plaintiffs claim. If it is not[, then] the two stages are

•

•
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•
collapsed into one because there will never be a fu ller hearing . ..." Id. at 445. See also
Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a

petitioner must show that "the harm .. . [is] so imminent as to be irreparable if a court waits until

•

the end of trial to resolve the harm."). Stated differently, "if a trial on the merits can be
conducted before the injury wou ld occur there is no need for interlocutory relief." 11 A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federa l Practice & Procedure § 2948.1, at 129

•

(3d ed.20 13). Such is certainly the case in these proceedings: the decision on the merits will be
rendered prior to the time that the Expansion Project begins operation.
8.

Petitioners have fa iled to carry their burden of proof that they will suffer

•

irreparable harm if the Permit is not stayed prior to the time that the rev iew on the merits is
completed in this matter. The record supports the find ing that hearing and determ ination on the
merits in thi s case will be completed by the end of the summer of 2014, long before the

•

Expansion Project is operational, being the fa ll of 20 15 at the earliest. [Jenson Declaration ~ 1O.]
If Petitioners are successful on their claims on the merits, then the proper remedy would be to
remand to the Director to reconsider the Perm it. In that event, the Petitioner would not have the

•

Permit necessary to operate the Expansion Project as required by the Utah Air Conservation Act
and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). The requested injunctive relief would therefore be selfenforcing and no claimed irreparable harm could result. 1 If Petitioners' claims fai l on the merits,

•

then injunctive relief would not be warranted in any event.

•
1

This conclusion is an important consideration here because the case law cited by Petitioners supporting the Stay
Motion is distinguishable from the case at bar. Here, success on the merits would itselfresult in a self-enforcing
injunction, inasmuch as the Permit is required in order for Holly to operate the Expansion Project in the first
instance. Thus, this matter is distinguishable from Davis v. Mineta, 302 F3d 1104 (I 0th Cir. 2002), where
construction of the highway project in question without proper wetland fill permits under the Clean Water Act may
have caused irreparable ham,.

•
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•

•
9.

•

Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proof that "bureaucratic

momentum" will result in irreparable harm prior to the time that hearing on the merits is
completed. There is no evidence to support any such conclusion. Moreover, the instant permit
review adjudicative proceeding is easily distingui shable from the cases cited by Petitioners,

•

suppo1ting their " bureaucratic momentum" argument for irreparable harm. Here, the provisions
of the CAA impose substantive requirements on Holly with in the permitting process or upon a
remand. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 503 (I st Cir. 1989) (ho lding that where a

•

statute substantively "require[s}the agency to change direction," such as the Clean Water Act at
issue in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), or the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 ( 1987),

•

"bureaucratic commitment to a project" does not constitute irreparable harm). Indeed, the one
case to address the "bureaucratic commitment" theory in the context of the CAA permitting
process expressly rejected the argument. Sierra Club v. Larsen, 769 F. Supp. 420 (D. Mass.

•

1991 ), aff'd 2 F.3d 462 ( I st Cir. 1993). The National Env ironmental Protection Act ("NEPA")
case law upon which Petitioners rely for their "bureaucratic momentum" argument is simply
inapplicable in this case. See Marsh, 872 F.2d at 503; 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) ("No action taken

•

under the CAA shall be deemed a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act."). Stated
differently, under the CAA, Holly is required to have, maintain, and follow a lega l and valid

•

permit in order to operate the Expansion Project. This scenario is easily distinguishable from a
NEPA situation, where the law requires, and only requires, that full consideration of the
environmental impacts of all applicable options be undertaken and completed before the 'federal
action" can be initiated. More specifically, the principle in Sierra Club that a violation ofNEPA

•
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•
constitutes an irreparable injury rests on NEPA 's purpose to foster informed decision-making.
Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 500. In the context of NEPA, irreparable harm to the environment,

almost by definition, occurs because uninformed deci sionmakers commit themselves to a course

•

of action that rarely can be undone given "a chain of bureaucratic commitment that will become
progressively harder to undo the longer it continues." Id. Such considerations are not applicable
here, where the substantive requirements of the CAA will continue to have prospective

•

application.
10.

Petitioners' failure to carry their burden of proof as to irreparable harm is

dispositive to the Stay Motion. However, analysis of the remaining factors is warranted.

•

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

11.

Petitioners raise three issues in their Stay Motion regarding the merits: (l) the

assertion that DAQ erred in allowing the use of the NE] emission factors to calculate PM 2_5
emissions from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers; (2) the assertion that Holly overestimated
the PM25 emission reductions that will be realized through the decommiss ioning of the propane
pit flare; and (3) the assertion that DAQ underestimated the coke burn rate from the FCC Unit

•

25, which Petitioners argue will result in higher PM 2_5 emissions. [Stay Motion pp. 15-37.]
12.

The merits have not yet been fully briefed and argued by the parties.

13.

DAQ is granted substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules.

See Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14)(c) (expressly "recognizing that [DAQ] has been granted

substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules"). Moreover, Section 19-l 301 .5 instructs that DAQ's factual, technical and scientific determinations should be upheld if

•

they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Utah Code§ 19-l-301.5(14)(c).

•
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•

•
14.

•

Solely for purposes of this Recommended Order, I conclude that Petitioners have

failed to carry their burden of showing that they are Iikely to succeed on the merits, or that the
case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further adjudication.
Carrying this burden here requires a showing that DAQ abused its discretion or lacked

•

substantial evidence to support its factual, technical and scientific determinations in connection
with the Permit.
15.

•

In reaching Conclusion No. 14, I rely in large part on the independent

determination of EPA that the Permit is acceptable, notwithstanding Petitioners' objections. See
EPA Comment Letters [IR004001-004005; 1R007840-007841 ]. In Alaska Dep 't ofEnvtl.

Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held that

•

EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state permitting authorities' BACT
determinations under the PSD program and has authority to issue stop construction orders if it
reasonably believes that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. The CAA also

•

provides EPA with concurrent enforcement authority that is directly applicable to the present
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 7413(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available to
the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the CAA with

•

respect to construction of a new source or modification of an existing source). See Jennifer A .
Davis Foster, Note, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The
Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 Missouri L. Rev., Issue 4, at 1

•

(Fall 2004). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that ifin EPA's independentjudgment, any ofthe
objections and issues Petitioners have raised on the merits were deserving of further evaluation,
comment, or reconsideration, EPA had an independent duty and authority to pursue such issues.
EPA declined to do so even after being given the oppo,tunity in connection with the Permit.
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•
16.

In this permit review adjudicative proceeding, we have a somewhat unusual

situation in administrative law where not one but two regulatory agencies with significant
technical expertise and concurrent (and somewhat overlapping) legal jurisdiction have been

•

involved in the procedural and substantive process that led to the issuance of the Permit. This
situation provides a second layer of regulatory oversight to ensure that the applicable procedural
and substantive requirements of the CAA, as adopted and enforced through the Utah Air
Conservation Act in the spirit of "cooperative federal ism," have been met. Solely for purposes
of the Stay Motion, therefore, I conclude that EPA's independent review and acceptance of the
Permit demonstrates that Petitioners do not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

•

or that the case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further
adjudication
17.

Petitioners' failure to carry their burden of proof as to success on the merits

•

should, standing alone, be dispositive of the Stay Motion.
Public Interest

18.

Air pollution is harmful to humans and ecological receptors. Thus, it is self-

ev ident that the public interest is served by reduction and elimination of air pollution. Under our
system, however, a source's compliance with the requirements set fo11h in the CAA, as
implemented through the Utah Air Conservation Act and related rules and regulations, satisfies,

•

as a matter of law, the public policy of protection of human health and the environment from
exposures to air pollution.
19.

Petitioners have failed to make a showing of cognizable harm that will occur

•

during the pendency of these proceedings unless the Holly AO is stayed. As a result, they have
failed to show that the public interest favors a stay.

•
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•

•
20.

•

To the extent that a violation of the CAA and other applicable law may have

occurred in connection with the Permit, the instant proceedings will be concluded prior to the
time that the Expansion Project begins operation. And in the event that Petitioners are successful
on the merits, injunctive relief, in a sense, would be self-executing since a valid permit is

•

required to operate the Expansion Project in the first instance. Hence, I find that the public
interest is adequately protected by compliance with the existing permitting requirements set forth
in the Utah Air Conservation Act and the CAA.

•

21.

The record also shows that the Holly AO will result in substantial emission

reductions in SO2 , NOx, and VOCs, which are precursors to PM pollution along the Wasatch
Front. The Holly AO will also lower refinery-wide emissions limits for PM I 0, NOx, and SO2.

•

Staying the Holly AO will delay implementation of pollution control technologies that will result
in these emission reductions, harming the public interest.
22.

•

the Modernization Project design and construction will generate. This undisputed factor weighs
against the Stay Motion.
23.

•

Petitioners' failure to establish that the Stay Motion is in the public interest should

be dispositive of the Stay Motion .
Balance of Harms

24.

•

Finally, the public interest also extends to the economic activity, including jobs

Petitioners have failed to carry their burden to show that the balance of harms tips

in their favor.
25.

The increased emissions about which Petitioners complain will not occur until

after construction is completed in 20 15, long after determination on the merits is completed. By

•
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•
contrast, a stay would result in the immediate cessation of design and construction activities for
the Expansion Project, resulting in the undisputed harms that are of record.
26.

Finally, if Petitioners are successful on the merits, injunctive relief would be self-

•

executing as discussed above. The balance of the harms, therefore, does not tip in Petitioners'
favor.
27.

Petitioners' failure to carry their burden to demonstrate that the balance of harms

tips in their favor should be dispositive of the Stay Motion.

PROPOSED ORDER
Based on the forgoing, I recommend that the Executive Director deny the Stay Motion.

•

DA TED this 25 th day of March, 2014.

BRET F. RANDALL
Administrative Law Judge

•
•
•
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•
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•
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•
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•

•
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Christian C. Stephens
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cstephens@utah.gov
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Tab D

•
•
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

•

ORDER ADOPTING ALJ'S PROPOSED
ORDER

In the Matter of:

and

Approval Order No.
DAQE-AN101230041-13

•

DENYINGPETffiONERS'REQUEST
FORSTAY

Holly Refining & Marketing CompanyWoods Cross, LLC
Heavy Crude Processing Project
Project Number: N10123-0041

Amanda Smith
Executive Director
Department of Environmental Quality
May 8, 2014

•
This matter is before me based on the Administrative Law Judge's proposed
detennination on a motion for stay in this matter. For the reasons set forth herein, I hereby adopt

•

the March 25, 2014 Proposed Order regarding Petitioners' Motion Requesting Stay of Approval
Order.
Findings of Fact

•

1.

On November 18, 2013, the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality issued

Approval Order DAQE-AN101230041-13 (Project Number Nl0123-0041) (hereafter "AO") to
Holly Refining and Marketing.Company, for the construction ofthe Heavy Black Waxy Crude
Processing Project.

•

2. On December 18, 2013, Petitioners Utah Physicians for a Health Environment and
Friends of the Great Salt Lake (hereinafter "Utah Physicians") filed a Request for Agency Action
(RFAA) seeking a review of the AO pursuant to Utah Code §§19-1-301.5 and 63G-4-201(l)(b)

•
•

and Utah Admin. Code R305-7-203 .

A DJ011035

•
3. On January 9, 2014, I appointed Bret F. Randall as the Administrative Law Judge

•

(ALJ) in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-301.5(5). I charged the ALJ to conduct
a permit review adjudicative proceeding in accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-301.5 and

•

Utah Admin. Code R305-7.
4. On December 21, 2013, Utah Physicians filed a motion and supporting memorandum
requesting a stay of the AO pending a full hearing on the merits pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,
§19-1-301.5(15) and Utah Admin. Code R305-7-217. Petitioners filed a Corrected Motion and
Memorandum Requesting Stay on January 21, 2014.

•

5. Following extensive briefing on the motion to stay by the Parties, the ALJ heard oral
argument on March 6, 2014. The hearing was transcribed by a court reporter.
6. On March 25, 2014, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §19-1-301.5(15)(c), the ALJ

•

issued proposed findings of fact (including references to the initial administrative record)
conclusions oflaw and a proposed order recommending that the Executive Director deny the

•

petitioners' motion to stay.
7. The ALJ's findings of fact (including references to the initial administrative record)
address the: regulatory background; permit chronology; DAQ's permit review; and impacts of
modernization project construction. The ALJ' s conclusions of law address each of the four
statutory elements required for a stay. The required statutory elements were briefed and argued
by the parties at the March 6, 2014 hearing.
8. On April 8, 2014, Utah Physicians submitted comments on the ALJ' s proposed order.
The following memoranda were subsequently filed on April 15, 2014 in response to Utah
Physicians' comments: Holly's Response to Utah Physicians' Comments on ALJ' s
Recommended Order Re: Petitioners' Request for a Stay of Approval Order; and the Utah

•

2
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•

•
•

Division of Air Quality's Response to Utah Physicians' Comments on ALJ's Recommended
Order Regarding Stay of Approval Order.
9. The points raised by Holly and DAQ in response to Utah Physicians' comments

•

confirm that the comments repeat points previously briefed and argued at the time ofthe hearing
on the stay. The ALJ has addressed each of those points in his proposed order.

Conclusions of Law

•

10. Whenever a motion to stay is filed in a perm.it review adjudicative proceeding, the
ALJ shall: (i) consider a party's motion to stay a perm.it review adjudicative proceeding; and (ii)
submit a proposed determination on the stay to the Executive Director. Utah Code Ann., §19-1-

•

301.5(15)(c).
11. Utah Code Ann., §191-301.S(lS)(d) provides that the ALJ may not recommend to
the executive director a stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, unless: (i) all parties agree to
the stay; or (ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that:
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless the stay is issued;
(B) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs whatever damage the
proposed stay is likely to cause the party restrained or enjoined;

•

(C) the stay, if issued would not be adverse to the public interest; and
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits, which
should be the subject of further adjudication.
The Parties did not stipulate to a stay and the Petitioners must, therefore, demonstrate

•

compliance with all of the four statutory elements .
12. The ALJ's findings offact and conclusions oflaw address each of the elements
necessary for a stay and establish that based on the record then before the ALJ, the Petitioners
have failed to carry their burden of proof on the statutory elements required for a stay.

•

•

3

ADJ011037

•
•
·Order

I have reviewed the proposed :findings of fact, conclusions oflaw and proposed
determination. I have also reviewed the comments and responses to comments submitted by the

•

parties regarding the ALJ's proposed determination. Based on the ALJ's review and evaluation, I
am persuaded that the petitioners have failed to meet the statutory elements required for a stay. I

therefore adopt the ALJ's fiildings offact, conclusions oflaw and proposed order, and I deny the
Petitioners' motion for stay.

•

Dated this 8th day of May, 2014

•

~

Amanda Smith, Executive Director
Department of Environmental Quality
195 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4810
amandasmith@utah.gov

•

•

•
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•
•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8th day of May, 2014, the foregoing ORDER ADOPTING ALJ'S
PROPOSED ORDER and DENYING PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR STAY

•
•

was served via e-mail upon the following:
Bret F. Randall
Administrative Law Judge
brandall@djplaw.com
cfrandsen@djplaw.com
Administrative Proceedings Officer
DEQAPRO@utah.gov
Debbie Obemdorfer, Administrative Assistant
dobemdorfer@utah.gov

•

Joro Walker
Charles R. Dubuc
jwalker@westemresources.org
rdubuc@westemresources.org
David Reymann, Holly Refining
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Steven Christiansen, Holly Refining
schristiansen@parrbrown.com
Cheylynn Hayman, Holly Refining
chayman@parrbrown.com

•

•

Megan Houdeshel, Holly Refining
mhoudeshel@parrbrown.com
Christian C. Stephens
Veronique Jarrell-King
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL
cstephens@utah.gov
.vjarrellking@utah.gov

Debbie Obemdorfer
Executive Assistant

•
•
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•
In the Matter of:

Approval Order No. DAQE-AN I0l 230041-1 3

•

•

Holly Refining & Marketing Company Woods Cross, LLC
Heavy Crude Processing Project
Project No. N l 0 123-004 I

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDED
ORDER ON THE MERITS

Administrative Law Judge Bret F. Randall
March I I, 2015

This matter is before me pursuant to appointment by the Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Environmenta l Quality dated January 9, 2014. The appointment charges me to
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code

•

Ann., § 19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. Following are my Findings of Fact, 1
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits .

•

•
1

•
•

While the Utah Code directs me to provide " findings of fact," I note that my review of th is matter is in an appellate
capacity. There was no trial, no witnesses were called, no testimony was heard, and no evidence was presented to
me as a trier of fact. Thus, the legislature's requirement that the ALJ provide " fin dings of fact'' and a proposed
dispositive action should not be read to suggest that I have weighed evidence, except in an appellate-like role,
apply ing the standards of rev iew as discussed below.
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•
INTRODUCTION

•

This matter came before me for oral argument on September 17, 2014 at 9:30 am .
Present at the argument was Joro Walker and Rob Dubuc on behalf of Petitioners; Christian
Stephens for Respondent Division of Air Quality; and Steve Christiansen, David Reymann,

•

Cheylynn Hayman, and Megan Houdeshel for Respondent Holly. Having reviewed the briefing
in this matter and heard oral argument, I propose that Petitioners' Request for Agency Action
and all claims asserted therein be rejected.

•

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.

In May of 2012, Holly Refining & Marketing Company- Woods Cross, LLC

("Holly") submitted a notice of intent (" May NOi") to the Utah Division of Environmental

•

Quality (" UDAQ") requesting an approval order to expand its Woods Cross refinery ("Holly
Refinery") and modernize certain equipment in a way that would allow Holly to process an
additional 20,000 barrels per day of black wax crude from the Uintah Basin in eastern Utah

•

("Modernization Project"). [May NOi, IR000049-001108] .
2.

In July of 2012, Holly re-submitted its May NOi with revisions in response to

UDAQ's request for additional information ("July NOI"). [July NOI, IR002798-003590].

•

3.

On November 28, 20 12, UDAQ released for public comment an Intent to

Approve document ("Fi rst ITA") containing a draft approval order. [First ITA, IROO I 967001996].

•

4.

During the initial 60-day public comment period, UDAQ received comments

from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") [JR004001-004005]; Western
Resource Advocates on behalf of Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and Friends of

•

Great Salt Lake (collectively "Petitioners") [IR004007-004035]; Blaine Rawson on behalf of

5
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•
Mark J. Hal I [1R004202-0042 I 7]; Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners [IR009046009135]; and Holly [JR003757-00391 OJ.
5.

Jn February and March of 2013, Holly provided a detailed response to EPA

relating to the EPA's comments referenced above, which objected (among other things) to
Holly's original netting analysis. [JR008245-008259].
6.

In March 2013, Holly submitted a new netting analysis pa11ly in response to a

•

specific request made by UDAQ in February of 20 I 3 and partly in response to EPA' s comments
referenced above [IR008 J98-008259] .
7.

In April 2013, Holly formally submitted a revised NOJ (" Revised NOi") to

UDAQ that also included the new netting analysis. [Revised NOi at IR007335-007395].

8.

In addition to certain other changes, the Revised NOl estimated PM2_5 emissions

from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers based on the EPA 's National Emission Inventory

•

(''NEI") data. [Id.]
9.

On June 5, 2013, UDAQ released for a second public comment period an Intent to

Approve document ("Second ITA") and a Source Plan Review. [Second ITA, IR00008449-

•

008479; SPR, 1R008480-008575] .
I 0.

On July 25, 2013, UDAQ received comments on the draft approval order in the

Second ITA from EPA ("EPA's Second Comment Letter") [JR007840-007841] ; Western
Resource Advocates on behalf Petitioners ("Petitioners' Second Comment Letter") [IR007842007997]; Blaine Rawson on behalf of Mark J. Hall ("Rawson' s Second Comment Letter")
[IR008579-008602]; Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners ("Sagady's Second Comment

•

Letter") [1R009046-009135] ; and Holly ("Holly's Second Comment Letter") [IR0076 13007836].

•
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•

•
11 .

•

On November 6, 20 13, UDAQ requested additional information from Holly

pertaining to certain comments raising questions about the Second !TA and Holly responded to
this request for supplemental information on November 7, 20 13. [IR008021 , IR008022-0052].
12.

•

On November 18, 20 13, UDAQ issued a Response to Comments Memorandum

("Response to Comments Memo") addressing all of the comments made during the second
public comment period, explained UDAQ' s response to those comments, and, where appropriate,
described how the comments had been incorporated into the Holly AO. [Response to Comments

•

Memo, IR009174-009222].
13.

UDAQ, having considered and answered all of the comments received during the

public comment period, issued Holly a new approva l order authorizing the construction of the

•

Modernization Project ("Hol ly AO"), on November 18, 20 13. [Holly AO, IR009223-009254] .
14.

On December 18, 2013, Petitioners fi led their Request for Agency Action

contesting UDAQ's issuance of the Holly AO (" RAA'').

•

15.

In January 9, 201 4, the Executive Director of UDAQ appointed me as the

administrative law judge ("ALJ") to conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this
matter in accordance with Utah Code Section 19-1-30 1.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7.

•

16.

On January 16, 20 14, I issued a Notice of Further Proceedings, in which, among

other things, ordered that the party with the burden of proof on any issue would be held to a
stringent marshaling requirement ("Marshaling Requirement").

•

17 .

On January 22, 20 14, Petitioners filed an Amended Motion and Memorandum

Requesting a Stay of the Approval Order ("Motion for Stay"). Oral argument was held on the
Motion for Stay on March 6, 2014 .

•
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•
I 8.

On March 25, 2014, I recommended to the Executive Director of the Department

of Environmental Quality (" Executive Director") deny the Motion for Stay finding that
Petitioners had not satisfied the four factors required for issuance of a stay of an environmental

•

permit.
19.

On May 8, 2014, the Executive Director of the Department of Environmental

Quality adopted my proposed order and denied the Motion for Stay.
20.

•

Prior to briefing the merits, ]-lolly and UDAQ submitted Motions to Dismiss

ce11ain issues in Petitioners' RAA.
2 I.

On Apri I 2, 2014, I denied without prejudice the Motions to Dismiss, finding at

that time that "preservation issues would be most efficiently addressed in connection with
briefing on the merits," which would afford a reviewing court "a more complete record for
appellate review." [Order on Motions to Dismiss at 6-7].
22.

On April 16, 2014, the Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification Regarding

Notice of Further Proceedings, in which they asked me to clarify the Marshaling Requirement
imposed by the Notice of Further Proceedings.
23.

•

On April 17, 2014, J issued an Order Clarifying the Marshaling Requirement

("Clarification Order") reiterating that the Petitioners bear the burden to marshal all of the
evidence in the administrative record, both supportive of and contrary to their claims.
24.

•

•

On September 12, 2014, I issued a subsequent Order regarding the Marshaling

Requirement, clarifying further the Petitioners' burden of proof in light of the Utah Supreme
Cou11 decision in State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645. In that Order, I explained that

•

Petitioners were required to marshal all of the evidence in the administrative record to carry their
burden of proof on any particular issue.

•
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•

•
25.

•

On September 17, 20 14, after receiving briefs on the merits from a ll the parties, I

heard ora l argument to hear the merits of Petitioners' RAA, as required by the Utah Code. After
rev iewing and considering all of the facts and arguments presented in the briefi ng and at ora l
argument and pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-30 1.5( 12)(c ), I hereby submit to the Executive

•

Director the fo llowing Proposed Findings of Fact, Conc lusions of Law, and Proposed Order
Regarding the Merits.

LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS ADJUDICATION

•

I.

Standard of Review
1.

This permit review adjudicative proceeding is governed by Utah Code Section 19-

1-30 1.5, which requires the presiding ALJ to "conduct a permit rev iew adj udicati ve proceed ing

•

based only on the administrative record and not as a trial de novo." Utah Code§ 19-l30 1.5(8)(a). Unlike many other adm inistrative proceedings involv ing an A LJ, in a permit review
adj udicative proceeding it is clear that the Utah Legislature intended to limit the ALJ's authority

•

to a review of UDAQ's decision, thereby placing the ALJ in an appellate-like review role. There
is to be no trial. T here will be no witnesses, no examination or cross examination, and no
fi ndings of fact where disputed testimony is weighed and where witness credibility is at issue, as

•

often occurs in other administrative adjudicative proceedings . Rathe r, a ll of the weighing of the
evidence has already occurred at the UDAQ level.
2.

•

UDAQ prepared a written response to public comments in connection with the

issuance of the Ho lly A O. [JR009174-9222]. The ALJ must " review .. . the director's
determination, based on the record," culminating in a proposed d ispositive action that includes
fi ndings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended order. Utah Code§ 19- l -301.5(12)(b)-

•

(c). Because these proceedings are, by definition, limited to the issues raised during the public

9
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•
comment period, UDAQ's written response to public comments plays a central role in evaluating

•

whether UDAQ's conclusions satisfy applicable legal requirements.
3.

Petitioners have the burden of proof to demonstrate that the Director's

determination to issue the Holly AO was in error. [Clarification Order at 4 ("Petitioners
acknowledge that they have the burden of proof in this proceeding.")]; see also Taylor v. Pub.

•

Serv. Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 121 , * 1 (unpublished) ("In the typical challenge to agency action,
the party challenging the action carries the burden of demonstrating its impropriety." (internal
quotations om itted)).
4.

The Director's determination can include factual findings, interpretations of law,

•

and mixed determinations of law and facts.
5.

To carry their burden of proof with respect to their challenge of factual findings,

the Petitioners must demonstrate that UDAQ's findings of fact are not supported by substantial

•

evidence; otherwise, the ALJ must "uphold all factual technical, and scientific agency
determinations that are supported by substantial ev idence taken from the record as a whole."
Utah Code§ 19-l-301.5(13)(b).2 Under Utah case law relevant to this proceeding, the ALJ's

•

review on questions of fact is limited to determining if UDAQ's factual findings "were
reasonable and rational," while giving "great deference" to UDAQ 's factual findings and not
"reweighing" the evidence. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining. 2012

•

2

While subsection ( 13)(b) expressly applies directly to the Executive Director's review, the standard of
review that the ALJ is to apply to the record is not expressly stated in the Utah Code. Under a fair reading
of the statute, it is clear that the ALJ is to apply the same standard as the Executive Director is required to
apply. This conclusion is based on a reading of the permit review adjudicative proceeding statute as a
whole. In the first instance, the ALJ's express duty and authority is to undertake a permit review
adjudicatory proceeding and not a trial de novo on the merits, resulting in a recommended ruling for the
Executive Director. In other words, the role of the ALJ is to "stand in the shoes" of the Executive
Director and provide her with a recommended ruling on the merits. Thus, the ALJ is to apply the same
standard ofreview to the administrative record as the Executive Director is required to apply. Utah Code
Ann.§ 19-1- 301.5.

•
•
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•

•
UT 73, ~ 11 , 38 P.3d 29 1 (hereinafter Sierra Club v. BOGM) (internal quotation marks omitted).3

•

While reviewing an agency's determination for substantia l evidence, the ALJ should "state the
facts and a ll legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the agency's
findings." Id. ~ 12 .

•

6.

With respect to legal interpretations, the ALJ should grant "substantial discretion"

to UDAQ in its interpretation of its governing statutes and rules. See Utah Code § 19-130 1.5(14)(c)(i). In this case, the governing statutes and rules include the Clean Air Act, the Utah

•

Air Conservation Act, and the applicable regulations under these statutes. UDAQ's legal
interpretation of these statutes and rules may be overturned only if Petitioners show that such
interpretation is a "clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law." See, e.g., Sierra

•

Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73, ~ 10; see also Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil. Gas &
Mining, 2001 UT 112, ~ 18, 38 P .3d 291 (an agency's "interpretation of the operative provisions
of the statutory law it is empowered to administer" must be given deference).

•

7.

By contrast, UDAQ's general interpretations of the law, including constitutional

questions, jurisdiction, and statutes unrelated to the agency, are granted little or no deference and
are simply reviewed for correctness. Sierra Club, 20 I 2 UT 73 , il 9; see also Sevier Citizens v.

•

Dept. of Envt. Quality, 2014 UT App 257, ~ 6 (where the statute under review was procedural,
and where issue was interpretation of the statute itself that granted agency interpretive discretion,
the coutt applied a traditional approach to standard of review and imposed a correctness standard

•

•

3

Section 19-1-301.5, however, also vests the ALJ with the authority to supplement the
administrative record. Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-30 l.5(8)(c)(iv) (providing that the ALJ "may
supplement the record with technical or factual information."). Based on these statutory
provisions, if the ALJ determines that UDAQ has not addressed an issue or UDAQ's response
to an issue is inadequate, the ALJ may request add itional technical or factual information from
the parties as opposed to recommending a remand of the A Os .
11
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•
to the question of whether the fai lure to file a petition to intervene strips the agency of
jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(7)).
8.

Finally, when the agency has been granted discretion to interpret the statute or

•

regulation at issue, mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. See Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ~ 39,308 P.3d 46 1. Here, Section

•

19-1-301.5(14)(c)(i) expressly grants UDAQ "substantial discretion to interpret its governing
statutes and rules." Agency decisions on mixed questions of law and fact must be upheld under
this discretion standard if they are "rationally based" and set aside only "if they are imposed
arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits ofreason ." Assoc. Gen.

•

Contractors, 200 I UT 112, ~ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).

II.

Petitioners' Burden of Proof
I.

Petitioners, as the parties challenging UDAQ's decision to issue the Holly AO,

•

carry the burden of demonstrating UDAQ's determinations were not suppo11ed by substantial
evidence, were erroneous, or were an abuse of discretion. See Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT
73, ~ 31; Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ~ 34; Taylor, 2005 UT App 121, * I (Utah
Ct. App 1993) (unpublished).
2.

A party with the burden of proof must "fully identify, analyze, and cite its legal

arguments" and "provide meaningful legal analysis" but may not "dump the burden of

•

argument and research" on the reviewing authority. W. Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27,
~ 29, 135 P.3d 874 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kennon v. Air Quality Bd.,

2009 UT 77, ~ 29,270 P.3d 417 (declining to review a petitioner's challenge to an AO where
the petitioners failed to adequately brief a claim). Moreover, a party's briefing is inadequate
where the briefing "merely contains bald citations to authority without development of that

•
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•

•
authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ~ 9, 194

•

P.3d 903 (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lamb, 20 13 UT App 5, ~ 11 , 294 P.3d
639.
III.

•

Petitioners' Duty to Marshal All Relevant Evidence

I.

This tribunal 's statutory jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 requires

this tribunal to conduct this proceeding based only on the administrative record and to uphold
"all factual , technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by substantial

•

ev idence viewed in light of the record as a whole." Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14)(c) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, there will never be a "trial" on the merits. Rather, UDAQ undertook the
adjudication of Holly's NO ls after receiving and considering, among other things, public

•

comments.
2.

All of the evidentiary information upon which the Director could have relied is

contained in the formal administrative record as defined by Utah Code Section 19- 1-

•

30 1.5(8)(6). For every issue raised in public comments, the Director provided a detailed
written response, which also fo nns part of the administrative record. Utah Code Ann. § 19-1 301.5(8)(6).

•

3.

The Director's detailed response to comments provides a specific record as to

how the Director considered and resolved each public comment and also, in some instances,
refers to and provides citation to other evidence in the administrative record upon which the

•

Director has relied in reaching any given conclusion. Thus, while there is no trial on the merits,
the Director' s response to public comments provides a rather detail ed "roadmap" as to the
factual and legal basis for the Director's decision to issue the Holly AO .

•
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•
4.

Because Petitioners have the burden of persuas ion in this proceeding, the only

way they can possibly carry that burden of proof it to convince the ALJ (or, by extension, the

•

Executive Director, the Utah Court of Appeals, or the Utah Supreme Court) that any disputed
factual, technical, or scientific agency determination is not supported by substantial evidence
taken from the administrative record as a whole. By extension, therefore, they must marshal all
of the evidence relevant to each claim they assert. See, e.g., Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ~ 42. In short,

•

the Marshaling Requirement forms an inherent part of Petitioners' burden of proof in this
proceeding. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that "a party who fails to identify
and deal with supportive evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the

•

deferential standard of review that applies to such issues." Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ~ 40 (emphasis
added).

5.

In their briefing on the merits and at oral argument, Petitioners raised a number of

•

objections to the Marshaling Requirement. These objections lack merit. 4 The Marshaling
Requirement was properly imposed, either as an inherent part of Petitioners' burden of proof or,
in the alternative, pursuant to the ALJ's statutory grant of authority to manage all non-dispositive
aspects of these proceedings.

6.

The Utah Legislature has granted the ALJ the jurisdiction to "take any action in a

permit review adjudicative proceeding that is not a dispositive action." Utah Code § 19-1-

•

301.5(9)(t). Although the Marshaling Requirement is not specifically adopted in the Utah Code
or Utah Administrative Code as applied to these proceedings and Rule 24(a)(9) does not
expressly appl y here, an AL.I has the authorization to manage this proceeding in the most efficient

•

4

The fact that Holly was able to marshal record evidence, point by point, in the manner that I had
requested of Petitioners, provides further support for the conclusion that Petitioners' arguments against
the Marshaling Requirement lack merit and should be rejected.

•
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•

•
and effective way appropriate under the circum stances of this case. 5 All of the policy reasons

•

underlying Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply with fu ll force to a permit
review adjudicative proceeding.
7.

•

In an analogous situation, the Utah Court of Appeals declined to unde11ake an

independent review of a large record. Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2
(Utah App. 1990). There, the court noted that Rule 24(a)(9) was intended precisely "to spare
appel late courts such an onerous burden." Id. Hence, the com1 continued, "[a]bsent

•

exceptional circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific po11ions of the
record wh ich have been drawn to our attention by the parties and which are relevant to the
legal questions before us." Id. The court noted that Rule 24(a)(9) was intended precisely "to

•

spare appellate courts such an onerous burden." Hence, the court continued, " [a]bsent
exceptional circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific portions of the
record which have been drawn to our attention by the parties and wh ich are relevant to the

•

legal questions properly before us." Id. I have appl ied this same standard to my review of the
administrative record in this proceeding, for the same reasons as stated by the Utah Court of
Appeals. If this rule were not applied to the administrative record in a permit review

•

adjudicative proceeding, an appellant on future appeal could potentially argue that the
administrative law judge overlooked or failed to consider, under his or her independent review
of the record, certain evidence of record even though that evidence was not specifical ly drawn

•
•

5

It is undisputed that should Petitioners appeal any issue arising from this proceeding to the Utah Court
of Appeals, Rule 24(a)(9) would apply to their briefs on appeal. Because the administrative law judge
and the Executive Director are called upon to apply the same standard of review to the agency
determinations as the Utah Court of Appeals, it stands to reason that the marshaling requirement should
also apply at the ALJ and Executive Director levels of review. Moreover, Petitioners have been on notice
of this procedural requirement from the outset of this proceeding and did not appeal the ALJ's Order
Clarifying the Marshaling Requirement to the Executive Director. They cannot therefore show undue
burden or prejudice.
15
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•
to the attention of the administrative law judge. I find and conclude that the types of
"exceptional circumstances" that may warrant deviation from this rule, as stated in Wright, do
not apply to the present proceedings. 6
8.

•

This conclusion finds further support in Utah case law in the cases cited below,

subject to the clarification that in these cases, the potential for a procedural default upon
fa ilure to marshal the record is not an appropriate result, as held in State v. N ielsen, supra.

•

However, to the extent that Utah case law regarding the burden of proof and marshaling does
not deal with the procedural default issue rejected in State v. Nelson, it is still good law and
should be considered as being re levant here.

See, e.g., Simmons Media Group. LLC v.

Waykar, LLC, 20 14 UT App 145, ,, 46, 763 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (dismissing a claim where the
appe llant " does not identify and deal w ith the supportive evidence" (internal quotation marks
omitted)) ; Nebeker v. Summit County, 2014 UT App 137,, 46, 762 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 ("To
prevail on such a challenge, the County must acknowledge the evidence that suppo1ts the
findings and demonstrate 'a basis for overcoming the hea lthy dose of deference owed to factual
findings"' (quoting Nielsen, 2014 UT 10 ,, 41-42); Wachocki v. Luna, 20 14 UT 139,, 11 , n.
6, 330 P.3d 717 (ho lding that because appellants fai led to marshal the evidence, appellants did
not carry their burden on appeal); W. Jordan City, 2006 UT 27,, 29; Heinecke v. Dep't of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that parties fail to meet their

•

burden to marsha l the ev idence when they leave " it to the cowt to sort out what evidence

6

There is simply nothing in the Utah Code to suggest that the administrative law judge in a pem1it review
adjudicative proceeding has an independent duty to comb through the entire Administrative Record to identify all
relevant facts in support of a disputed fact ual, technical, and scientific agency determ ination, particularly where, as
here, Petitioners are represented by experienced and competent legal counsel. To be sure, a more generous standard
of briefing may apply to a permit review adj udicative proceeding where parties appear prose. Because no prose
parties are involved in the instant proceedi ng, 1 will not speculate as to the potential applicability of the Marshaling
Requirement in cases where parties are not represented by legal counsel.

•

•
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•

•
actually supported the finding" and instead argued their " own position without regard for the

•

evidence suppo1ting the ... findings") .
9.

The duty to carry the burden of proof through marshaling must fall to Petitioners

in this permit review adjudicative proceeding, because as a matter of longstanding

•

administrative law, the patty challenging any factual finding underlying an agency' s
determination is required to marshal " all" evidence supporting the agency' s determination.
Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73, ~ 12; see also Kennon, 2009 UT 77, ~ 27 ("When

•

challenging factual findings, a party is obligated to marshal 'all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding."' (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9))); First Nat'I Bank of Boston v.
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P .2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (In an

•

appeal of an agency action, "the party challenging the finding ... must marshal all of the
evidence supporting the finding .").
10.

•

The duty to marshal the evidence in administrative appeals also applies to

parties challenging an agency's determination on mixed questions of fact and law. Peterson
Hunting v. Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 14, ~ 15, 269 P.3d 998; see also United Park City
Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ~ 25, 140 P.3d 1200 ("Even

•

where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of
the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the
[appellants] also have a duty to marshal the evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

•

A party obligated to marshal the evidence must do so for each claim that the marshaling
mandate applies. Sierra Club 2012, 2012 UT 73, ~ 30 & n.3 (holding that Petitioners
failed to marshal one claim while determining that the same Petitioners marshaled
another claim). At its core, the marshaling requirement demands that a patty "marshal
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts,
the ... findings are not support by substantial evidence." Id.~ 30. To do so, the paity
may not "'simply attack [the agency's] credibility."'

•
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•
Associated Gen. Contractors 200 I UT 11 2, ,r 34 ( quoting Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W .
R.R., 2001 UT 77, ,r 36, 3 1 P.3d 557).
11 .

In light of the Marshaling Requ irement, the ALJ has ordered that Petitioners

were not subject to a page limitation in their briefing on the merits. Rather, the only
requirement has been that the briefing be of reasonable length. Thus, Petitioners have been

•

afforded every opportunity to carry their burden of proof in this proceeding to convince the
ALJ that any disputed factual , technical, or scientific agency determination is !J1l1. supported by
substantial evidence taken from the administrative record as a who le. In order to meet that
burden of proof, it wi ll be necessary for Petitioners to bring to the tribuna l's attention all

•

evidence from the admin istrative record that relates to any such disputed issue.

IV.

Preservation Standard
I.

Pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-30 I .5( I 0), " [a] person who files a request for

•

agency action has the burden of demonstrating that an issue or argument raised in the request for
agency action has been preserved." Lacking such demonstration, the ALJ "shall dismiss, with
prejudice, any issue or argument in a request for agency action that has not been preserved." Id.
2.

•

An issue or argument has been preserved for appeal if (a) the person raised it

during the public comment period and it was supported with sufficient information or
documentation to enable the director to fu lly consider the substance and significance of the issue,

•

Utah Code§ 19-l-301.5(4)(a)-(b); or (b) the issue was not reasonably ascertainable during the
public comment period, id.§ 19-l-301.5(6)(c).
3.

The failure to raise reasonably ascertainable issues or arguments relating to the

•

proposed permit during the public comment period deprives UDAQ from considering a ll

•
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•

•
possible issues prior to any issuance of an approval order and results in less effective agency

•

process.
4.

The demonstration that each issue has been properly preserved must be found in

the Petitioners' RAA at the outset of the case. See id.; see also Utah Admin. Code R305-7-

•

203(3)(h) (mandating that an RAA provide a showing on preservation).
5.

The fa ilure to raise issues in the RAA frustrates the goals of the permit review

adjudicative process by fai ling to place the respondents on notice of the specific claims. Such

•

fa ilure prevents UDAQ and Holly from assessing whether it should have supplemented the
record in response to newly presented claims in the RAA. Moreover, by not raising issues in the
RAA and waiting to reveal claims until the briefing, Petitioners prevented Holly from assessing

•

the full risks of proceeding with construction under an AO subject to a permit challenge .
6.

Any claims not preserved in accordance with the statutory standard set forth

above will be dismissed.

•

7.

Petitioners raised concerns in their RAA and then again in their Reply Brief about

whether due process had been satisfied where Holly submitted additional information to UDAQ
after the close of the public comment period and Petitioners were not given a second opportunity

•

to submit comments on this additional material.
8.

First, Petitioners have waived this claim by not briefing it in their opening brief.

Petitioners may not raise claims in their RAA and then wait to address such claims until their

•

Reply brief. See e.g. , Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ~ 9, 17 P.3d 1122
(refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief).
9.

•

Even if Petitioners' claims regarding procedural due process were not waived and

had merit, which is unclear in light of the fact that Petitioners do not adequately brief this issue,

19
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•
fail to cite any case law, or quote from the due process clause of the Utah or United States
Constitution, it is clear that Petitioners were afforded an opportunity to supplement the record
and raise issues in the RAA relating to any new information submitted after the close of the

•

public comment period.

I 0.

Petitioners were on notice that additional information had been submitted, as it

was referenced multiple times in the response to comments document UDAQ issued in

•

conjunction with the final Holly AO. Petitioners also had access to UDAQ's permitting file after
the Holly AO was issued before the deadline for filing their RAA.
11.

Moreover, this tribunal has allowed arguments that were not reasonably

•

ascertainable to be raised in the RAA, for the first time, in accordance with Utah Code Section
l 9-1-301.5(6)(c)(ii), and allowed the parties to supplement the record via motion in accordance
with Section 19-1-301.5(8)(c). This tribunal has also waived any page limits to allow the parties

•

the opportunity to fully develop any claims that arose either during the public comment period,
or after.
12.

Petitioners are incorrect that their due process rights have been implicated in this

•

7

case. Any claims or issues that were reasonably ascertainable during the public comment period
must have been raised in Petitioners' comments. Any claims that were not reasonably
ascertainable during the public comment period could be included for the first time in the

•

Petitioners' RAA but may not appear for the first time in Petitioners' briefing on the merits.
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate how, in light of this tribunal' s treatment of the claims in
accordance with 19-1-301.5, any procedural due process rights have been violated.

•

7

To the extent Petitioners claim that permit review adjudication statute and rules violate the due
process protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions, such claims are beyond the
jurisdiction of the ALJ to decide in this permit review proceeding. See e.g. , Nebeker v. Utah
State Tax Comm' n, 200 I UT 74, ,I 23, 34 P.3d 180.

•
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•

•
V.

•

Scope of Proceedings; Regulatory Background; and EPA Role

1.

The evidence Petitioners presented in this matter stands for the self-evident,

general proposition that air pollution is harmful to human health and to the environment. [IR at
009140-48; IR at 009139-45; IR at 009144-45; IR at 009145-47.] On that point, there is no

•

disagreement.
2.

In enacting the Utah Air Conservation Act, the Utah Legislature declared: " lt is

the policy of thi s state and the purpose of [the Utah Air Conservation Act] to achieve and

•

maintain levels of air quality which will protect human health and safety, and to the greatest
degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the comfort and
convenience of the people, promote the economic and social development of this state, and

•

facilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state." Section 19-2-101 (2), Utah Code
Ann.
3.

•

The Utah Legislature further dec lared that the "purpose" of the Utah Air

Conservation Act is to "(a) provide for a coordinated statewide program of air pollution
prevention, abatement, and control; (b) prov ide for an appropriate distribution of responsibilities
among the state and local units of government; (c) fac ilitate cooperation across jurisdictional

•

lines in dealing with problems of air pollution not confined within single jurisdictions; and (d)
provide a framework within which air quality may be protected and consideration given to the
public interest at all levels of planning and development within the state." Section 19-2-1 01(4),

•

Utah Code Ann .
4.

Similarly, in enacting the Clean Air Act, the Congress found, among other things:
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles,
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including

•
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•
injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; [and]
(3) that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments ....
42 U.S.C. § 740 I (a).

5.

Congress also stated that the "primary goal" of the Clean Air Act is to "encourage

•
•

or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ... for pollution
prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (c).
6.

In these proceedings, I am charged to conduct a permit review adjudicative

•

proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-301 .5 and Utah Adm in.
Code R305-7.
7.

As a matter of law, any source's compliance with the permitting requirements set

forth in the Clean Air Act and the Utah Air Conservation Act satisfies the public policy of
protecting the public and the environment from the harms of air pollution.
8.

The question before me in these proceedings is not whether air pollution is

•

harmful but rather whether the Holly AO is in compliance with applicable laws, rules, and
regulations. Based on the evidence in this record, the unavoidable conclusion is that the Holly
AO is in compliance with the law, all as explained in more detai l below.
9.

•

The conclusions reached in these proposed Findings and Fact and Conclusions of

Law, to the effect that the Holly AO is in compliance with all applicable laws, rules, and
regulations, notwithstanding Petitioners' objections, find additional suppo1t in the EPA 's
independent review of the Holly AO and that agency's conclusion that the Holly AO may be
issued. See EPA Comment Letters [IR004001-004005; IR007840-00784 l]. In Alaska Dep 't of

•
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•

•
Envtl. Conservation v. EPA , 540 U.S. 461, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held

•

that EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state permitting authorities' BACT
determinations under the PSD program and has authority to issue stop construction orders if it
reasonably believes that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. The CAA also

•

provides EPA with concurrent enforcement authority that is directly applicable to the present
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 7413(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available to
the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the CAA with

•

respect to construction of a new source or modification of an existing source). See Jennifer A .
Davis Foster, Note, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The
Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 Missouri L. Rev., Issue 4, at I
(Fall 2004). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that if in EPA's independent judgment, any of the
objections and issues Petitioners have briefed on the merits were meritorious, EPA had an
independent duty and authority to pursue such issues. EPA declined to do so even after being

•

given the opportunity in connection with the Holly AO .

I 0.

In this permit review adjudicative proceeding, we have a somewhat unusual

situation in administrative law where not one but two regulatory agencies with significant

•

technical expertise and concurrent (and somewhat overlapping) legal jurisdiction have been
involved in the procedural and substantive process that led to the issuance of the Permit. This
situation provides a second layer of regulatory oversight to ensure that the applicable procedural

•

and substantive requirements of the Clean Air Act, as adopted and enforced through the Utah Air
Conservation Act in the spirit of "cooperative federalism," have been met.

•
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CLAIMS PETITIONERS
FAILED TO BRIEF ON THE MERITS
I.

Petitioners' RAA contains a number of claims that Petitioners did not raise in

•

their briefing on the merits. Those claims are listed in a Table of Waived Claims attached hereto
as Appendix A, incorporated herein by this reference.
2.

Both Holly and UDAQ pointed out in their briefing and at oral argument that

•

Petitioners failed to brief these claims and therefore wa ived such claims. Petitioners did not
rebut this argument and at oral argument conceded that this tribunal need not address claims they

•

did not brief.
3.

Because Petitioners failed to brief these claims, they should be dismissed with

prejudice on two separate and independent grounds: (a) waiver; and (b) failure to carry
Petitioners' burden of proof. See, e.g., See Sierra Club v. BOGM, 20 12 UT 73, ~ 3 I; Kennon,

•

2009 UT 77, ~ 29; W. Jordan City, 2006 UT 27, ~ 29; Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, *2
n.3 ("[A]rguments not raised in an appellant's initial brief are waived."); Brown v. Glover, 2000
UT 89, ~ 23, 16 P.3d 540 ("Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were

•

not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the
appellate court.").

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CLAIMS PETITIONERS
BRIEFED ON THE MERITS

•

Petitioners' remaining claims can be grouped into eleven independent claims, each of
which will be addressed below. Before addressing the specific claims, I would like to make the
following general findings of fact relating to the regulatory context, inasmuch as the general aim

•

of many of Petitioners' comments go to the issue of the harms caused by air pollution.

•
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•
I.

UDAO Is Properly Regulating the Holly Refining Flares as Required by Subpart

Ja .

•

Petitioners' first specific argument on the merits goes to the interplay between the
regulation of the Holly flares, as required by law, and the Holly AO at issue in this matter.

•

Petitioners argue that the Holly AO is inva lid because UDAQ did not "properly regulate" the
refining flares by explicitly listing and explaining every applicable provision of the regulation
governing the flares (New Source Performance Standards ("NSPS"), 40 C.F .R. Part 60, Subpart

•

Ja ("Subpart Ja"). [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 4-12.] More specifically, Petitioners argue that

"the Director has fa iled to specify in the AO - or elsewhere - the exact conditions of Subpart Ja
that apply to the Holly Refining Flares and has failed to impose these conditions on the faci lity.

•

Without particu lar AO terms and conditions that reflect the relevant Supbart Ja standards on the
flares, the Heavy Crude Project will not meet the requirements of Utah Adm in Code R307-40 l8(1)(b)(vi), Rule 307-401-8( l)(a) and Rule R307-401-8(5)." [Petitioners' Opening Briefat4-5.]

•

For the reasons set forth below, this argument should be rejected .
A. Findings of Fact

I.

Holly's NOi acknowledges that Subpart Ja applies to the refinery generally and to

the flares specifica lly. [See IR002866-87, Holly's July 20 12 NOi ("The fo llowing Subpa1ts are

•

applicable to the proposed project...Subpart Ja- Standards of Performance for Petroleum
Refineries"); IR002868-69 ("The provisions of [40 C.F .R. Part 60 Subpart Ja] apply to the new
FCCU and fue l gas combustion devices, including flares and process heaters."); 8 IR002962

•
•

8

When Holly submitted its NOI, Subpart Ja included all flares in its definition of "fuel gas
combustion device." See 40 C.F.R. § 60. 10I a(2012). However, during Holly' s permit review
process, the regulation was revised to separate fue l gas combustion devices from flares . 40
C.F.R. § 60.10I a(20 13). Despite this change in the regu lations, in Holly's NOi and the Source
Plan Review, flares were grouped together with other fuel gas combustion devices and subject to
the same em ission requirements. See IR005871-72.
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(" Because the flare is located at a petroleum refinery, the flare must comply with the

•

requirements and limitations presented in 40 C.F.R. Part 60 Subpart Ja.")].
2.

Holly's NOI also incorporated emission limits derived from Subpart Ja for

combustion devices. [IR002868-69, Holly's July 2012 NOI ("Holly will comply with the
following emission limitations ... Holly shall not burn in any new fuel gas combustion device any
fuel gas that contains H2 S in excess of 162 ppmv determined hourly on a three-hour rolling
average basis and H2S in excess of 60 ppmv determined daily on a 365 successive calendar day
rolling average basis.").]
3.

UDAQ independently recognized in the Source Plan Review that Subpart Ja

applies to the Holly Refinery and that Holly is subject to the emission limitations contained in
Subpart Ja. [IR00857 l -8572, Source Plan Review ("40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja: The provisions of
this subpart apply to the new FCCU and fuel gas combustion devices, including flares and

•

process heaters. Holly Refinery will comply with the following emission limitations ... Holly
Refinery shall not burn in any new fuel gas combustion device any fuel gas that contains H2 S in
excess of 162 ppmv determined hourly on a three-hour rolling average basis and H 2S in excess of

•

60 ppmv determined daily on a 365 successive calendar day rolling average basis.").] UDAQ
also made clear that Subpart Ja applies to the flares in its Response to Comments Memo.
[IR009183 , Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpa1t Ja applies to the Woods Cross

•

refinery generally and to both the No1th and South Flares.")].

4.

UDAQ determined that Holly is required to comply with Subpart Ja whether or

not such emission limits were contained in the Holly AO. [See IR009 I 83, Response to

•

Comments Memo (" Regardless of whether the requirements [ofNSPS] are in the AO, Holly
Refinery must comply with all applicable subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation of any

•
26

ADJ011561

•

•
federal limits."); IR009252, Holly AO (listing Subpart Jain Section 111, "Applicable Federal

•

Requirements").]
5.

The EPA made no comments regarding issues with the applicability or

enforcement of Subpart Ja as to the Holly Refinery generally or as to the AO specifically. [See

•

IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter; JR007840-7841 , EPA Second Comment Letter.]
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

6.

•

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858-7860, Petitioners' Second Comment
Letter.]
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof

•

7.

Petitioners assert that this issue is purely a question of law-whether UDAQ is

required to explicitly outline and explain every applicable provision of Subpart Ja in the Holly
AO. Petitioners concede that Subpart Ja applies to Holly's flares and other combustion sources,

•

but argue that the AO is deficient because each applicable provision is not explained in detail in
the Holly AO.
8.

•

The question of whether Utah law requires applicable NSPS provisions to be

listed in approval orders is a question of law that the agency has been given discretion to
interpret and so shall be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Whether UDAQ correctly
applied a particular NSPS provision and whether Holly is in compliance with NSPS are mixed

•

questions of law and fact that are reviewed for reasonableness and whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the determinations. Whether Holly is in compliance with
subpart Ja is a question that is specifically handled by DAQ's enforcement section and therefore
beyond the scope of these proceedings .
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•
9.

Jn their briefing, Petitioners failed to reference any of the specific evidence in

•

Holly's NOJ in which Holly recognized it was subject to Subpart Ja.
10.

Additiona lly, Petitioners' reference to other evidence in the record is re legated to

footnotes and lacks any description of the document being referenced.
11.

Because Petitioners have omitted multiple pieces of evidence from their analysis

that show Subpart Ja does apply to the Holly Refinery, they have failed to meet their burden of

•

proof on this issue for the reasons described in more detail above.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
12.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

•

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' arguments should fail on
the merits for the independent reasons discussed below.
13.

Subpart Ja is one of many NSPS the EPA has promulgated for particular types of

new or modified sources that EPA has determined are major emitters of criteria air pollutants,
such as petroleum refineries. See generally 42 U.S .C. § 7411, Standards of Performance for
New Stationary Sources (granting the administrator of EPA the authority to regulate ce11ain

•

sources). The applicability of a particular NSPS to a particular source is often specifica lly
outlined in the text of the regulation app licable to that source category. See e.g., 40 C.F.R. §
60.1 00a (defining modification for purposes of Subpart Ja applicability). The applicability of
NSPS is evaluated separately fro m other Clean Air Act regulations such as the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration Program ("PSD"), which is implemented through individual preconstruction permits like the Holly AO. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503 (setting forth the
pre-construction permitting requirements).
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•

•
14.

•

Unlike the PSD program, the NSPS regulations apply to a source whether or not

that source is undergoing a modification requiring pre-construction approval. See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. § 60.1 (a) (defining NSPS applicability); id. § 60.2 (defining when "construction" or
"modification" takes places for purposes ofNSPS applicability); Envt'I Defense v. Duke Energy

•

Corp., 549 U.S. 561 , 577-78 (2007) (recognizing the distinction between the NSPS and PSD
regulations). Therefore, NSPS compliance and/or applicabi lity determinations are not dependent
upon inclusion of the NSPS regulation's language in the pre-construction permit. Compliance or

•

non-compliance with NSPS is entirely separate from the PSD permitting process .
15.

The oversight of Holly's compliance with Subpart Ja is a matter for UDAQ's

enforcement section. This is true regardless of whether the provisions of Subpart Ja are in the

•

permit or not. [IR009183, Response to Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the
requirements [ofNSPS] are in the AO, Holly Refinery must comply with all applicable
subparts . .. Holly Refinery is not in violation of any federal limits.").]

•

16.

If Holly were in violation of Subpart Ja, contrary to UDAQ's determination, the

Clean Air Act provides Petitioners with a separate remedy in the form of a citizen suit under
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (Clean Air Act citizen suit

•

provision). Challenging compliance with Subpart Ja in this permit review proceeding is
therefore misplaced.
17.

•

Petitioners also are incorrect in their assertion that R307-415 of the Utah

Administrative Code requires all federally-applicable NSPS requirements to be included in the
Holly AO. The regulations Petitioners cite apply only to Title V operating permits- not
approval orders. The Title V operating permit regulations are independent of the approval order
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•
pre-construction permit regulations. Compare Utah Admin. Code R307-415 (Title V operating
permit regulations), with id. R307-401 (pre-construction approval order permit regulations).
18.

•

The purpose of Title V is to consolidate all applicable federal and state regulatory

requirements into one permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 71.1 (b) ("All sources subject to the operating
permit requirements of title V and this part shall have a permit to operate that assures compliance
by the source with all applicable requirements."). Thus, there is no legal requirement to include

•

all applicable NSPS regulations in an approval order.
19.

Accordingly, Petitioners' arguments that the applicable provisions of Subpart Ja

must be included in the Holly AO fail on the merits and should be dismissed.

II.

•

The North Flare is Subject to Subpart Ja.

I.

The Petitioners next contend that the Director erred in reversing his position

regarding the applicability of Subpart Jato the North Flare. [Petitoners' Opening Brief at 12-

•

15.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

The Director determined that Holly must comply with all applicable subparts of

•

the NSPS regulations and that Holly was not in violation of any federal limits. [JR.009183 ,
Response to Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the requirements [of NSPS] are in the
AO, Holly Refinery must comply with all applicable subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation

•

of any federal limits.").]

3.

The Director determined that the North Flare was not being modified as part of

this project and therefore was outside the scope of the permitting action. [IR009183, Response

•

to Comments Memo ("The North Flare is not being modified as part of the project proposed by

•
30
ADJ011565

•

•
Holly Refinery in its NOi, so it is outside the scope of this permit action. NSPS Subpart Ja

•

applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares." ).]
4.

According to undisputed evidence in the record, Holly's North Flare was subject

to and in compliance with Subpart J and A of the NSPS regulations. [IR007999, Email

•

Correspondence between Eric Benson and Camron Harry ("Holly 's North Flare was appl icable
and compliant w ith 40 CFR 60 Subpart A & J upon startup.").]
5.

•

bring the North Flare into compliance with applicable NSPS standards. [See IR004800-4801 ,
Consent Decree (requiring flaring devices to become NSPS compliant).]
6.

•

A consent decree entered in 2008 between Holly and EPA required that Holly

As of December 2008, Ho lly reported to the EPA that its North Flare was in

compliance with NSPS. [See IR007946, IR00795 I, Semi-Annual Progress Report to EPA and
UDAQ re Consent Decree (reporting that " Performance tests for both North and South Flares
[were] conducted December I 0, 2008" and " [the] North Flare [was] subject to NSPS as of date

•

of[Consent Decree] entry, e liminate all routinely-generated gas" and compliance status was
"Complete .... [N]o routinely-generated gas sent to the flare. ").]
7.

•

In connection w ith its independent review of the entire Holly AO, the EPA made

no comments about the No1th Flare or Subpart Ja, compliance with the Consent Decree, or any
of the other related issues raised by Petitioners here. [See IR00400 1, EPA First Comment Letter;
I R007840-7841, E PA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
8.

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1 -301.5(4) by raising

the issue du ring the public comment period. [See IR007858, IR007864, Petitioners' Second
Comment Letter.]
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C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof

9.

Petitioners' argument that the Director reversed his position re lative to the North

Flare is a question of fact and the Petitioners bear the burden to demonstrate that the Director's

•

deci sion is not supported by substantial ev idence in the record and was an abuse of discretion.

I 0.

Petitioners, in the ir briefing, fai led to marsha l all of the evidence that supported

the Director's ultimate conclusion that Subpart Ja applied to the North Flare and that Holly was

•

in compliance with this Subpart. By contrast, Holly did marshal a ll of the evidence in its
briefing.

11.

Nothing in the record supports the asse1tion that the Director changed his mind

•

about the applicability of Subpa1t Ja. From the beginning of the project, all parties agreed that
this NSPS provision applied to the Holly Refinery.

12.

Accordingly, Petitioners fa iled to satisfy their burden of proof for this claim.

•

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
13.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fa il on the merits

•

for the independent reasons discussed below.

14.

The legislative intent of a permit review adjudicative process is to allow for an

evolving understanding of a project before any fina l decisions are made. The Director may, at

•

the beginning of a project, take a position in light of the information in the record at the time but
later reverse that position based on additional information presented during the public comment
period or otherwise, such as information provided by the source upon request. The question that

•

must be answered in this permit rev iew adjudication proceeding is whether the Director's final
decision to issue the Holly AO is supported by substantial evidence in the record. This question
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•

•
remains the same whether or not the Director may have changed his mind during the permitting

•

process. In fact, the entire point of the permitting process as defined by the Utah Legislature is
to allow for well-informed administrative decisionmaking. To the extent that the Director may
have reached a different view on any given point suggests that the process is working as

•

intended .
15.

In this case, the Petitioners do not present any evidence that there was a reversal

of position with respect to the applicability of Subpa11 Jato the North Flare. To the contrary, all

•

of the evidence in the record supports the position that the Director ultimately took, which was
that Subpart Ja applied to the North Flare.
16.

•

Flare were routed to the North Flare and this modification triggered NSPS Subpart Ja
applicability. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 13.]
17.

•

Petitioners argue that the North Flare was modified when all gases from the South

Regardless of whether the North Flare was modified, the record evidence

demonstrates that Holly and the Director agreed that Subpart Ja applied for this project.
[IR009 l 83; IR009183; IR004800-4801 ; IR007946, IR007951.] Therefore, any evidence that a
modification may have occurred on the North Flare would only be superfluous, not

•

contradictory.
18.

The EPA raised no procedural or substantive comments regarding with UDAQ's

handling of Subpart Ja. [See IR004001 , EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 l , EPA

•

Second Comment Letter.]
19.

The substantial weight of the evidence suppo11s the Director's ultimate

determination that Subpart Ja applies to Holly's North Flare and Petitioners' arguments that the
Director contradicted himself should be dismissed with prejudice .
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•
III.

A BACT Analysis Was Not Required for the North Flare.
I.

Petitioners argue that UDAQ erred in failing to perform or require a BACT

analysis for the North Flare. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 15-16] . For the reasons set forth
below, this argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

Holly did not propose any physical mod ification of the North Flare as part of the

•

project approved in the Holly AO. [IR009183, Response to Comments Memo ("The North F lare
is not being modified as part of the project proposed by Holly Refinery in its NOi, so it is outside
the scope of this permit action. NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally

•

and to both the North and South Flares."); fR009189, Response to Comments Memo ("Because
ne ither the North Flare nor the SRU will undergo any physical change or experience an increase
in emissions as a result of Holly Refinery's proposed project, the 'emission units' are not subject

•

to the BACT analysis requirements in the PSD rules.").]
3.

UDAQ did not anticipate any increase in overall flare emissions as a result of the

project. [IR00856 l , Source Plan Review ("there is no reason to assume that upset condition

•

emissions will be any greater after the proj ect is complete than before the project.").]
4.

The North Flare is already subject to and in compliance with NSPS requirements.

[JR009 l 83, Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross
refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares.").]

5.

UDAQ determined that BACT for flares was compliance with Subpart Ja.

[IR0085 l 6-l 7, Source Plan Review ("The only technically feas ible control options for emissions

•

of all pollutants from flares are: (1) equipment design specifications and good combustion work
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•

•
practices ... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems ... DAQ NSR recommends compliance with the

•

requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart .la as BACT." ).]
6.

According to the record, prior to the authorization of this project, all of the flare

gases were being routed to the North Flare. [1R08200, Holly' s first revised netting analysis

•

("currently al I gases are routed to the north flare" ).]
7.

The EPA raised no procedural or substantive comments regarding UDAQ's

analysis regarding BACT for the North Flare. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter;

•

IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.]
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
8.

•

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858, IR007864, Petitioners' Second
Comment Letter.]
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof

•

9.

Petitioners' claim that UDAQ erred in failing to perform a BACT analysis on the

North Flare is a mixed question of law and fact. There is also a dispute regarding the correct
interpretation of the regulations that trigger BACT, which is a question of law reviewed under a

•

clearly erroneous standard. The application of that law to the facts in this case triggers the mixed
question standard of review in which the ALJ reviews the Director' s determination for
reasonableness.

•

I 0.

Petitioners failed to marshal all of the evidence related to their claim .

11.

Specifically, Petitioners failed to cite UDAQ's finding that BACT for flares is

compliance with Subpart .la and that the North Flare is already subject to NSPS requirements .
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•
12.

Accordingly, Petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of proof on this claim and it

•

can be dismissed on this basis.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
13.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
I 4.

In the briefing on this issue, Petitioners erroneously conflate the same definition

of modification they cite in their NSPS arguments. However, a "modification" that triggers a
BACT analysis is different than what is required to trigger NSPS applicability. See, e.g., Envt'l

•

Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 , 577 (2007) ("The 1980 PSD regulations on
' modification' simply cannot be taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the
NSPS.").
15.

•

A modification for purposes of BACT applicability occurs when a person

" intend[s] to make modifications or relocate an existing installation which will or might
reasonably be expected to increase the amount or change the effect of, or the character of, air

•

contaminants discharged." Utah Admin. Code R307-401-3(l)(a) (emphasis added). An
" installation" is defined as "a discrete process with identifiable emissions which may be part of a
larger industrial plant" and a "modification" is defined as "any planned change in a source which
results in a potential increase of emission." Id. R307-I 00-2.
16.

Accordingly, for there to be a "modification" triggering BACT applicability, there

must be (I) a planned change in an emissions unit that (2) is reasonably expected to increase the

•

amount or character of the emissions. The federal regulations contain similar requirements. See
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 U)(3) (BACT is required on units that experience a net emissions increase "as a
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•

•
result of a physical change or change in the method of operation in the unit."); 71 Fed. Reg .

•

54,235, 54,240 (Sept. 14, 2006) (" We further note that our current rules do not require BACT or
LAER at unchanged units ...."); Letter from Robert B. Miller, Chief of the Permits and Grants
Section of the EPA to Lloyd Eagan, Director of the Bureau of A ir Management in Wisconsin
(Feb. 8, 2000) ("[W]here an emissions unit has not undergone a physical or operational change,
BACT does not apply.").
17.

•

Here, UDAQ specifically found that Holly was not proposing any changes to its

North Flare as part of the project. A shift of emissions from one flare to the other does not result
in increased emissions, only redistributed emissions. In its NSPS regulations, the EPA discussed
the analogous situation of tw o interconnected flares, stating "that interconnections between flares

•

will not alter the cumulative amount of gas being flared (i.e., interconnecting two fl ares does not
result in an emissions increase relative to the two single fl ares prior to interconnection) ....
Considering this, we agree that the interconnection of two flares does not necessarily result in a

•

modification of the flare and we have specifically excluded flare interconnections from the
modification provisions.... [W]e agree that connections that do not increase the emissions from
the flare should not trigger a modification ...." 77 Fed. Reg. 56,422, 56,438 (Sept. I 2, 2012).
Petitioners' argument is not the law.
18.

Moreover, to the extent Petitioners are arguing that the re-route of gases to the

North Flare constitutes a change in operation, such a change occurred well before Holly initiated

•

the current black wax crude project. This is evidenced by the language Petitioners themselves
quote which reflects that "currently all gases are routed to the north flare." [IR08200, Holly's
first revised netting analysis (emphasis added).]
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•
19.

Without a change in operation or an increase in emissions for the North Flare,

Petitioners' argument (that a " modification" of the North Flare was part of this project triggering
a BACT analysis for the North Flare) is not suppo1ted by the record and should be rejected.
20.

•

Even if Petitioners could demonstrate by substantial evidence that Holly proposed

to modify the North Flare, conducting a BACT analysis on the North Flare would be superfluous
because the North Flare is already subject to Subpart Ja, which itself constitutes BACT for

•

Holly's flares. [See IR0085 I 6-17, Source Plan Review ("The only technically feasible control
options for emissions of all pollutants from flares are: (1) equipment design specifications and
good combustion work practices ... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems .. . DAQ NSR recommends

•

compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja as BACT."); see also IR009183,
Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally
and to both the North and South Flares.").] Petitioners' argument fails for this independent

•

reason as well.

21.

Finally, the record suggests that Petitioners' argument is ultimately moot because

Holly is required by the recently-adopted PM2_5 SIP to install flare gas recovery technology at the

•

Refinery,9 which Petitioners do not contest is the most stringent pollution control device
currently available for flares.

10

[See IR0085 l 6, Source Plan Review (referring to flare gas

recover as "the top control technology").] This requirement is binding on Holly regardless of

•

whether it is explicitly stated in the Holly AO. As such, even if Petitioners' argument were

9

The Utah PM 2_5 SIP requires "all major source petroleum refineries in or affecting a designated
PM2.s non-atta inment area within the State shall install and operate a flare gas recovery system."
See Utah PM 2_5 SIP, Section TX, Part H, p. 43.

•

°Flare gas recovery is a system that captures gases that would otherwise be combusted in the

1

flare and redirects those gases as fuel sources for other refinery operations. This reduces the
emissions associated with flaring and is an economic use of excess fuel gas.
38
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•

•
correct, there is no need for a remand regarding control technology on the North Flare because

•

there are no additional pollution controls that could be required of Holly .
22.

Accordingly, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate with substantial evidence in

the record as a whole that UDAQ erred in not performing a BACT analysis on the North Flare
and this claim should be dismissed with prejudice on the merits.

IV.

•

Emissions From Holly's Flares Were Properly Calculated and Are Regulated in
Accordance With the Unavoidable Breakdown Rule.
1.

Petitioners next argue that the emissions from the flares have not been properly

calculated and that UDAQ has not been appropriately regulating the flares in accordance with the
Unavoidable Breakdown Rule (" UBR"). [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 16-22.] For the reasons

•

stated below, this argument should be rejected .

A. Findings of Fact

2.

•

In the Holly AO, UDAQ imposed a number of emission limits that included

emissions from the flares, thereby limiting the routine emissions from the flares. [See IR009225,
Holly AO ("Previous exclusions from the AO emission caps will be removed therefore the AO
emission caps will be source wide caps."); IR009240, Holly AO (" PM 10 Combustion Emissions
Cap Sources ... Flares."); IR009247, Holly AO ("PM10 emissions from all combustion sources

•

shall not exceed 4 7.5 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.13 tpd."); IR009245, Holly AO ("The
emission of SO2 into the atmosphere from all sources (excluding routine turnaround maintenance
emissions) shall not exceed 110.3 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.31 tons per day.");

•

IR009245, Holly AO ("Emissions of SO2 shall be limited as follows ... All other sources 0.21
(tpd) 74.9 (tpy)."); IR009245 , Holly AO ("For all the above listed emission points a CEM shall
be used to determine compliance as outlined in 11.B.3.e."); JR009247-48, Holly AO (" Total 24-

•

hour PM10 emissions for the sources shall be calculated by adding the daily results of the above
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•
PM 10 emissions equations for natural gas, plant gas, and fuel oil combustion. Results shall be
tabulated for every day, and records shall be kept."); IROO8568, Source Plan Review (discussion

•

of inclusion of flares into S02 and PM emission caps).]
3.

In response to Petitioners' comments that the emission estimates for the flares

were inaccurate because they did not include upset emissions, UDAQ explained that Holly's
emissions were capped and any exceedance due to an upset would constitute an exceedance of
the cap. [JROO9187, Response to Comments Memo ("The commenter is correct that there are no
limits on the flares. This is because the flares are in place as control device[s] for upset
conditions. However Holly Refinery does have to comply with the requirements of 40 CFR 60

•

Subpart Ja. The Commenter is incorrect that ' upset' conditions are not addressed ... 'the
refineries were allowed maximum never-to-be exceeded daily limits of PM 10, S02, NOx based on
the apparent variability. Emissions were capped at these maximum levels from the sources that

•

could have their emissions metered by fuel metering/and calculations and from the other sources
that would be stack tested every 1-3 years."' (quoting Utah SIP § IX.A.6.c.(2) (1991 )).]
4.

The assumption in determining the PTE for the flares was that upset emissions

would be zero because they are not part of normal refinery operation. [1ROO2852, July 2012 NOI
("PM10 and PM2_5 emissions for the Woods cross refinery flares were assumed to be zero."); see

also IRO02857, July 2012 NOJ ("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be
zero.").]
5.

According to the evidence in the record, the PTE for the flares was calculated

based on the purge gas flowing through the flare and planned startups and shutdowns, but did not

•

include calculations for upset emissions. [IROO3 l 75-76, July 2012 NOJ (recognizing emissions
from the flares of S0 2 were estimated based on the assumption of 1700 scfl1 non-upset

•
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•

•
throughput to the flare. This is the " purge gas" amount that must run to the flare to keep it from

•

backdrafting); JR009196, Response to Comments ("startup and shutdown emissions were
included in the analysis"); IR008560-8561, Source Plan Review ("to be conservative and
representative of potential increases in emissions from SU and SD, UDAQ and Holly Refinery

•

have agreed to include these emissions in Step I of the PSD and NNSR applicability analysis");
IR008522, Source P lan Review (" To ensure proper flare operation, Holly Refinery will install
flow meters and gas combustion monitors on the flare gas line."); IR009211 ("The combustion

•

of flue gas through the pilot flame is accounted for in the emission calculations.").]
6.

According to the record, upset emissions from flares are unpredictable and

uncontrollable because the flare is the safety valve for excess refinery gases generated in a period

•

of malfunction. [IR0085 l 6, Source Plan Review ("The flare system at Holly Refinery provides
for the safe disposal of hydrocarbon gases which are vented automatically from process units
through pressure relief valves, control valves or are manually vented."); IR00856 I, Source Plan

•

Review ("Section 3.6 of the July 20 12 NOi lists upset conditions for both the No1th and South
Flares. These upset conditions (malfunctions) do not include normal process flow combustion at
the flares and there is no reason to assume that upset condition emissions will be any greater

•

after the project is complete than before the project. Although these emissions have not been
included in the netting analysis, they are noted below for reference.").]
7.

The Holly AO does not contain exceptions for emissions due to malfunctions at

the refinery; such excess emissions are subject to the UBR. [IR009 I 96, Response to Comments
Memo ("All limits of the permit apply at all times, which include periods of startup, shutdown
and malfunction. The ITA contains no exclusion for these events."); IR0092 11 ("Flare

•
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•
emissions during malfunction/ upset conditions are regu lated through R307-107 (ITA Condition

•

11.3).").]

8.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA raised no

procedural or substantive comments regarding with UDAQ's regulation of the Refinery Flares,
including the UBR. [See IR00400 I , EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 J, EPA Second
Comment Letter.]

•

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

9.

Petitioners have partially preserved this argument in accordance with Section I 9-

1-301.5(4). In their comments, Petitioners challenged the calculation of the PTE for the flares

•

but said nothing about misapplication or nonco mpliance with the UBR. [See IR009056-9057,
Sagady second comment letter.]

I 0.

Petitioners could have reasonably ascertained this issue as the UBR was

•

specifically referenced in the !TA. [See IR008453.]

11.

The argument that the issue is preserved because UDAQ referenced the UBR in

the Response to Comments Memo is misplaced. In the responses, UDAQ simply referenced the

•

UBR in response to an entirely unrelated comment. [See I R0092 I 0-9211, Response to
Comments Memo (referring to R307- l 07 in response to the comment that "nothing provided by
the applicant's final revised notice of intent justifies the claimed 98% control efficiency claimed

•

for VOC, HAP and CO Destruction efficiency from Applicant's open air flares").]

I 2.

UDAQ's unrelated response does not save Petitioners from the requirement to

raise their issues and arguments in a way that gives UDAQ notice of the substance of the issue.
13.

To the extent Petitioners argue that the UBR has been violated by Holly or is not

being enforced by UDAQ, the argument is beyond the scope of w hat was raised during the

•
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•

•
comment period and is unpreserved pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(4). Accordingly,

•

it should be dismissed.
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof

14.

•

The claims Petitioners assert (both preserved and unpreserved) regarding the PTE

for the flares constitute mixed questions of law and fact. The questions of law involve the
interpretation of the UBR and the regulations and guidance relating to how PTE for flares should
be calculated-specifically, whether upset em issions must be included in such calculations. The

•

application of those laws to the facts of this case and the calculations performed by Holly create
a mixed question. Accordingly, a reasonableness standard of review shall apply.
15.

•

Petitioners have fai led to meet their burden of proof for this claim because they

failed in their briefing to marshal all of the relevant evidence from the record .
16.

Petitioners ignore multiple pieces of evidence that explain how Holly calculated

the PTE for the flares in accordance with applicable guidance and the UBR.

•

17.

Having fa iled to meet their burden of proof, Petitioners' claim should be

dismissed on this basis.
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits

•

18.

Even if Petitioners had properly preserved all of their arguments regarding the

PTE calculations of the flare emissions, and even had carried their burden of proof (or to the
extent marshaling is not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law)), Petitioners'

•

claims fail on the merits for the independent reasons discussed below .
i.

19.

•

UBR Application

Petitioners claim that the UBR requires emission limits on sources of malfunction

emiss ions. Nothing in the plain language of the UBR requires numeric limits on malfunction
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em issions. Nor is there any other authority in support of requiring such a limit as part of the
UBR. To the extent that Petitioners' arguments constitute a request for rulemaking, they must be

•

rejected in these permit review proceedings. 11
20.

In any event, such limits are impossible for malfunction emissions because such

emissions are, by their very nature, unpredictable and uncontrollable. [See IR008516.]
21.

The UBR simply sets forth criteria that must be met in the event of excess

malfunction emissions to allow UDAQ the enforcement discretion to forgo monetary penalties.
See Utah Admin. Code R307-107-I to -3.

22.

Stated differently, the UBR assumes that malfunction emissions are violations of

•

an applicable approval order but affords to UDAQ enforcement discretion regarding the
imposition of fines and penalties if a source is otherwise in compl iance with the other
requirements of the rule, including monitoring and good combustion practices. Utah Admin.

•

Code R307-107-1 to -3 (requiring reporting of breakdown emissions and giving UDAQ
enforcement discretion).
23.

The limit in the Holly AO for malfunction emissions from the flare is zero tpy,

•

which is accounted for in the overall SO2 and PM emission caps. [See IR002857, July 2012 NOi
("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be zero.").] Any violation of those
limits due to an upset or malfunction subjects Holly to the enforcement discretion of UDAQ

•

under the UBR.

11

Petitioners may not advocate for a rulemaking change in a permit review adjudicative
proceeding. [See In the Matter of: South Davis Sewer District, Order (Remand to ALJ with
Directions on Determining Whether There is a Basis to Grant Friends Standing to Intervene),
March 29, 20 11 , p. 11 ("a permitting proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to
advance adoption of new rules or challenge existing ones").] Such a request is only proper in a
ru lemaking proceeding under Utah Code Section 630-3-1 0 I et seq.

•
•
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•

•
24.

•

Any enfo rcement action by UDAQ, however, would be an independent

proceeding separate from this adjudication and not a valid basis to remand the AO.
ii.
25.

•

Flare PTE

Petitioners challenge the PTE calculations of SO2 and PM from the flares by

arguing that the PTE inappropriately excluded upset and malfunction emissions. This argument
fa ils for three reasons.
26.

•

First, the law does not require the inclusion of upset emissions in a PTE

calculation for flares because such upset emissions are not considered pa1t of normal operation .

See Sierra Club v. Wyoming Dep 't ofEnvtl. Quality, 25 1 P.3d 3 10, 3 14 (Wyo. 20 11 ) (ho lding
that " hypothesizing the worst possible emissions from the worst possible operation is the wrong

•

way to calculate potential to emit. .. PTE includes only emissions that occur during normal
operations" thus "cold start" emissions and " malfunctions" were properly excluded from the
plant's PTE); see also Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United

•

States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 11 4 1, 1158 (D. Colo. 1988) (" [P]otential to emit
does not refer to the maximum emissions that can be generated by a source hypothesizing the
worst conceivable operation. Rather, the concept contemplates the maximum emissions that can

•

be generated while operating the source as it is intended to be operated and as it is normally
operated.").
27.

•

Ho lly excluded malfunction emissions from its PTE calculations for the flares

and, instead, calculated emissions based on the " average non-upset throughput to [the] flare" and
appropriate emissions factors. [See IR 003 175.]

•
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•
28.

Second, Petitioners' arguments challenging the PTE calculations for the flares

also fail because federally enforceable permit conditions in the Holly AO limit malfunction

•

emissions to zero tons per year from the flares.
29.

PTE is defined as:

the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical
and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of
the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted,
stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the
effect it would have on emissions is federally enforceable.

•

40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(4) (emphasis added); Utah Adm in. Code R307-101-2 (same definition).
30.

Holly assumed a limit of zero tpy for malfunction emissions, which it factored

into its emissions totals for the SO2 and PM 1o emission caps in the Holly AO. [See IR002857,
July 2012 NOi ("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be zero.").] The SO 2

•

and PM 10 emission caps, which include emissions from all combustion sources including flares,
are federally enforceable operational limitations. [See IR009245, Holly AO (Section 11.B.6.a,
"The emission of SO2 into the atmosphere from all sources (excluding routine turnaround

•

maintenance sessions) shall not exceed 110.3 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.3 I tons per
day."); see also IR009247, Holly AO (Section II.B.7.a "PM 10 emissions from all combustion
sources shall not exceed 47.5 tons per rolling 12-rnonth period.").]
3 1.

If Holly exceeds its emission caps due to an upset or malfunction, Holly will be in

violation of its permit and subject to enforcement by UDAQ. [See IR009196, Response to
Comments Memo ("All limits of the permit apply at all times, which include periods of startup,

•

shutdown and malfunction.").] The UBR was put in place to deal with these very kinds of
emissions.

•
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•

•
32.

•

Finally, the 240 tpy that Petitioners contend w ill be emitted every year as a result

of upset emissions was a conservative estimate of what malfunctions could be- not what they
actually are. [See IR003780.]
33.

•

actual recorded historic malfunction emissions from the flare averaged only 34 tpy of SO2 from
both flares combined. 12 [Id.]
34.

•

In fact, the em ission calculation documentation in the record demonstrates that

An addition of 34 tpy of SO2 from the flares, even if such emissions were required

for purposes of calculating PTE, would not have changed the conclusions of the netting analysis
or made this project major for SO2 given that the netting analysis demonstrated a 150.69 tpy
overall emission reduction in SO2. [See IR007574-7575.]

•

35 .

For all of these independent reasons, Petitioners' arguments regarding the PTE for

the flares fail on the merits and should be dismissed.

iii.

•

36.

Reporting Requirements for the Flares

Petitioners' fi nal argument relating to the flares is that the Holly AO lacks limits

or enforceable reporting requirements for its flares. The substantial weight of record evidence
shows that this contention is unfounded .

•
12

•
•

The prediction for malfunction emissions utilized three standard deviations of the average
actual malfunction emissions to come up with the 120 ton per flare figure. [See IR003780] The
actual total of SO2 emitted from the North and South Flares combined was:
12.7 tons of SO2 in 2009
25.5 tons of SO2 in 2008
9 1.0 tons of SO2 in 2007
19.7 tons of SO2 in 2006
20.8 tons of SO2 in 2005
Id. Accordingly, contrary to Petitioners' contention that 240 tons of SO 2 from the flares will be
emitted on a yearly basis, the highest emissions in any one given year was only 91 tons and the
lowest was 12.7 tpy.
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•
37.

Holly is required to perform continuous em issions monitoring ("CEM") of SO2

emissions on all sources of SO2, including flares. [IR009245, Holly AO, ("For all the above
li sted emission points a CEM shall be used to determine compliance as outlined in Il.B.3.e.").)
38.

Holly also is required to install "flow meters and gas combustion monitors" on the

South Flare gas line "to monitor flare combustion efficiency" [IR009251 , Holly AO); and Holly
is required to calculate PM emissions from all PM sources based o n the amount of fuel
combusted, the totals of which are then added into Holly' s emission cap for PM and reported to
the state. [IR009245-47, Holly AO.)
39.

Finally, Subpart ]a-applicable to all Holly Flares-contains requirements for

•

monitoring and recordkeeping. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.107a(a)(2) (requiring owners or operators of
fl ares to install a continuous monitoring device to measure H2S in the fuel gases going to the
flare); see also 40 C.F.R. § 60. 108a (record keeping and reporting requirements).
40.

•

These multiple record keeping and reporting requirements all apply to Hol ly's

flares. Accordingly, Petitioners arguments regarding the flares all fail and should be dismissed
w ith prejudice on the merits.

•

The Record Demonstrates That Holly's Emissions Will Not Cause or Contribute
to an Exceedance of the NAAOS.

V.

I.

Petitioners next argue, at some length, that the Holly AO is insufficient to protect

•

the short term National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") because it does not contain
short term emission limits on all of Holly's emission sources. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 22-

•

34.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

UDAQ determined that its regulations did not requ ire sho1t term emission limits

when there was no risk of exceedance of the NAAQS. [IR009186, Response to Comments
48
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•

•
Memo ("Where it is clear that a source would not cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation,

•

there is no free-standing regulation requ iring short-term em issions limits.").]
3.

Based on modeling information provided by Holly and reviewed by UDAQ's

modeling staff, UDAQ determ ined there was no risk of any exceedance of the NAAQS from

•

Holly's proposed project. (IR009 I 90-91, Response to Comments Memo ("Holly Refinery's
October 9, 2012 memo ... was based on a request by UDAQ for Holly Refinery to submit an
initial impact analysis based on the July 20 12 NOJ. This analysis showed no impact on the

•

NAAQS CO, PM 10, NO2, or SO2." ); IR009209, Response to Comments Memo (" This modeling
analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour SO2, concentrations would be 50.4 µg/m3, much
lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3" ).]

•

4.

Ho lly subm itted its plans for modeling to UDAQ and those plans were approved

by UDAQ ' s modeling staff. [IR00031-48, Modeling Protocol (prepared by MS! setting forth the
plan for the modeling); IR00l 153-54, Letter from UDAQ to Holly (approving of the Modeling

•

Protocol submitted for emissions impact modeling); IR003591-97, Tom Orth Memo (analyzing
Holly ' s modeling and agreeing with results).]
5.

•

Holly's em ission modeling analysis contemplated the maximum emissions that

Holly could generate on a lb/hr basis, thereby ensuring that any short-term spikes in emissions
were accounted for in the modeling and would not cause exceedances. (IR002993-96, Ju ly 20 12
NOi (explaining that emissions input for the modeling were measured in lb/hr); IR009209,

•

Response to Comments Memo ("T his modeling analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour
SO2, concentrations would be 50.4 µg/m 3 , much lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3").]

6.

•

Malfunction emissions were not considered in the modeling analysis because

federal and state guidance exclude malfunction emissions from the modeling protocols .
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•
[IR00921 4, Response to Comments Memo (explaining the appl ication of Appendix Wand that

•

malfunction emissions need not be included in modeling).]
7.

The results of Holly ' s mode ling efforts clearly demonstrated there would be no

exceedance of the NAAQS, including short-term NAAQS. [IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 615) (demonstrating no exceedance ofNAAQS).]
8.

UDAQ determined that Holly's permit application was complete in an email sent

on July 19, 20 14. [See IR003767, email from Camron Harry to Eric Benson, dated July 19, 20 12
("I am notifying you that I have now determined Holly Refinery' s NOI is administratively
complete.").]
9.

•

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two

separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding short-term
NAAQS protection or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion over

•

the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure to protect the short-term NAAQS. [See
IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 1, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
10.

•

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR00786 l-7863, Petitioners' Second Comment
Letter.]

•

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
11.

Petitioners have not satisfied their burden of proof for this argument because they

have failed to marshal a ll of the evidence that demonstrates the NAAQS wi ll not be exceeded.
12.

•

While Petitioners cite some of UDAQ's reasoning in the response to comments,

they failed to marsha l the actual modeling evidence showing that short term emissions were

•
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•
calculated on a lb/hr basis. This evidence supports UDAQ's determination that the short-term

•

NAAQS were being protected regardless of whether there are short term emission limits in the
Holly AO.
13.

Having fa iled to provide any contradictory evidence in the record, Petitioners

cannot satisfy their burden of proof and their claims regarding the NAAQS fail.
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits

14.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.

i.

•

15.

Short-Term Emission Limits Are Not Required for Minor
Modifications

Petitioners contend that short-term emission limits are always required to ensure

protection of the short-term NAAQS. However, the one-hour NO 2 and SO2 guidance documents
Petitioners rely upon for this contention, [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 23-24], by their terms apply

•

only to "major" modifications. See Memorandum from Anne Marie Wood, Air Quality Policy
Division, to EPA Regional Directors, General Guidance for Implementing the I-hour SO2
National Ambient Air Quality Standard in Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits, at 6
(Aug. 23, 20 I 0) ("We are issuing the following guidance to explain and clarify the procedures
that may be followed by applicants for Prevention ofSignificant Deterioration Permits."
(emphasis added)).
16.

Moreover, the guidance expressly states that it does not bind state permitting

authorities. See Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, to Regional Air Division Directors, at 2 (Aug. 23, 2010) ("This guidance does not

•

bind state and local governments and perm it applicants as a matter of law.") .
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•
17.

According to UDEQ's analysis, Holly' s proposed project fell into the " major"

category for CO and GHG emissions, not for NOx, SO2, or PM. [IR009186, Response to
Comments Memo.]
18.

•

Whether a modification is "major" is determined on a pollutant-by-pollutant

basis:
Applicability of the major NSR program must be determined in advance of
construction and is pollutant-specific. In cases involving existing sources, this
requires a pollutant-by-pollutant determination of the emissions change, if any,
that will result from the physical or operational change . . . . Once a modification
is determined to be major, the PSD requirements apply only to those specific
pollutants for which there would be a significant net emissions increase.

•

67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,188 & n. 5 (Dec. 31, 2002). Because the project is not major for NOx,
SO2, or PM, the Director, as a matter of law, was not required to adhere to federal guidance or

•

impose short-term emissions limits for these pollutants. 13

•

13

Petitioners claim that the Utah Supreme Court has "held that BACT emission limits must
protect short term NAAQS," citing Sierra Club v. Air Quality Board, 2009 UT 76,226 P.3d 719.
[Petitioners' Opening Br. at 23-27.] Petitioners incorrectly interpret the Court's holding. In that
case, the court simply observed in dicta "the EPA has described the goals ofBACT emission
limitations in three-parts: (1) to achieve the lowest percent reduction, (2) to protect short-term
ambient standards, and (3) to be enforceable as a practical matter." Id. at 734. The court never
evaluated or held this was a correct interpretation of the relevant regulations. Moreover, the fact
that a goal of BACT is to protect the short-term NAAQS does not mean that short-term limits
must invariably be imposed as pa11 of a BACT determination regardless of whether the project
involves a major modification or poses any actual risk of an exceedance. EPA guidance
indicates that while any BACT emissions limits are to be considered in determin ing w hether the
source will cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation, the BACT requirement is not an
independent basis for imposing additional short-term emissions li mits. See Memorandum from
Anne Marie Wood, Acting Director Air Qual ity Policy Division to Regional Air Division
Directors, at 7 (Aug. 23, 2010) ("Once a level of control is determined by the PSD applicant via
the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) top-down process, the applicant must model the
proposed source's em issions at the BACT emissions rate(s) to demonstrate that those emissions
w ill not cause or contribute to a violation of any NAAQS or PSD increment.").

•
•
•
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•

•
19.

•

Petitioners' reliance on In re: Mississippi Lime, PSD Appeal No. 11-01 (Aug. 9,

2011 ) as an a lternate basis for the requirement for imposition of short-term emission limits in the
Holly AO is a lso misplaced. The decision is inapplicable for two reasons.
20.

•

First, in Mississippi Lime, the permit applicant proposed to construct a facility

that, unlike Hol ly's proposed expansion, would emit SO2 and NOx in qua ntities well above the
significance thresholds so as to render the proposed facility subject to the PSD requirements for
those pollutants. See JEPA, Project Summary at 4 (20 10) (noting that " Mississippi Lime's

•

proposed lime manufacturing plant is subject to PSD for emissions of SO 2, NOx and CO because
the potential emissions of the plant are more than 100 tons/year"), available at
http ://www.epa.state.il.us/public-notices/2010/mississippi-lime-pdr/project-summary.pdf; see

•

also Mississippi Lime, slip op. at I (noting that M ississippi Lime sought to construct a new lime
manufacturing plant).
2 1.

•

Second, as the Director expla ined in his response to comments-which

Petitioners do not contest-in Mississippi Lime, the permit was remanded to the state permitting
authority "not simply because it fai led to establish a limit, but because IEPA fai led to provide ' a
coherent, well-reasoned explanation of the decision' not to impose such a limit." [IR00918 6,
Response to Comments Memo.]
22.

By contrast, UDAQ has a well-reasoned explanation for why it did not impose the

short-term limits requested by Petitioners-the modeling demonstrated there would be no

•

exceedance of the sh01t-term NAAQS. [IR00301 7, July 20 12 NOi (Table 6-1 5) (demonstrating
no exceedance ofNAAQS).]
23.

•

Accordingly, Petitioners' argument that short-term limits were required in the

Holly AO fails on the merits and should be rejected .
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ii.

24.

Holly's Modeling Constitutes Substantial Evidence That the
NAA OS Will Be Protected

Although UDAQ and Holly were not required to conduct modeling to

•

demonstrate compliance with the NAAQS because Holly proposed only a minor modification for
NOx, SO2, and PM, see 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(ii) ("The requirements of paragraphs G) through
(r) of this section apply to ... the major modification of any existing major stationary source."), 14

•

in an effort to be thorough, Holly conducted the modeling anyway.
25.

Before conducting any modeling, Meteorological Solutions lnc. ("MS!"), Holly's

technical consultant, developed a modeling protocol setting fo11h the procedure that MSJ would

•

use to demonstrate that there were would be no exceedance of the NAAQS, including the short
term NAAQS. This protocol was sent to the modeling staff at UDAQ, who approved of the
protocol. [See IR00031-48, Modeling Protocol; IROOl 153; IR003593, Orth Modeling Memo

•

("The applicant had an approved modeling protocol for using AERMOD in PSD modeling
protocols.").) MSI used the PTE calculations of all SO2 and NOx emission sources at the
refinery for input into the model for the short-term modeling. [See IR000038 ("Maximum

•

hourly potential to emit (PTE) emissions for existing and proposed sources will be input to the
model."); JR.000041 (same).)
26.

PTE is defined as "the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a

pollutant under its physical and operational design," taking into account enforceable emissions
limits. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21 (b)(4), 51. I 65(a)( I)(iii), 5 l. l 66(b)(4). Using the maximum capacity
of each unit, MSI determined the total emissions the refinery could generate in one hour of

•

operation measured in terms of lbs/hr. [See 1R002993-96, July 20 12 NOL] Because PTE is

14

See also Utah Admin. Code R307-403-3 ("Every ... major modification must be reviewed by
the director to determine if a source will cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS.")

•
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•

•
based on maximum capacity, this calcu lation represented the maximum emissions that could be

•

produced at the refinery in a one-hour period. These va lues were used in the model and, once the
background concentrations were combined with the PTE emissions, the modeling results showed
that there would be no exceedance of the NAAQS, including the short-term NAAQS. [See
IR003017, July 20 12 NOi (Table 6-15); IR003596, Tom Orth Memo (Table 3); see also
IR009209 ("This modeling analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour SO2, concentrations
would be 50.4 µg/m 3 , much lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3 ... Accordingly there is no need

•

to impose I or 24-hour SO2 limits to protect the SO2 NAAQS.").]
27.

UDAQ's Orth Memorandum specifically found that "the proposed project' s

impacts, when combined with other industrial sources and ambient background, would comply

•

with federal standards," including the one-hour NOx and SO2 NAAQS. In light of all of this
record evidence, it was reasonable for UDAQ not to include any additional short-term emission
limits in the Holly AO.

•

28 .

Petitioners do not di spute that the modeling results showed no exceedance of the

NAAQS. Instead Petitioners challenge the modeling itself. These challenges do not undermine
UDAQ's approval of and reliance on the modeling analysis, particularly given the deference that

•

UDAQ is due with respect to technical issues such as a ir quality modeling: " [Q]uestions
pe1taining to the appropriate pollutant emissions rates and other inputs to a ir quality models raise
scientific and technical concerns that generally are best left to the specialized expertise and
reasoned judgment of the permitting authority." In re: N. Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant,
PSD Appeal No. 08-02, at 53 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009).
29.

First, Petitioners argue that DAQ's 01th Memorandum is unre liable because it

states that " [t]his report outlines the methodology used in the dispersion modeling analysis of
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emissions of criteria and HAP proposed in the NOi and the subsequent modeling resu lts. lt
makes no determination with respect to compliance with the NAAQS or UDAQ - Toxic

•

Screening Levels for HAPs or compliance thereof." [IR00359 1-92, Tom Orth Memo.] However,
that language simply indicates that the 01th Memorandum, by itself, did not constitute a
determination as to compliance w ith the NAAQS, as illustrated by the fact that the memorandum

•

made only a "recommendation" as to what further steps to take. [IR003597, Tom Orth Memo.]

It does not mean that the Director may not consider the Orth Memorandum in determining
compliance with the NAAQS and whether short-term limits are required, as the Director did in
the Response to Comments Memorandum. [See IR0091 90-9 I, lR009209, Response to

•

Comments Memo.]
30.

Second, Petitioners assert that the modeling analysis cannot be used because the

modeling must be "based on short term limits specified in the AO," and may not " merely

•

estimate short term emission rates." [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 29-3 1.] However, the modeling
done here was based on the max;mum possible hourly emissions level based on the maxhnum
capacity of each emissions unit as explained above, not an estimate of average short-term

•

emission rates. [See IR002993-96, July 2012 NOJ.] UDAQ acted w ithin its discretion when it
re lied upon this modeling analysis.
3 1.

•

Third, Petitioners argue that the modeling is inadequate to demonstrate

compliance with the short-term NAAQS because the modeling does not include upset emissions
from the flares. [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 31-33 .] In support of this argument, Petitioners rely
on 40 C.F.R. § 51 , Appendix W, for the proposition that such emissions must be modeled.

•

Petitioners are incorrect. As UDAQ specifically explained in rejecting Petitioner's argument:
The commenter references 40 CFR 5 1 Appendix W, Section 8. l.2(a) as reference
that malfunction/upset emissions should be included in the modeling analysis.

•
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•
However, the commenter neglected to include the following footnote from that
same section: "Malfunctions which may result in excess emissions are not
considered to be a normal operating condition. They generally should not be
considered in determining allowable emissions. However, if the excess emissions
are the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or other preventable
conditions, it may be necessary to consider them in determining source impact."

•
•

[IR009214, Response to Comments Memo (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App'x W, § 11.B.7.a.1.2(a)
n.a).] UDAQ' s explanation has not been rebutted by Petitioners.
32.

UDAQ's interpretation of Appendix Wis supported by a 2011 EPA guidance

document providing additional clarification of the modeling requirements under Appendix W .

•

See Memorandum from Tyler Fox, Leader Air Quality Modeling Group to Regional Air Division
Directors, Additional Clarification Regarding Application ofAppendix W Modeling Guidance

for the ]-hour N02 National Ambient Air Quality Standard (Mar. 1, 2011 ). There, EPA stated

•

that modeling for compliance with the ]-hour NAAQS should only
address emission scenarios that can logically be assumed to be relatively
continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly to the
annual distribution of daily maximum 1-hour concentrations based on existing
modeling guidelines, which provide sufficient discretion for reviewing authorities
to not include intermittent emissions from emergency generators or
startup/shutdown operations from compliance demonstrations for the I-hour NO2
standard under appropriate circumstances.

•

Id. at 2. 15

•

33.

In an attempt to fit within the language of Appendix W, Petitioners contend that

Holly's malfunction emissions must be the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or

•
•

15

EPA further clarified that "we are concerned that assuming continuous operations for
intermittent emissions would effectively impose an additional level of stringency beyond that
intended by the level of the standard itself. As a result, we feel that it would be inappropriate to
implement the I-hour NO2 standard in such a manner and recommend that compliance
demonstrations for the I-hour NO2 NAAQS be based on emission scenarios that can logically be
assumed to be relatively continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly
to the annual distribution of daily maximum 1-hour concentrations." Id at 9. The same logic
applies to the 1-hour SO2 standard.
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•
other preventable conditions, and therefore shou ld have been included in the modeling analysis.
Petitioners argue that because EPA ' s NSPS regulations relating to flares require a root cause
analysis where a flare em its more than 500 pounds of SO2 in a 24-hour period, em issions over

•

that level are necessarily the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or other preventable
conditions. [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 33.] However, Petitioners cite no authority suggesting
that the separate requirement to conduct a root cause analysis contained in the NSPS regulations

•

somehow amounts to a determination that as a matter of law all upsets emitting more than 500
pounds of SO2 are necessarily caused by preventable conditions for purposes of Appendix W.
Petitioners cite no reason to conclude that, just because an investigation into the cause of al l

•

emission events over a certain size is required, all such emission events are necessarily caused by
preventable conditions. Indeed, EPA recognizes that "the probabi lity of successfully identifying
a means to avoid future emissions from each root cause analysis performed is certain ly less than

•

I 00 percent," 72 Fed. Reg. 27,178, 27, 197 (May 14, 2007), indicating that far from a ll emissions
that trigger a root cause analysis wou ld be caused by preventable conditions. [Petitioners'
Opening Br. at 32-33.] Petitioners' argument finds no support in the record. The record

•

evidence is to the contrary, recognizing that
if SO2 modeling would have been requ ired, then the malfunction emissions for
SO2 would not have been included because they do not represent normal,
controlled operations. The 120 tpy of SO2 from the flares due to malfunctions, as
documented in the SPR Reviewer Note 5 (pp8 l-82), are based on Holly
Refinery's historical data and do not predict future malfunctions. Nor do they
result from poor maintenance or careless operation of the flare.

•

[IR0092 l 4-15, Response to Comments Memo.]
34.

In light of UDAQ' s technical conclusion, it was well within UDAQ's discretion

to determine that the malfunction emissions shou ld not be included in the modeling analysis.
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•
iii.

•

35 .

Hollv Was Not Required to Model for PMl..5.

Petitioners ra ise one final challenge to Holly ' s modeling. Specifi cally, Petitioners

argue the modeling d id not address the revision of the annual PM 2.s NAAQS that took place in
January 20 13. This argument does not relate to any purported need for short-term emissions

•

limits but rather is a sepa rate attack on the modeling analys is .
36.

For the same reasons as stated above, Holly ' s modification was not determined to

be "major" for PM 2.5 and therefore Holly was not required to do any modeling for PM regardless

•

of whether the NAAQS were amended. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k)-(m); see also Utah Admin .
Code R307-4 l 0-4.
37.

•

•
•

Additionally, Holly's application fe ll within the grandfathering provision of the

rev ised PM2.s NAAQS and so did not need to be updated to address the revised NAAQS. In
finalizing the PM2.5 NAAQS, EPA explained:
To facilitate timely implementation of the PSD requirements resulting from the
revised NAAQS, which would otherwise become applicable to a ll PSD permit
applications upon the effective date of this final PM NAAQS rule, the EPA is
finalizing a grandfathering provision for pending permit applications. This final
rule incorporates revisions to the PSD regulations that provide for grandfathering
of PSD permit applications that have been determined to be complete on or before
December 14, 20 12 or for which public notice of a draft permit or preliminary
determination has been published as of the effective date of today's revised PM 2.s
NAAQS. Accord ingly, for projects e ligible under the grandfathering provision,
sources must meet the requirements associated w ith the prior primary annual
PM2.s NAAQS rather than the revised primary annual PM2.5 NAAQS.
78 Fed. Reg. 3,086, 3,249 (Jan. 15, 2013).
38.

Holly's application was determined to be administratively complete on July 19,

201 2, long before the PM2. 5 NAAQS mode ling requirements became effective. [See 1R003767,
email from Camron Harry to Eric Be nson, dated July 19, 2012 ("I am notifying you that I have
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•
now determined Holly Refinery's NOI is adm inistratively complete.").] Therefore, no add itional

•

modeling was required.
39.

In sho11, none of Petitioners' challenges to the modeling analysis itself succeed.

Petitioners have fai led to provide any evidence that would undermine the significant evidence in
the record demonstrating there would not be an exceedance of the NAAQS. The modeling

•

analysis demonstrated that Holly's project would not cause or contribute to any NAAQS
violation, including the short-term NAAQS . EPA raised no comments about any of the
foregoing issues in connection with its independent technical and legal review of the Holly AO.
Therefore Petitioners' arguments fail on the merits and should be dismissed.
VI.

•

Holly and the Director Properly Calculated PM Emissions from the FCC Units.

I.

Petitioners next argue that the Director erred in fai ling to require Holly to count

condensable emissions in determining compliance with the emission limits on the FCC Units.

•

[Petitioners' Opening Brief at 34-36.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be

•

rejected.
A. Findings of Fact

2.

UDAQ determined that condensable particle emissions would not be counted for

compliance with FCC Unit limits, but would be included in inventory calculations. [rR009243,
Holly AO ("The condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration,

•

but shall be used for inventory purposes.").]
3.

The Utah PM10 SIP, approved by EPA in 1994 (64 Fed. Reg. 68031 (July 8,

1994)), exc luded condensable PM emissions from compliance demonstration with the PM 10

•

em ission caps in the SIP. [IR007826, PM 1o SIP (attached as Exhibit L to Holly' s Comment

•
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•

•
Letter, ("The back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes and shall be determined

•

using the method specified by the Executive Secretary.").]
4.

UDAQ recognized that the language in the PM 1o SIP controlled for purposes of

drafting the Holly AO and excluded condensable emissions from all compliance limits for all
PM 10 SIP cap sources-including the FCC Unit 25. [IR008569, Source Plan Review ("Holly
Refinery is listed in the PM 10 SIP. That document established several emission limitations, one
of which is a cap on PM 10 emissions. At the time the SIP was written the cap on PM 1o emissions

•

was established using only the filterable PM10 emissions captured during stack testing. This
limitation was then included in the AO (and subsequent revisions) issued to Holly Refinery.
UDAQ has since agreed that all future particulate (PM 10 and PM2s) limitations at all sources will

•

also include the condensable fraction of particulate emissions (such as those found in the back
half of a particulate sampling train or by reference test method 202). However, any limitation
which is derived directly from the PM 10 SIP cannot be altered without similarly altering the SIP.
Therefore, those limitations on SIP-listed sources will continue to retain the original ' filterable
emissions only' language, with the condensable emissions being used only for inventory
purposes. Such is the case with Holly Refinery's PM 10 cap emission limit. It is the intent of the

•

Division to update these types of conditions once new SIP limitations are established in the
PM2.s SIP.").]
5.

UDAQ specifically determined that it would not set PM2.s limits on the new FCC

Unit 25 because source wide limits of PM2s were being set for Holly in the new PM2.s SIP that
was being developed at the time UDAQ issued the Holly AO. [IR009183, Response to
Comments Memo ("UDAQ has not set a condensable limit on the FCC Unit 25 in this permitting

•

action because UDAQ is currently developing a SIP for PM 2.5 . In this SIP, the contribution of
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•
Holly Refinery to the valley airshed will be part of that evaluation and condensable limitations
will be addressed."); IR009206, Response to Comments Memo ("PM 2_5 condensable emissions

•

will be addressed in the PM 2.s SJP.").]
6.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted

two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding condensable

•

emissions in determining compliance with the PM emission limits on the FCC Units or otherwise
exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion over the final Holly AO for any real or
perceived failure regarding the same. [See IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840784 I, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

•

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

7.

During the public comment period, Petitioners' comments were limited to

challenging the PTE calculations for the new FCC Unit 25 and whether such calculations

•

properly included condensable emissions. [See IR007857, WRA Second Comment Letter
("Holly's Permit Application Underestimates the Increase in PM Emissions from the new
FCCU").]
8.

Petitioners' challenge to the FCC Unit 25 emission limit and the exclusion of

condensables was never raised in the comments notwithstanding the fact that this issue was
reasonably ascertainable as the limit was included in the ITA. [See IR008469, ITA

•

("Condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, but shall be
used for inventory purposes").]
9.

Petitioners also appear to argue in their Opening Brief that the BACT analysis for

•

the FCC Unit 25 was invalid because it did not address condensables. Petitioners failed to raise
this argument during the comment period and therefore it was not preserved.
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•

•
I 0.

•

Because, Petitioners failed to preserve both of these arguments as required by

Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(4), they should be dismissed.
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof

11.

•

Even if Petitioners had preserved their claims, Petitioners have failed to meet their

burden of proof.
12.

Whether condensable emissions are required to be included for purposes of

compliance with emission limits is a question of law. Because this question of law is one with

•

which UDAQ has been charged to administer, the ALJ must apply a clearly erroneous standard
of review.
13.

•

Petitioners do not acknowledge the requirements of the PM10 SIP. Although this

is not an instance where marshaling is required, Petitioners' disregard of the PM10 SIP
requirements is fatal to their claim that condensable emissions must be included for compliance
with the FCC Unit's limits.

•

14.

Petitioners have failed to point to any valid legal basis that undermines UDAQ's

conclusion that the PM 1o SIP does not require condensables to be included for compliance with
the PM emission limits in the Holly AO.

•

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
15.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits

•

for the independent reasons discussed below.
16.

The PM 10 SIP imposes a cap on all PM 10 sources at the Holly refinery including

the new FCC Unit 25 but does not require condensable PM emissions to be calculated for

•

compliance with that cap. [IR007826, PM 10 SIP (attached as Exhibit L to Holly's Comment
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•
Letter ("The back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes and shall be determined

•

using the method specified by the Executive Secretary."); IR009243, Holly AO ("The
condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, but shall be used
for inventory purposes."); IR008569, Source Plan Review (recognizing the PM 10 SIP cap).]
17.

At the time the Holly AO was being considered, the PM 1o SIP was the only

•

applicable PM SIP and any provisions in the Holly AO that conflicted with that SIP would have
required a SIP amendment. [See IR008569, Source Plan Review ("any limitation which is
derived directly from the PM 10 SIP cannot be altered without similarly altering the SIP");
IR007826; Attachment L to Holly's second comment letter (excerpt from PM 10 SIP stating " [t]he

•

back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes ... [t]he PM 1o captured in the front
half. .. shall be considered for compliance purposes").]
18.

Although the recently adopted PM 2.5 SIP now requires condensable PM emissions

•

to be calculated for compliance purposes, such a requirement was not in place prior to the
issuance of the Holly AO. Utah law is clear that permits are only required to incorporate
regulatory requirements that exist at the time of permit issuance. [See, e.g., In the Matter of

•

Petroleum Processing Plant Emery Refining, LLC, Order Returning Recommended Order Re
Motions to Stay to Administrative Law Judge for Further Action, April 8, 2014 ("Emery Order")
at 4 (limiting ALJ's review to the record before her and prohibiting consideration of a separate

•

NOi that could be granted or denied sometime in the future.).]
19.

Petitioners' references to Federal Register notices and guidance requiring PM

condensable emissions for compliance purposes are misplaced because such requirements had

•

not yet become binding on Holly. See 73 Fed. Reg. 28321, 28334 (May 16, 2008) (describing a
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•

•
transition period for incorporation of condensable requirements into state implementation plans

•

but only requiring such inclusion on major NSR projects).
20.

IfEPA believed UDAQ erred in its handling of condensables in the Holly AO, it

had the jurisdiction and obligation to raise that issue in connection with its independent review of

•

the Holly AO. EPA declined to do so. [See IR007840-7841, EPA comment letter (raising no
issues about permit limits or the inclusion of condensables for compliance purposes).]
21.

•

Petitioners also appear to argue that the BACT analysis for the new FCC Unit 25

is invalid because it does not account for condensable emissions. This argument fails not only
because Petitioners did not preserve it during the comment period but also because any emission
control technology that reduces filterable emissions will necessarily control for condensable

•

emissions, both being post-control components of Holly's emission sources. Petitioners do not
present any evidence that an alternative emission control technology would more effectively
control condensable emissions beyond that which Holly is already required to install.

•

22 .

emissions in the Holly AO fail on the merits and should be dismissed with prejudice.

VII.

•

All of Petitioners' arguments regarding UDAQ' s treatment of condensable PM

1.

Holly Properly Calculated and Included in its Netting Analysis VOC Emissions
Reductions From its Cooling Towers .
Petitioners next argue that Holly improperly claimed a 39.28 tpy VOC emission

reduction from its cooling towers in the netting analysis it submitted to UDAQ. [Petitioners'
Opening Brief at 36-41.] For the reasons set forth below, this argument should be rejected .

•

A. Findings of Fact
2.

In 2009, Holly implemented a voluntary monitoring program in which it

identified leaks in its cooling tower operation and fixed those leaks, thereby reducing emissions

•

of VOCs from its cooling towers. [IR009203, Response to Comments Memo ("The reduction in
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•
VOC emissions reported in Holly Refinery's NOJ was a result of a voluntary monitoring
program of the cooling towers that identified leaks from the towers that Holly Refinery fixed,

•

thereby reducing its VOC emissions.").]
3.

This monitoring program was made mandatory in the Holly AO on a going

forward basis to ensure that the emission reductions Holly experienced by fixing its equipment

•

remained at the reduced level. [IR007236, email from Mike Astin (environmental manager for
Holly) to Camron Harry (permit writer for UDAQ), dated March 26, 2013 (" For the cooling
towers, we monitor the cooling water return lines monthly for volatile organics using the Texas
EI Paso method. Jf any leaks are identified, we use screening methods to identify the leaking

•

heat exchanger and repair it."); JR009230; Holly AO (requiring that "all cooling towers
implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly AO (requiring repair of any leaks
detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after identifying the

•

leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").]
4.

Prior to implementing the leak detection and monitoring program, Holly utilized

an "uncontrolled" emission factor to calculate emissions from its cooling towers. [IR009203,
Response to Comments Memo ("Prior to using the Modified El Paso Method, the AP-42 VOC
'uncontrolled' emissions were the basis for refineries to report cooling tower VOC emissions.").]
5.

After implementation of the monitoring program made mandatory by the Holly

•

AO, Holly utilized a "controlled" emission factor to calculate emissions from its cooling towers.
[JR008558, Source Plan Review ("VOC emissions from cooling towers 4 through 8 were
previously estimated using the uncontrolled emission factor listed in AP-42 Section 5.1 of 6

•

lb/I 0"' 6 gal cooling water. In 2009, Holly Refinery began a voluntary daily monitoring program
to detect VOC leaks into cooling water and to eliminate those leaks. In 2012, the monitoring
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•

•
method was replaced with monthly monitoring using the Texas El Paso method. With continued

•

use of regular monitoring, it is proposed to utilize the 'controlled' emission factor of 0.7 16/10/\6
gallons cooling water in AP-42 Section 5.1. This method will also be implemented for cooling
towers IO and 11.").]
6.

It is the difference between the calculations with the "uncontrolled" and

"controlled" emission factor that makes up the emission reduction that Holly included in its
netting analysis. [Id.]

•

7.

ln connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two

separate comment letters to UDAQ. [See IR004001 , EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840784 I, EPA Second Comment Letter.] While the Second Comment Letter requested more

•

infonnation regarding "the basis for the estimate of emissions reduced by conve11ing from gas
fired to electric motors for the compressors" [IR007840], the EPA raised no concerns about the
netting issues raised by Petitioners here. Moreover, EPA's request for supplemental information

•

on this issue was satisfied in UDAQ's response to comments .
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

8.

•

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by rai sing

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR004214-42 l 6, Mark Hall First Comment
Letter.]
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof

•

9.

Petitioners' claim that Holly incorrectly included a VOC emission reduction from

its cooling towers is a mixed question of law and fact. The correct interpretation of the
regulations governing when a source can utilize an emission reduction in a netting analysis is a
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•
question of law. However, the application of those regulations to the facts in this case presents a
mixed question to which the ALJ must apply a reasonableness standard of review.
I 0.

Because this is a mixed question of law and fact, Petitioners had the burden to

marshal the relevant factual evidence that pertained to this claim.
l 1.

Petitioners failed to meet this burden by failing to reference the requirements in

the Holly AO that make monitoring and leak repairs for the cooling towers enforceable permit

•

conditions. This evidence undermines Petitioners' argument that the cooling tower emission
reductions are not enforceable or creditable.
12.

Having failed to marshal this and other relevant evidence, Petitioners cannot

satisfy their burden to prove that UDAQ acted unreasonably in accepting Holly's netting
analysis.

•

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits

13.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
14.

•

Petitioners challenge the creditability and enforceability of the VOC emission

reduction from the cooling towers because they claim it resulted from a voluntary monitoring
program and therefore was unenforceable. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.2l(b)(3) (requiring decreases in
actual emissions be creditable and enforceable in order to be included in a netting analysis); [see
also Petitioners' Opening Br. at 36-37). Petitioners also claim that Holly was precluded from

including the emission reduction in its netting analysis because the State of Utah arguably relied
upon the emission reduction for demonstration of attainment of the PM25 SIP. [Id.] Both
arguments fail on the merits.
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•

•
i.

•

15.

Creditabilitv o[tlte VOC emission reduction

The UDAQ reasonably found that Holly's VOC emission reduction to be

creditable because it resulted from a physical change to refinery equipment and will be
maintained through an enforceable permit condition in the Holly AO. [See IR009230; Holly AO

•

(requiring that " all cooling towers implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly
AO (requiring repair of any leaks detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after
identifying the leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").]

•

16 .

Under applicable law, an emission reduction is creditable if "(a) the old level of

actual emissions exceeds the new level of actual emissions; (b) it is enforceable as a practical
matter; [and] (c) it has approximately the same qualitative significance for public health and

•

welfare as that attributed to the increase from the particular change." 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (vi)(a)(c). The VOC emission reduction Holly claimed satisfies each of these three requirements.
17.

•

First, Holly' s VOC cooling tower emissions were higher prior to Holly' s physical

repairs to the cooling towers. [See IR009203, Response to Comments Memo ("The reduction in
VOC emissions reported in Holly Refinery's NOi was a result of a voluntary monitoring
program of the cooling towers that identified leaks from the towers that Holly Refi11e1y fixed,

•

thereby reducing its VOC emissions." ) (emphasis added); see also IR007236, email from Mike
Astin (environmental manager for Holly) to Camron Harry (permit writer for UDAQ), dated
March 26, 2013 ("For the cooling towers, we monitor the cooling water return lines monthly for
volatile organics using the Texas El Paso method. If any leaks are identified, we use screening
methods to identify the leaking heat exchanger and repair it.").]
18.

•

Petitioners argue that these emissions are merely estimated from emission factors

and do not represent actual emission reductions, and therefore are not credible. Contrary to
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•
Petitioners' arguments, however, the applicable regulations contemplate the calculation of
emissions through emission factors. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b )(21 )(i) (providing that emissions

•

"shall be calculated"). The EPA-drafted preamble to the re levant regulation explains that
emission factors may be used in calculating "actual emissions." 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,195
(Dec. 31, 2002) ("When you calculate the baseline actual emissions for an existing emissions

•

unit. .. you may select any consecutive 24 months of source operation within the past 10 years.
Using the relevant source records for that 24-month period, including such information as the
utilization rate of the equipment, fuels and raw materials used in the operation of the equipment,

and applicable emission factors, you must be able to calculate an average annual emiss ions rate,
in tpy, for each pollutant emitted by the emissions unit that is modified, or is affected by the
modification." (emphasis added)).
19.

l find that a "calculation" of emissions from cooling towers would necessarily be

an estimate based on operating hours, production rates, and types of materials. Holly's VOC
calculation was based on these same factors. [See IR008558, Source Plan Review (noting that
Holly used the 'controlled' emission factor of 0.7 lb/10"'6 gallons cooling water as described in
AP-42 Section 5.1 )]; See also AP-42 5.1 Petroleum Refining emission calculation descriptions,
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie l/ap42/ch05/final/c05s01.pdf (including in the emission
calculation for cooling tower emissions the cooling water rate and refinery feed rate).]
20.

Prior to Holly's voluntary monitoring program and physical changes to its cooling

towers to reduce and e liminate VOC leaks, Holly utilized the "uncontrolled" AP-42 emission
factor to calculate the VOC emissions from the cooling towers. [See IR009203, Response to

•

Comments Memo ("Prior to using the Modified El Paso Method, the AP-42 VOC 'uncontrolled'
emissions were the basis for refineries to report cooling tower VOC emissions.").]
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•

•
2 l.

•

After the units were repaired, Holly used the AP-42 "controlled" emission factor

which resulted in a calculated emission reduction. [IR00 8558, Source Plan Review ("VOe
emissions from cooling towers 4 through 8 were previously estimated using the uncontrolled
emission factor listed in AP-42 Section 5.1 of 6 lb/ I 0" 6 gal cooling water. In 2009, Holly

•

Refinery began a voluntary daily monitoring program to detect voe leaks into cooling water
and to eliminate those leaks. In 2012, the monitoring method was replaced with monthly
monitoring using the Texas El Paso method. With continued use of regular monitoring, it is

•

proposed to utilize the 'controlled' emission factor of 0.7 lb/I 0"6 gallons coo ling water in AP-42
Section 5.1. This method wi ll also be implemented for cooling towers IO and 11.").]
22.

•

Where actual emissions are not easily measured-such as voe emissions leaking

from cooling towers-calculation estimates can prov ide reliable information to satisfy 40 C.F.R.

§ 52.2 1(vi)(a)-(c). See 74 Fed. Reg. 55,670 55,679 (Oct. 28, 2009) (noting that certain historical
inventory data based on the AP-42 factors and "the AP-42 emission factors are the best available
data by which to estimate cooling tower emissions").
23.

Second, the voe emission reduction from the cooling towers is enforceable

because it was the result of a physical change to the refinery equipment, which must be

•

monitored and maintained under the terms of the HollyAO . [JR009224, Holly AO (condition
11.B.4.a Id.; see also 40 e.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(3)(vi)(b) (reduction is creditable if it is enforceable "at
and after the time that actual construction on the particular change begins").]

•

24 .

Holly is required, pursuant to the terms of the Holly AO, to continue monitoring

for leaks from the cooling towers and must fix any discovered leaks in order to maintain the
lower voe emission levels from the cooling towers. [See IR009230; Holly AO (requiring that

•

"all cooling towers implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly AO (requiring
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•
repair of any leaks detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after identifying the
leak . .. [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").] Any failure to do so
subjects Holly to enforcement action by UDAQ-making these requirements, and the associated
emission reduction, enforceable.
25.

Third, Holly has satisfied the qualitative significance requirement that Petitioners

claim has been violated. EPA's NSR Manual states that " [c]urrent EPA policy is to assume that

an emissions decrease will have approximately the same qualitative significance for public
health and welfare as that attributed to an increase" unless the state has reason to believe
otherwise. [Petitioners' Reply Brief at 34 (emphasis added) (quoting EPA NSR Workshop
Manual, 1990, A-38-39).]
26.

Holly's modeling demonstrates that there will be no violation of any NAAQS or

PSD increments and overall, VOC emissions will be reduced. [See IR002980-3021, Holly's

•

NOi, section 6.0; see also IR003591-3597, Tom Orth Memorandum; IR007575, UDAQ
information sheet (indicating a -17.02 overall VOC emission decrease from the project).]
27.

Consequently, UDAQ had no reason to believe that the qualitative presumption

would not be met in this case, and Petitioners have not identified any contrary evidence. See,

e.g., In re Inter-Power ofN. Y., Inc. , No. 92-8, 5 E.A.D. 130, 153-54 (EAB Mar. 16, 2014)
(rejecting the argument that EPA should have conducted a health assessment to demonstrate that
the qualitative significance of emissions was approximately the same, and holding that the
burden was on the petitioner to " docume nt[] that [the source's] fuel change has increased its
heavy metals emissions or created any hea lth conce rns. Accordingly, [petitioner] has not pointed

•

to any record evidence" that indicates that this provision was not satisfied). Holly's inclusion of
the VOC emission reductions from the cooling towers therefore was proper.

•
72
ADJ011607

•
28.

•

Petitioners also argue that the 52.95 tpy VOC emission baseline referenced in the

July 2012 NOJ is inflated and, therefore, the emission reduction of 39.28 tons ofVOC is inflated.
Petitioners overlook that the emission spreadsheet they cite indicates that if 52.95 tpy was the
VOC baseline, the associated emission reduction would have been 48.08 tons-not 39.28.
[IR003059, July 20 12 NOL] Holly had two different baseline calculations for VOC emiss ions
because at different points in the application process it used different baseline years for its
netting calculations. [Compare 1R003059, July 20 12 NOI, with 1R007300, Revised NOL] In its

•

Revised NOJ, Holly used 44.15 tpy as a baseline for VOC emissions, which resulted in the
reduction of 39.28 tons of VOC. [IR007300.] Had it used the higher baseline, the emission
reduction would have also been higher, which means Holly's netted VOC reduction is

•

conservatively low. All of these baseline totals are derived from emission inventory reports that
Holly submitted to DAQ, and they were a ll calculated w ith AP-42 emission factors. [1R003059,
July 2012 NOi (citing "VOC Baseline 2008-2009" inventory years; IR007300, Revised NOi

•

(citing "VOC baseline 2008-2009" inventory years").]

ii.

29.

•

Holly Was Not Required to Adiust Downward its Baseline VOC
Emission Calculations

Petitioners also cha llenge the VOC emission reduction on the basis that Holly

should have adjusted downward its baseline VOC emission calculations because the El Paso
monitoring method is required by a Maximum Achievable Control Technology ("MACT")
requirement under a National Em ission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants and has been

•

relied upon by UDAQ as a Reasonably Available Control Technology ("RACT") requirement in
the PM 25 SIP to demonstrate attainment.
30.

•

Any requirements that are otherwise required to be imposed as MACT standards

under section 11 2 of the Clean A ir Act that result in emission reductions can still be used for
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•
netting purposes unless the state has specifical ly relied upon the em ission reduction in
demonstrating attainment ofa NAAQS in a SIP. See 40 CFR § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)(b) & (c) ("[l]f
an emission limitation is part of a maximum achievable control technology standard ... , the
baseline actual emissions need only be adjusted if the State has taken credit for such emissions
reductions in an attainment demonstration or maintenance plan."); see also Memorandum from
John S. Seitz, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, to Bob Hannesschlager,
Acting Director, Multimedia Planning and Permitting Division, Region VI (Nov. I 2, 1997)
("Since the MACT program is not designed to limit criteria or other pollutants regulated by NSR
programs of parts C and D of title I of the Act, EPA's policy is that actual emissions reductions
of hazardous or other air pollutants that result from complying with MACT regulations codified
at 40 CFR part 63 may be considered 'surplus' for purposes ofNSR netting and are not
precluded from NSR netting as long as the reductions are otherwise creditable under NSR.").
31.

•

Petitioners argue that UDAQ relied upon the MACT standard of the Texas E l

Paso Method in the PM2.s SIP to demonstrate compliance. However, that assertion is misplaced
because the PM2.s SIP had not been formally adopted at the time UDAQ issued the Ho lly AO.

•

Petitioners overlook that the regulation upon which they rely for this assertion provides only that
emissions must be adjusted downward where such emissions "would have exceeded an
emissions limitation with which the major stationary source must currently comply," with

•

"currently comply" referring to the time of permit issuance. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(48)(ii)(c)
(emphasis added).
32.

That Holly may have been on notice that the E l Paso Method might subsequently

•

be required as a RACT standard is irre levant in this analysis and Petitioners cite no authority
holding otherwise.
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•

•
33.

•

Accordingly, UDAQ acted reasonably in accepting Holly's netting analysis w ith

the VOC emission reductions included therein. Petitioners' c laims to the contrary should be
dismissed with prejudice on the merits.

VIII. The FCC Unit 25's PTE Was Accurate and its Emission Limits Are Adequate.

•

I.

Petitioners challenge the accuracy of Holly's PTE calculations for the FCC Unit

25, arguing that the Holly AO is insufficient because it does not impose specific PM em ission
limits on the unit. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 41-46.] For the reasons stated below, this

•

argument should be rejected .

A. Findings of Fact
2.

•

The emissions from the FCC Unit 25 are limited by the maximum capacity of the

unit of 8500 barrels per day ("bpd"). [IR00281 I, July 2012 NO I ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking
Unit (FCCU) with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per day will be constructed along with a
45 MMBtu/hr feed heater. Emissions from the FCCU will be controlled by a wet gas

•

scrubber."); IR002820, July 2012 NOi ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) from an idled
New Mexico refinery wi ll be relocated to the Woods Cross Refinery. T his unit is capable of
processing 8500 barrels of gas oil per day and is simi lar in size to the existing FCCU.");

•

IR003078, July 20 12 NOI ("FCC Capacity Limit based on Equipment Specifications 8500
bbls/day."); IR003160, July 2012 NOi ("New FCCU ... Capacity ... 8500 bbpd."); IR008491,
Source Plan Review ("To process the additional bottom cut from the new crude unit (Unit 24),

•

an additional Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit ('FCCU Unit 25') with a capacity of processing 8500
barrels per day wi ll be constructed."); IR009227, Holly AO ("Unit 4: Fluid Catalytic Cracking
Unit (FCCU) 8,880 bpd annual average capacity" ); IR009229, Holly AO ("Unit 25: FCCU 8,500

•
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•
bpd annual average capacity"); IR009 l 92, Response to Comments Memo ( explanation for why

•

the FCC Unit 25 emissions are limited by the operational capacity of the unit).]
3.

The information relating to the capacity of the FCC Unit 25 contained in Holly's

NOi was certified as accurate by the Plant Manager, Mike Wright. [IR007836, certification
signature page (Mike Wright certified that the information provided for the approval order was

•

accurate and complete.).]
4.

UDAQ determined that a coke burn rate of 6200 lb/hr was reasonable based on

the data Holly provided. [IR009219, Response to Comments Memo ("Based on UDAQ's

•

technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is a fair and
reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25."); JR008052, November 7,
2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the FCC Unit 25).]
5.

UDAQ also determined that Holly was subject to a PM emission cap that included

•

the FCC Unit 25, and that any exceedance of the PTE calculated for the unit would subject Holly
to enforcement for exceedance of the emission cap. [JR009208, Response to Comments Memo
("regardless of maximum throughput rates, the emissions are limited at the values established in

•

ITA"); IR009219, Response to Comments Memo (explanation for why the PTE for the FCC Unit
#25 was correct because the unit is subject to the PM emission cap and any exceedance of that
cap would be a violation).]
6.

•

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted

two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding UDAQ's PTE
calcu lations for any FCCU or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement

•

discretion over the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure regarding the same. [See
IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

•
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•

•
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

•

7.

In their public comments, Petitioners only challenged the accuracy of the PTE

calculations for Holly's FCC Unit 25. Specifically, Petitioners argued there was insufficient
evidence to support the 6200 lbs/hr coke burn rate calculation, and that as a result, additional

•

limits were needed for the unit. [See IR008598-8599, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.]
8.

Jn response to this comment, UDAQ requested that Holly provide additional

documentation and calculations to support the 6200 lb/hr coke burn rate. [IR00802 l .]

•

9.

rate. [IR8022-8023; IR008052.]
10.

•

burned.
In Petitioners' briefing on the merits, Petitioners challenge for the first time the

accuracy of the maximum capacity of the FCC Unit 25 , claiming that there was no evidence in
the record to support the 8500 bpd figure.
12.

•

Petitioners argued differently in their Motion for Stay, that the 6200 lb/hr figure

would not effectively limit PM emissions because emissions would increase if more coke was

11.

•

Holly responded by providing the calculations it used to determine the coke burn

This maximum capacity was expressly stated in multiple places in the NOI and

ITA. Any concern with the accuracy of the number was therefore reasonably ascertainable
during the public comment period. [IR00281 l , July 2012 NOI ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking
Unit (FCCU) with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per day"); JR008491, Source Plan

•

Review ("To process the additional bottom cut from the new crude unit (Unit 24), an additional
F luid Catalytic Cracking Unit ('FCCU Unit 25') with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per
day wi ll be constructed.").]
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•
13.

Accordingly, the only issue that has been adequately preserved by Petitioners is

their challenge to the 6200 lb/hr coke burn rate and their assertion that additional limits are

•

required for the FCC Unit 25. Their most recent challenge to the accuracy of the 8500 bpd
capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25 has not been preserved in accordance with Utah Code Section

•

I 9-1-30 I .5(4) and should be dismissed for the reasons described above.
C. Findings and Conclusion on Burden of Proof
14.

Even if Petitioners had preserved their challenge to the accuracy of the 8500 bpd

capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25, Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof.
15.

Whether the PTE emission calculations for the FCC Unit 25 are supported in the

•

record is a highly technical factual issue that requires this tribunal to give deference to UDAQ in
its review of the issue. Petitioners must demonstrate that UDAQ lacked substantial ev idence in
the record to suppo11 its decision that the PTE was calculated correctly.
16.

Accordingly, Petitioners carry a heavy burden of proof to marshal the evidence

relating to this issue to allow this tribunal to adequately evaluate and weigh the evidence relating
to the claims at issue.
17.

•
•

Petitioners have fa iled to meet their burden here by ignoring the relevant evidence

in Holly' s NOI explaining how Holly calculated the emissions that would be generated by the
FCC Unit 25. Petitioners also provide no evidence contradicting Holly's certification that all of

•

the numbers contained in the NOI were accurate.
18.

DAQ invited commenters, including Petitioners here, during the public comment

period to provide technical ev idence of alternate coke burn rates that commenters argued would
be more appropriate. Neither Petitioners nor other commenters responded to DA Q's request.
[IR.0092 19, Response to Comments Memo ("The commenter makes general reference to the
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•

' UOP yield estimates' and 'other more generic publications,' but provided no documents or

•

primary data to support or detail to which estimate, if any, was used to derive the suggested
range of coke burn estimates. Based on UDAQ ' s technical experience and expertise, the 6200
lb/hr value is a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25. The

•

commenter has not provided any specific technical information to UDAQ that would suggest a
higher value is more appropriate.")
19.

•

Failing to carry their burden of proof on this highly technical issue, Petitioners'

claims fail.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
20.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
21.

•

The question of whether Holly and UDAQ correctly calculated the potential

emissions for the FCC Unit 25 is a highly technical issue that requires this tribunal and any
reviewing court to give deference to the agency because the agency, in its technical expertise, is
in the best position to evaluate these issues.

•

22 .

Holly based its conclusion that the new FCC Unit 25 would burn coke at a rate of

6200 lb/hr on empirical data it obtained from the FCC Unit 4 that was in current operation at the
refinery. [IR008052.] UDAQ requested and reviewed Holly's calculation information and was

•

satisfied that it justified the coke burn rate. [IR0092 I 9, Response to Comments Memo ("Based
on UDAQ' s technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is
a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25 ."); IR008052,

•

November 7, 2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the FCC Unit 25).]
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•
23.

The 6200 lb/hr figure was a conservative estimate. The original calculations

showed a rate of 5653.964 lb/hr, and the FCC Unit 4 is a larger unit than the new FCC Unit 25.
[IR008052; see also Holly AO at IR009227-009229 (The FCC Unit 4 processes 8,880 barrels per
day ("bpd") while the proposed FCC Unit 25 can only process 8,500 bpd).]
24.

Petitioners are incorrect in their assumption that because the rate is not included

•

as a limit in the Holly AO that Holly will exceed the PM limit of 0.301b/l 000 lbs of coke burned.
The FCC Unit 25 emissions will not exceed the PTE because there is a finite capacity limit on
the FCC Unit 25 that acts as a physical limitation on the amount of PM that can be emitted.
25.

Even were this not the case, the refinery is limited to an overall PM10 emission

•

cap of 47.5 tpy and 0.13 tpd for combustion sources. [See IR009219, Response to Comments
Memo.] "If these limitations are not met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies
the problem with additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these
limits." [Id.]
26.

Petitioners have failed to point to any evidence in the record that undermines the

reasonableness of UDAQ's reliance on the calculations Holly provided.
27.

Petitioners' only challenge to the PM cap that limits emissions from the FCC Unit

25 is the contention that EPA generally disfavors source wide cap limits. This assertion is
without merit.
28.

•
•

In the PM 1o SIP that EPA approved, UDAQ specifically noted that due to the

significant variability of emission sources at a refinery, emission caps are appropriate. [See
IR07768, PM 10 SIP language attached to Holly Comment letter as Exhibit I, (because "there was
significant variability from day to day and from year to year ... the refineries were allowed
maximum never-to-be exceeded daily limits of PM 10, SO2 , NOx based on the apparent

•
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•

•
variability").] This is true even though EPA generally disfavors source wide caps. In this case,

•

EPA recognized an exception to the general approach in approving such caps in the PM 10 SIP.
29.

In light of the highly technical nature of this issue, UDAQ must be afforded the

greatest degree of deference in its conclusions regarding the evidence in the record supporting

•

the FCC Unit 25 ' s PTE calculations. See Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14). Lacking any evidence
that would undermine UDAQ's conclusions, 16 Petitioners' challenge to the PM emission
calculations fail.

•

IX.

Hollv is in Compliance with Title V.
I.

Petitioners next argue that the Holly AO may not be issued if Holly is not in

compliance with Title V of the Clean Air Act. Petitioners make three distinct arguments related

•

to this claim: (I) Holly's Title V application is not complete because the AO and Source Plan
review lack certain Title V requirements; (2) Holly has not adequately supplemented its Title V
application; and (3) not all applicable parts of Subpart Ja are included in the Holly AO in

•

violation of Title V regulations. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 46-51.] For the reasons stated
below, these arguments should be rejected .

•
16

•
•

For the first time in their Reply Brief, Petitioners appear to suggest that that the Holly AO is
purportedly deficient because the Director's use of PM 10 modeling as a surrogate for PM 2_5
modeling was invalid. Specifically, Petitioners assert that the FCC Unit 25 must contain a
separate PM2.s limit to ensure its emissions w ill not contribute to a NAAQS violation.
[Petitioners' Reply Brief at 42.] Even were it permissible to raise a new argument in a Reply
Brief, Petitioners never raised any concerns about this alleged surrogate policy in their comment
letters; thus the issue is not preserved. Moreover, Holly is now subject to a source w ide em ission
cap in the PM2.s SIP that will limit its PM2_5 emissions. [Utah PM2_5 SIP, January 8, 20 14, p. 21
(setting a source wide PM25 limit of 47.6 tons per rolling 12-month period).] UDAQ was
reasonable in determining that its regulation of Holly's PM 2_5 sources in the PM2_5 SIP would
limit Holly' s emissions and that a separate limit in the Holly AO was unnecessary.
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•
A. Findings of Fact

2.

Holly's predecessor-in-interest received a letter from UDAQ in 1995 that stated

•

Holly's operating permit application was administratively complete, w hich provides Hol ly with
an application shield from Title V enforcement action. [IR007725, Letter from UDAQ to the
Phillips 66 Company, Holly's predecessor in interest (stating that "the Operating Permit
application for Phillips Refinery (application #4 7) has been reviewed and determined to be
complete in accordance with Utah Administrative Code (UAC) R307-15-5(1)(b)," that "the
above site is shie lded from enforcement action for operating w ithout a permit until a permit is
issued," and that additional information would be requested if needed).]
3.

•

UDAQ recognized that Holly had a T itle V application shie ld letter in its response

to Petitioners' comments regarding Title V. [IR009 l 75, Response to Comments Memo (Holly
submitted at UDAQ's request "a July 29, 1995 letter from UDAQ indicating that a complete

•

Title V Permit application had been received [and it] has been included in the record.");
1R0091 84, Response to Comments Memo ("ln any event ... Holly Refinery is operating under an
application shield ... [t]he Title V application is currently pending.").]
4.

•

UDAQ a lso recognized that Petitioners pointed to no statute or regulation that

would preclude Holly from receiving an approval order without first obtaining a final Title V
permit. [IR009 184, Response to Comments Memo ("UDAQ does agree that Holly Refinery is a

•

major source and is thus bound by R307-4 l 5, but the commenter has not referenced regulations
that prevent a major source without a T itle V permit from obtaining an AO, nor is UDAQ aware
of such a regulation.").]
5.

UDAQ determined that Holly was still subject to all applicable federal regulations

regardless of whether Holly was in receipt of a final Title V permit. [IR008571, Source Plan
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•

•
Review ("Title V of the Clean Air Act of 1990 applies to Holly Refinery as a major source. The

•

absence of a Title V permit does not negate the requirements of Holly Refinery, it is still subject
to all AO conditions and federal regulations that would be included in the Title V permit.").]
6.

•

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted

two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding noncompliance with Title V or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion
over the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure regarding the same. [See IR00400 I ,
EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841 , EPA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
7.

•

Petitioners did raise a Title V issue during the comment period that focused on the

allegation that Holly was illegally operating without a Title V permit. [See IR007860-7861,
Petitioners' Second Comment Letter ("Holly Refinery is illegally operating and will continue to
do so until it receives a valid Title V permit.").]

•

8.

However, this is a much different claim than what Petitioners advocate in their

briefing on the merits- that somehow Holly's approval order and suppo1ting documentation
turned into a Title V application that is insufficient, leaving Holly in violation of Title V of the

•

Clean Air Act.
9.

This new argument was also not raised by Petitioners in their RAA even though

the source plan review signature page they rely upon in the briefing was available for Petitioners

•

to review. [See 1R007834-7835 (attached to Holly' s Second Comment Letter).]
10.

The relief requested in the RAA was simply that the Director must issue a Title V

permit for Holly prior to authorizing the expansion project-not that Holly' s Title V application
was incomplete or insufficient. [See RAA at 38.]
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•
11.

To the extent Petitioners' arguments extend beyond their initial contention that

Holly is allegedly illegally operating without a valid Title V permit, such arguments have not

•

been adequately preserved and should be dismissed on this basis.
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
12.

The question of whether Holly is in compliance with Title V and whether UDAQ

properly interpreted the Title V statute and rules to allow UDAQ to issue the Holly AO presents
a mixed question of law and fact. The questions regarding interpretation of the Title V rules and
regulations are questions of law. The application of that law to this specific case presents a
mixed question of fact and law that must be reviewed under a reasonableness standard.
13.

Petitioners are required to marshal all of the relevant evidence on this issue to

allow this tribunal to adequately evaluate whether there is substantial evidence in the record to
support UDAQ's decision to issue the Holly AO.
14.

Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof for this claim. In fact,

Petitioners' fail to reference the only p iece of record evidence related to Title V compliance:
UDAQ's letter to Hol ly's predecessor expressly stating that the refinery is in compliance with

•

Title V. [See IR007725.]
15.

Petitioners also fail to identify any final determination on Holly' s pending Title V

application that would restrict UDAQ's ability to issue Holly its approval order.
16.

Lacking this evidence, Petitioners cannot satisfy their burden of proof and their

•

claims regarding Title V must fail.
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•
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits

•

17.

Even if Petitioners had carried the ir burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this c laim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below .

•

18.

Petitioners argue that before the Director may issue Holly an approval order, he

must purportedly determine whether Holly is in compliance with Title V. See Utah Admin.
Code R307-401-8(l)(b)(x) (an approval order may only be issued if"the proposed installation
will meet the applicable requirements of... all other provisions of R307"); [see also Petitioners'
Opening Br. at 4 7].

19.

Petitioners asse1t that Holly is in violation of Title V because its Title V

application is not complete and it has v iolated its duty to supplement its application "as
necessary to address any requirements that become applicable to the source." Utah Admin. Code
R307-4 15-5b. In support of this assertion, Petitioners re ly on the fact that, as part of Holly's

•

approval order application, Holly signed an optional signature page allowing the information in
the Source Plan Review to be included in Holly's pending operating permit application. [See
IR007836, SPR signature page.] Because this signature page signifies that the AO application is

•

an update to Holly's Title V application but lacks certain Title V requirements, Petitioners argue
that Holly's T itle V application is legally deficient.
20.

•

Petitioners similarly argue that by omitting the Subpart Ja requirements in the

Holly AO, Holly a lso has violated the application requirements under T itle V. On these bases,
Petitioners asse1t that UDAQ may not issue an approval order to Holly while it is in vio lation of
the Title V permit application requirements.

•

2 1.

These arguments fai I for four reasons .
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22.

First, any arguments related to Title V compliance or the sufficiency of Holly's

Title V application is outside of this tribunal's jurisdiction. The Executive Director of DEQ has
made clear that an ALJ'sjurisdiction is limited to the administrative record before him or her and
the particular permit under review. [See Emery Order (limiting ALJ's jurisdiction to the record
before her and prohibiting consideration of an NOl application that could be granted or denied at

•

some point in the future.).] Any other permits or applications for permits that Holly may have
submitted-all of which involve separate administrative records-are beyond the scope of these
proceedings. Id. More important, Petitioners do not point to any final Title V permit decision

•

that could be reviewed by this tribunal even if it had jurisdiction to do so.
23.

Second, even if I had jurisdiction, it is clear from this record that Petitioners have

not presented any evidence or authority that renders invalid the application shield letter issued to
Holly's predecessor-in-interest. [See IR007725.] This shield remains in place until the

•

permitting authority takes action on the entire Title V permit application, which it appears has
not yet occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661 c(d) ("if a pa1t 70 source submits a timely and complete

•

application for permit issuance (including for renewal), the source's failure to have a part 70
permit is not a violation of this part until the permitting authority takes final action on the permit
application"); see also 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(6) (same); see also Utah Admin. Code. R307-4155a(3)(e) (same). This means every approval order that Holly has received is an update to its Title

•

V permit application. The Holly AO is no exception and does not independently give rise to a
cause of action under Title V's separate rules or regu lations.
24.

Third, even ifJ had jurisdiction, this argument fails as a matter of law: Nothing in

•

the Title V statute or applicable regulations contains any time period for supplementation of the
Title V application. See Utah Admin. Code R307-415-5b. That Holly continues to provide

•
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•
information to EPA and UDAQ regarding NSPS compliance (which is a Title V requirement)
effectively evidences that Holly's Title V permit application is being updated on an ongoing
basis. [See IR004 I 38-59, Exhibit 7 to Petitioners' first comment letter (containing a compliance
repo11, sent to the EPA and UDAQ, including compliance demonstration for NSPS
requirements).] Thus, Petitioners' reliance on the signature page as evidence of an incomplete
Title V application is without merit.
25.

Fourth, even if I had jurisdiction, Petitioners' argument that UDAQ's failure to

recite the entire Subpart Ja regulation in the Holly AO violates Title Vis incorrect. [Petitioners'

Br. at I 0-11.] As previously explained, UDAQ is not required to recite the entire 43-page
Subpart Ja regulation in the Holly AO. In any event, the record demonstrates that Subpart Ja

•

does apply and that Holly is in compliance with all federal requirements. [See JR007725.]
26.

For all of these reasons, Petitioners' claims regarding Title V fail on the merits

and should be dismissed with prejudice.

•

X.

The Record Supports the Use of the NEI Emission Factors in Holly's Emission
Calculations.
I.

Petitioners next argue that the Director erred when he authorized the use of the

NEI emission factors to calculate PM emissions from certain of Holly's heaters and boilers.
[Petitioners' Opening Brief at 51-58.] For the reasons discussed below, this argument should be
rejected.

A. Findings of Fact

•

2.

Holly submitted to UDAQ two independent expert reports explaining why the

NET emission factors were more accurate and better predictors of emissions than the AP-42
emission factors-namely, because of the newer dilution testing methodology that was used to

•

develop the NEI emission factors. [IR007238-58, First G len England Report ("England I " )
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•
(explaining why the NEI emission factors more accurately predict PM2.s emissions from gas
fired heaters and boilers); 1R008024-44, Second Glen England Report ("England Il") (same).]
3.

Because the NEJ emission factors were untested at the Holly refinery, UDAQ

imposed stack testing requirements to verify the accuracy of the emission factor calculations.
[1R009215-16, Response to Comments Memo (explaining that UDAQ imposed stack testing

•

requirements to verify the accuracy of the NEI emission factors, reviewed the Glen England
Reports and maintained the original conclusion that use of the NEJ emission factors was
appropriate); IR009217, Response to Comments Memo (explaining that Holly was subject to a

•

stringent emission limit for its heaters and boilers that matched the NEI emission factor
calculations and that Holly is subject to stack testing requirements to verify compliance).]

4.

UDAQ also imposed an emission limit of0.00051 lb/MMBtu in Section 11.B.7.a.2

•

of the Holly AO. [IR009248, Holly AO.]
5.

UDAQ only imposed this limit on Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers. [IR008558-

59, Source Plan Review (explaining use ofNEI emission factors for NSPS sources); 1R009218,

•

Response to Comments Memo (explaining use ofNEI emission factors for NSPS sources).]
6.

Presumably at the request of Mark Hall, a commenter on the draft Holly AO, EPA

staff members sent emails to an undisclosed Gmail account discussing the accuracy of the NEJ
emission factors and the ability of EPA to approve new emission factors generally. [JR0089118922; JR009043.] Neither the attachments to these emails nor the complete emails were

•

included with the comments. [Id.]

•
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•
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B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

•

7.

Petitioners preserved some aspects of their argument regarding their challenge to

the NEI emission factors in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising the issue during the pub Iic
comment period. [See IR008584-8595, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.]
8.

Petitioners did not, however, preserve the argument that§ 7430 of the Clean Air

Act precluded the use of the NEI emission factors.
9.

Section 7430 of the Clean Air Act was not cited anywhere in the comments

submitted during the public comment period but was reasonably ascertainable because it was
codified in the U.S. Code during the public comment period.
10.

•

Petitioners did not raise this substantive argument until their briefing on their

request for a stay in this proceeding.
11.

Accordingly, any arguments relating to § 7430 of the Clean Air Act are

unpreserved and should be dismissed.

•

12 .

In their Reply Brief, Petitioners, argued for the first time that the § 7430 claim

was made in response to additional information submitted to UDAQ after the close of the public
comment period and was therefore not barred by the preservation rules found in Utah Code

•

Section 19-1-30 I .5(4). Petitioners asserted than any prohibition to their ability to address
information submitted after the close of the public comment period would be a violation of their
due process rights.

•

13 .

Petitioners' due process argument relating to their ability to assert the § 7430

claim was not briefed until the Reply. Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are rejected
in appellate contexts. See e.g., Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ~ 9, I 7 P.3d

I 122 (refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief). Accordingly, this
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•
tribunal will not entertain Petitioners' due process arguments briefed for the first time in their
Reply Brief.
14.

Additionally, even if such an argument were properly before this tribunal, the

only information Holly submitted after the close of the public comment period relating to the
NEI emission factors was the second Glen England Report, in which Mr. England expanded on

•

his prior report (submitted before the public comment period) explaining why the NE! emission
factors were the most representative factor for determining emissions from Holly's new heaters

•

and boilers. [See IR008024-44.]
15.

Petitioners' § 7430 argument is not directed at this second Glen England report

and does not address any of the technical findings contained therein. Instead, as Petitioners
admit, the § 7430 argument is purely a legal argument relating to whether UDAQ could use

•

emission factors other than the AP-42 factors, officially approved by EPA.
16.

Therefore, in light of the fact that the§ 7430 argument has nothing to do with the

Glen England Report and is a purely legal argument that was reasonably ascertainable during the
public comment period, the claim has not been adequately preserved, and no due process rights
have been infringed.

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
17.

Even if Petitioners' claims had all been adequately preserved, they have failed to

meet their burden of proof.
18.

Petitioners' claim that UDAQ erred in relying on the NEI emission factors to

calculate the PTE for Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers presents a mixed question of law and

•

fact. Whether UDAQ is legally authorized to use an emission factor other than AP-42 is a
question of law and UDAQ has been given discretion to interpret this law, requiring the

•
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•

•
application of a clearly erroneous standard ofreview. The question of whether UDAQ was

•

reasonable in accepting the NEI em ission factor data is a highly technical mixed question of law
and fact that is reviewed for reasonableness.
19.

Although Petitioners reference, in a footnote, the Glen England Reports, they do

not analyze any of the information contained in those reports. Instead, Petitioners focus on a
paper that Glen England published in 2004, wh ich discusses genera lly the NEI emission factors
as well as several emails from EPA staff discussing the adequacy of the NE! emission factors.
20.

Petitioners also focus their argument on the assertion that UDAQ is prohibited by

Section 7430 of the Clean Air Act from using any emission factors not specifically approved by
EPA.

•

21.

Petitioners have failed to adequately marshal all of the relevant evidence for this

highly complicated issue. Accordingly, they have not satisfied their burden of proof to challenge
Holly's use of and UDAQ's acceptance of the NEI em ission factors.

•

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
22.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits

•

for the independent reasons discussed below .
23.

Petitioners advance multiple arguments as to why the use of the NEI emission

factors to calculate emissions from Holly' s heater and boilers was improper. Each of these

•

arguments fai ls for the reasons discussed in detail below .
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i.

24.

There is No Legal Requirement that UDAO use AP-42 Emission
Factors

Petitioners argue that the law mandates UDAQ use AP-42 emission factors to

•

calculate PM emissions from Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers. This argument fails for three
reasons.
25.

First, nothing in Utah's minor source permitting regulations and nothing in the

federal PSD/NSR regulations requires the use of AP-42 emission factors. In fact, those
regulations do not mention the AP-42 factors at all.
26.

While EPA has identified the AP-42 factors as one method of estimating potential

•

emissions under the PSD/NSR program, the AP-42 factors are not the only authorized method.
EPA also has sanctioned numerous other methods, including "emissions from technical
literature." [EPA New Source Review Workshop Manual, Prevention of Significant

•

Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, draft dated October 1990 ("EPA
Puzzlebook"). The NEI emission factors are "emissions from technical literature" that Holly
used to calculate potential PM 2.5 emissions from its gas fired heaters and boilers.
27.

•

Moreover, the AP-42 factors themselves caution that they are not to be

mechanically applied, but may be superseded by more specific or appropriate technical
information. As EPA has advised:
Before simply applying AP-42 emission factors to predict emissions from new or
proposed sources, or to make other source-specific emission assessments, the user
should review the latest literature and technology to be aware of circumstances
that might cause such sources to exhibit emission characteristics different from
those of other, typical existing sources. Care should be taken to assure that the
subject source type and design, controls, and raw material input are those of the
source(s) analyzed to produce the emission factor. This fact shou ld be
considered, as well as the age of the information and the user's knowledge of
technology advances.

•
•
•
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•

•
EPA, Introduction to AP-42, 4 (Jan. 1995), available at www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42/c00s00.pdf.
In this fashion, EPA delegates to the relevant permitting authority discretion to determine how to
calculate emission rates.
28.

Second, Petitioners' argument that the NSPS regulations mandate the use of AP-

42 is also misplaced because the NSPS program is entirely separate from the PSD program and
regulations from one program cannot dictate action in the other. See, e.g, Envtl. Defense v. Duke

Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 577 (2007) (recognizing the definitions of " modification" under the

•

PSD and NSPS programs are distinct and the "PSD regulations on 'modification' simply cannot
be taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the NSPS").
Finally, Petitioners' argument that 42 U.S.C. § 7430 prohibits the use of the NEI

29.

emission factors because EPA has not specifically approved such factors also fails.
30.

The plain language of this statute contradicts Petitioners ' argument because

Section 7430 applies only to emission factors used "to estimate the quantity of emissions of

•

carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and oxides of nitrogen from sources of such air
pollutions."

17

42 U.S.C. § 7430 (emphasis added). The statute says nothing about the use of

emission factors to estimate the quantity of PM2.s and PM 10- the only emissions for which Holly

•

used NEI factors to estimate emissions from its heaters and boilers .
31.

In any event, Section 7430 does not dictate that UDAQ use any specific emission

factors in a permitting proceed ing, but requires EPA to update emission factors, saying nothing

•
17

•

Consistent with the plain language of the statute, EPA has repeatedly explained that this
provision applies only to "the emission factors used to estimate emissions of volatile organic
compounds (VOC), carbon monoxide (CO), and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) from area and mobile
sources," not to emission factors for PM2.s and PM 10 • 67 Fed. Reg. 56289 (Sept. 3, 2002); 62
Fed. Reg. 45802 (Aug. 29, 1997) .
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•
about when such factors must be used. UDAQ retains discretion to decide which emission

•

factors are appropriate, in its expert technical opinion.
32.

As EPA has explained in evaluating the use of emission factors generated under

Section 7430:
These procedures are not a means for individual facilities to obtain EPA approval
of a site-specific emission factor or to determine the appropriateness of applying a
published EPA factor to a specific facility. EPA does not approve site-specific

factors or judge the appropriateness of its factors for specific facilities. The
responsibility for such decisions continues to be that of the State or local
regulating authority, as well as the facility operators themselves.
EPA' s published emission factors are intended to provide an affordable method of
estimating emissions where no better data are available. They are best used to
characterize the total emissions loading of a large geographic area containing
many individual facilities. Therefore, these factors attempt to represent a typical
or average facility or process in a given industry. EPA recognizes that other

•

•

methods of obtaining emissions estimates may be more accurate than industryaverage emission factors, and encourages the use of better methods whenever the
source and/or the State or local regulating authority is able to support those
methods.
Public Participation Procedures for EPA Emission Estimation Guidance Materials, at 2 (May
1997) (second and third emphasis added).
33.

18

•

EPA has specifically recognized that state permitting authorities may use other

methods without obtaining approval under§ 7430, so long as the permitting authority "is able to
support these methods." Id.
34.

UDAQ had substantial evidence in the record to support its decision to use the

NEI emission factors as set forth in section ii. below.

•
18

•

Available at http://tinyurl.com/EPA-guidance.
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35.

•

Petitioners have fai led to establish any valid legal basis mandating the use of AP-

42 emission factors for estimating PTE for permitting purposes. Therefore this claim fa ils on the
merits.

ii.

36.

It Was Reasonable for UDAO to Accept Ho/Iv's Use ofthe NE/
Emission Factors

UDAQ did not abuse its discretion by fo llowing EPA ' s instruction and looking to

alternative methods of calculating emissions in this case. As noted above, the determination of

•

which emission factors to use fa lls squarely within the discretion of UDAQ. That determination
is entitled to substantial deference, particularly given its technical nature. See, e.g., Utah Code

§ 19-1-301.5(13)(b); accord In re: N Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, PSD Appeal No. 08-02,

•

at 53 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009) ("[Q]uestions pertaining to the appropriate pollutant emissions rates
and other inputs to air quality models raise scientific and technical concerns that generally are
best left to the specialized expertise and reasoned judgment of the permitting authority."); In re:

•

Newmont Nev. Energy Inv., LLC, TS Power Plant, 12 E.A.D. 429, 444 (EAB 2005) ("[W]e
accord broad deference to permitting authorities with respect to issues requiring the exercise of
technical judgment and expertise."); Utah Dep 't ofAdmin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 658

•

P.2d 601,6 10 (Utah 1983) ("[A] court shou ld afford great deference to the technical expertise or
more extensive experience of the responsible agency.").
37.

•

Before explaining why UDAQ' s acceptance of the NEI emissions factors is

reasonable, suppo1ted by substantial evidence, and does not constitute an abuse of discretion, it is
necessary to provide some brief background regarding PM and em ission factors generally.
38.

Particulate matter (PM) is comprised of a complex mixture of extremely small

particles and liquid droplets. [Utah PM2_5 State Implementation P lan, adopted December 4, 20 13

•

("2013 SIP"), § I. I.] PM 1o is particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 10 microns or
95
ADJ011630

•
less. 40 C.F.R. § 51.50. PM 2.5 is particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 2.5

•

microns or less. Id.
39.

There are two types of PM emissions: primary and secondary. The type on which

Petitioners focus in their challenge, primary PM, is comprised of particles that are directly
em itted from a source as a solid or liquid ("filterable PM") or vapor that immediately condenses
after discharge to form solid or liquid PM ("condensable PM"). See 40 C.F.R. § 51.50.
According to EPA's AP-42 emission factors, condensable PM accounts for 75% of PM

•

emissions from the type of natural gas combustion sources at issue here. [See AP-42
Compi lation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors (1998); see also England II at IR008029.]
40.

An emission factor attempts to estimate the quantity of a pollutant released into

the atmosphere with an activity associated with the release of that pollutant. 47 Fed. Reg.

•

52723-01, 52724 (Oct. 14, 2009). EPA's AP-42 emission factors were "initially developed for
emission inventory purposes on ly"-i.e., to assist national, regional, state, and local regulatory
authorities with making air quality management decisions and developing emission control
strategies. Id. at 52723, 52725. Since then, however, EPA has recognized the AP-42 emission

•

factors have been "used for many other air pollution control activities for which they were not

•

designed," including permitting and enforcement. Id.
4 l.

Various testing methods have been developed for calculating primary PM2.s

emissions (both filterable and condensable). The AP-42 factors on which Petitioners rely were
originally developed almost twenty years ago using a "stack test impinger method," which draws
a gas sample through a heated filter and then a series of iced "impingers." [England I at

•

IR007240.] As explained in the England Reports, the problem with this method is that cooling
the sample with chilled water causes emissions- and particularly SO2 emissions- to condense

•
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•
and particulate out as "pseudo-particulate" matter. Although the gas emissions would not

•

condense to form particulate matter under normal operating conditions, the AP-42 factors
nevertheless measure this pseudo-particulate matter as primary PM2.5 . [England II at IR0080278029; England I at IR007240, 1R007242.]
42.

EPA has recognized this same problem w ith the stack test impinger method. EPA

has observed, for example, that "sulfur dioxide (S02) gas (a typical component of emissions
from several types of stationary sources) can be absorbed partially in the impinger solutions and

•

can react chemically to form sulfuric acid. This sulfuric acid 'artifact' is not related to the
primary emi ssion of [condensable paiticulate matter] from the source, but may be counted
erroneously as [condensable particulate matter]." 75 Fed. Reg. 80,118, 80,121 (Dec. 21 , 2010).

•

EPA also has acknowledged "that S0 2 in particular, and perhaps other gaseous compounds, can
react with the collecting liquids used in the [stack test impinger] method to form materials
(artifacts) that would not otherwise be solid or liquid or would not condense upon exiting the

•

stack." 72 Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25, 2007) .
43 .

The Glen England Reports explain that this problem is particularly acute for gas-

fired sources. EPA developed its test methods for sources such as coal-fired boilers, which emit

•

PM concentrations at much higher levels than gas-fired sources, and EPA has never evaluated
the performance of these methods for gas-fired sources. [England II at IR008029, IR008034.]
These measurement errors caused by the hot filter/iced impinger methods "are so significant

•

w hen applied to gas-fired boilers and heaters ... that they partially or completely obscure the true
emission level."

19

[England II at IR008029.]

19

•

In addition to being based on flawed test methods which measure artifacts that do not actually
constitute pa,ticulate matter, the relevant AP-42 PM2.5 factors are based on limited data. The
AP-42 PM2.s factors a re based on only 11 tests of four emissions units for condensable
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44.

The NEJ factors, by contrast, were developed using a newer "dilution method."

Unlike the old stack test methods, dilution-based testing does not create artificial pseudo-

•

particulate matter because the gas sample is cooled with filtered air, similar to what happens to
emissions in the course of actual operations. According to the England Reports, this results in
much more representative and accurate PM 2 _5 measurements. [England lJ at IR008027,
IR008030-8032; England I at IR00724 I.]
45.

EPA has recognized the benefits of this newer testing method, observing "that a

dilution sampling method for measuring direct PM2_5 eliminates essentially all artifact formation
and provides the most accurate emissions quantification." 72 Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25,

2007) (emphasis added). In fact, EPA has expressly identified certain applications "where

•

dilution sampling provides advantages over the standard test methods," and actively
"encourage(dl sources that encounter these situations to request that the regulatory authority ...

use this method to approve the use of dilution sampling as an alternative to the test method
specified for determining compliance." 75 Fed. Reg.80118-01, 80132 (emphasis added).
46.

•

In this case, EPA raised no objection to use of the NEI emission factors during the

public comment period. 20 [See Response to Comments at 43 (noting that "during the public
comment period, EPA did not object to the use of [the NEI] emission factors").] Nor has EPA
particulate matter (which forms the majority of PM 2_5 emissions). [England II at IR008039.]
These tests were not performed by EPA, but by contractors on behalf of individual facilities or
industry trade associations. [England II at 1R008035.] Moreover, the measurement uncertainty
of the AP-42 PM2.s factors for gas-fired sources is greater than the average estimate of emissions.
[England II at 4.] The England Reports describe these and a number of other flaws with the AP42 PM 2.s factors that are not reiterated in detail here. [See England II at 3.]
20 While EPA did ask for more information as to the basis for the reduction of PM10 and PM2.s
potential-to-emit numbers in Holly's second netting analysis, [see IR007840-7841 ], UDAQ
addressed this inquiry in its Response to Comments, explaining that the calculations were "based
on the 2006 EPA-published National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Information." [IR009176]
Subsequent to this direct identification of the use ofNEI emission factors, EPA has raised no
further questions concerning the netting analysis or otherwise challenged Holly' s AO.

•

•
•
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•
challenged the issuance of the AO. EPA also has raised no objection to UDAQ's recent
authorization of the NEI factors for purposes of calculating PM 2 _5 under UDAQ's PM 2 _5 State
Implementation Plan. [See Utah SIP § I.X.H.11 (k)(i), dated January 8, 2014 ("SLP Pa11 H") at
60.]
47.

In arguing that UDAQ must use the AP-42 emission factors, Petitioners do not

defend the accuracy of the AP-42 factors on a technical basis. Nor do they address any of the
criticisms, expressed by both EPA and the England Reports, about the inaccuracies of the stack

•

test impinger methods on which the AP-42 factors are based.
48.

The fact that AP-42 factors have been used in the past does not mean that UDAQ

must continue to rely on those same factors for the Holly AO. UDAQ' s determinations-

•

including the " technical" and "scientific" questions such as what emission factors are to be
used-are to be made on the basis of the evidence provided to UDAQ and placed in the
administrative record in a particular permitting action. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5(13)(6). Holly

•

provided UDAQ with data regarding the flaws in the AP-42 PM2_5 factors and outlining the
superior accuracy of the NEI PM2_5 factors. UDAQ evaluated this evidence and "determined that
the NEI emission factors can be used." [IR.009216, Response to Comments Memo.] Prior use of

•

the AP-42 PM2.s factors does not undermine this conclusion. 21

21

•
•

Petitioners' claim that the May 2011 RT! International Emission Estimation Protocol for
Petroleum Refineries endorses the use of the AP-42 emission factors and does not identify the
NE! PM2.5 data. [See lR008661 , attachment F to Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] However,
the purpose of the protocol was not to identify the absolute level of PM2_5 emissions from each
refinery, but to require the tested refineries to use the same emissions factor so that their relative
emissions could be compared. In responding to comments on the protocol, EPA explained that
" it is important that default emission factors are consistent between different reporters so we can
properly compare the results." [Summary of Comments and Responses, EPA-HQ-OAR-20100682 (Feb. 2, 20 11), Appx. V of Holly' s Opposition to Motion for Stay, also available at
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HO-OAR-20 I 0-0682-0028.] In any event, the
protocol itself states that the "emission factors in AP-42 are the recommended default emission
99

•

ADJ011634

•
49.

Based on the substantial evidence in the record providing techn ical support for

UDAQ's decision to accept use of the NEJ emission factors and the emission calculations based

•

on those factors, and given the lack of contradictory technical evidence, Petitioners cannot meet
their burden to demonstrate that UDAQ acted unreasonably.

iii.

50.

The NE/ PMu Emission Factors are Based 011 Sound Technical
Data and Petitioners' Reference to Other Information Does Not
Undermine the Data.

•

The majority of the technical data supporting the NEI em ission factors is found

in the England Repo1ts, which state that " [t]he NE! PM2.5 emission factors were derived by

•

EPA staff from data contained in GE EER's comprehensive test reports published from 20022004," along with " detailed supporting test data." [England 11 at IR008032.]
51.

This testing program " included extensive quality assurance measures," and more

comprehensive data than is provided in the compliance tests used to developed the AP-42
factors. [England II at IR008034-8035 .] These results have been subject to peer review and
have been corroborated by other independent scientific studies. [England JI at IR008032.] The
NEI test data is also qua ntitatively superior when it comes to condensable particulate matter

•

emissions, which form the majority of PM2.s emissions: the AP-42 factors were based on 1 I test
runs of four units, while the NEI factors were based on 20 test runs of six units. [Eng land II at
IR008039, IR00804 l.]
52.

The cautionary statements regarding the NEI e mission factors upon which

Petitioners re ly "do not suggest in any way that those factors are insufficiently supported by data
or should not be used." [England II at IR008033.] The AP-42 PM emission factors are

•

accompanied by similar language explaining that the emission factors are based on limited data
factors," not that the AP-42 factors are the on ly permissible emission factors. [IR008715
(emphasis added).]

•
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•
and may not be accurate. [England 11 at IR008029-8030.] Such cautionary language is generally

•

found in all instances where emission factors are used.
53.

The boiler sampling data and performance guarantees from the John Zink

Company are an incomplete compilation of data that is not explained, nor relatable to Holly' s gas

•

fired heaters and boilers. The boiler standards were provided to UDAQ on a one-page sheet of
test results, without the full test reports or any explanation as to the testing methodology or
nature of the emissions sources. [See IR008586, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.]

•

Additionally, two of the four boilers did not burn natural gas during their tests and so are not
analogous to the gas-fired sources at issue here. [England II at IR008030 n. l .] The emissions
from the remaining two sources vary widely, resulting in "very low" confidence in the average.

•

[England II at IR008040.] Accordingly, this data does not undermine use of the NEI emission
factors.
54.

•

The Zink guarantees were similarly provided without context or explanation.

Without the testing data, it is impossible to verify that these factors were not based on the same
flawed test methods as the AP-42 factors. Moreover, the Zink guarantees are not emission
factors or estimates, but rather guarantees provided by a commercial manufacturer that emissions

•

w ill not exceed a cettain level. Equipment manufacturers have an incentive to guarantee
emissions that are conservatively high so that the commercial risk associated with failing to meet
the guarantee is low. [England II at IR008034 ("If PM guarantees are not met during

•

performance tests on a new unit, tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in customer payments
may be at stake.").]
55.

•

In weighing the evidence in the record, as this tribunal must do in accordance

with Utah Code Section 19-1-30 1.5, it is c lear that the use of the NEI emission factors is
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•
supported by the majority of sound scientific evidence in the record and UDAQ was therefore

•

reasonable in its acceptance of the NEI factors.

iv.

56.

UDAO Was Reasonable in its Reliance on Enforceable Emissions
Limits in the Ho/Iv AO in Determining the Potential to Emit for
Hollv's Heaters and Boilers.

Petitioners argue that emission limits on Holly's heaters and boilers cannot be

used to limit the facility's potential to emit and so UDAQ erred in its determination that Holly's
project was minor for PM2.s- This tribunal disagrees.
57.

The AO imposes an enforceable limit on PM 2_5 emissions from each of the

•

emissions units for which the NEI emission factors were used in an amount equal to the NEI
emission factors. [1R009248, Holly AO (providing that "[t]he emissions of PM 10 from the

•

following NSPS Boilers and heaters shall not exceed 0.00051 lb/MMBtu").]
58.

The methodology used in this case to determine whether the proposed

modification was "major" for PSD/NSR purposes was a comparison of the refinery's potential to
emit after the expansion project versus its baseline actual emissions before the expansion. See 40

•

C.F.R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(iv)(d). [See also IR008560, Source Plan Review (noting that Holly has
used the potential to emit methodology to determine the projected increases from the expansion
project).] Under this method, the estimated potential emissions are compared to the baseline
emissions; if the difference between the two exceeds a certain quantity, the modification is
deemed " major" for that pollutant.
59.

"Potential to emit" is defined as

the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical
and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of
the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted,

•
•
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•

•
•

stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the
effect it would have on emissions isfederally enforceable. 22
40 C.F.R. § 52.2 1(b)(4) (emphasis added); Utah Admin. Code R307-I0l-2 (same definition).23
60.

•

T he emissions limit imposed on the NSPS boilers and heaters is an enforceable

limitation in the Holly AO. [See IR009218, Response to Comments Memo (" If the stack testing
indicates that Holly Refinery cannot comply with these emission factors, it would be out of
compliance with its AO .... ")]; see also 67 Fed. Reg. 80, 186, 80,190-91 (Dec. 3 1, 2002)

•

(explaining when an emissions limitation is enforceable). According ly, the potential to em it of
these emissions units was properly limited to 0.00051 lb/MMBtu - the same level as established
by the NEI emission factors.

•

61.

Holly's project would only be a minor mod ification for PM.
62.

•

UDAQ was reasonab le in relying on this limiting factor in its determination that

Ultimately, none of Petitioners' arguments challenging Ho lly's use of the NEI

emission factors undermines ' UDAQ's reasonable decision to accept Holly's emission
calculations based on those factors. Petitioners' arguments on this claim all fail on the merits
and should be dismissed with prejudice .

•

XI.

The Emission Reductions From the Decommissioning of the Propane Pit Flare
Were Properly Included in Holly's Netting Analysis.

22

•

The term "federally" in this definition is interpreted as meaning "practically enforceab le" by a
federal, state, or local entity. 67 Fed. Reg. 80, 186, 80, 191 (Dec. 3 1, 2002). [See also
Memorandum from John S. Seitz re: Release ofinterim Policy on Federal Enforceability of
Limitations on Potential to Emit, at 3 (Jan. 22, 1996).]
23

•

Petitioners suggest that the NSPS regulations provide a definition for calculating "potential to
emit." This is incorrect. The NSPS rules nowhere use the concept of "potential to emit" to
determine whether a modification has taken place. Instead, the NSPS definition of modification
is based on whether there has been a change in the hourly emissions rate, while the PSD
regulations are based on total annual em issions. See Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. at 577-78 .
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•
I.

Petitioners final argument is that Holly inaccurately calculated the emission

reductions from its decommissioning of the propane pit flare and should not have included such
emissions in its netting analysis. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 60-61]. For the reasons stated
below, this final argument should be rejected.

•

A. Findings of Fact
2.

The emission reductions that Holly claimed from its decommissioning of the

propane pit flare came from actual emission inventory information submitted to UDAQ in 2008
and 2009 and were not re-calculated specifically for purposes of this project. [IR0092 l 8,

•

Response to Comments Memo ("flare emissions came from the UDAQ inventory record for
repo1ted actual emissions from 2008-2009 based on 259 MMBtu/hr and actual throughput

•

data").]

3.

The historic modifications to the propane pit flare to bring it into compliance with

NSPS did not affect the baseline calculations or the AP-42 emission factor calculations.
[IR007337, Revised NOi (" Compliance with NSPS affects neither the AP-42 emission factor

•

calculation, which is based on the amount of propane used, nor the baseline calculations.").]
4.

None of Holly's modifications to the Propane Pit Flare affected overall emissions.

•

Therefore Holly was free to take credit for the emission reductions when the flare was
decommissioned. [IR009 l 82, Response to Comments Memo ("Because compliance with 40
CFR 60 Subpaits A & J did not affect emissions, reductions from the removal of this propane pit

•

flare are creditable reductions.").]
5.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two

separate comment letters to UDAQ. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR0078407841 , EPA Second Comment Letter.] While the Second Comment Letter requested more

•
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•

•
information regarding (a) "the basis for the estimate of emissions reduced by conve1ting from
gas fired to electric motors for the compressors" [IR007840] and (b) the netting calculations
relating to the new benzene saturation unit #23 and applying a boiler #5 NOx limit [IR007841],
the EPA raised no concerns about the netting issues raised by Petitioners in their final argument

•

on appeal. Moreover, EPA 's request for supplemental information on this issue was satisfied in
UDAQ's response to comments.

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

•

6.

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

this issue during the public comment period. [See IR007857 Petitioners ' Second Comment
Letter.]

•

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
7.

The issue of whether Holly accurately estimated reduction of PM emissions from

the removal of its propane pit flare presents highly technical factual questions. It also presents

•

legal questions about what data may be used for reduction purposes in a netting analysis .
Accordingly, this issue is a mixed question of law and fact and UDAQ 's decision to include the
emission reductions in the netting analysis will be analyzed under a reasonableness standard.

•

8.

Petitioners failed to marshal all of the evidence pe1taining to this issue- namely

the 2008 and 2009 emission inventory data. Petitioners merely question the final calculations
without presenting any conflicting evidence or analyzing the evidence in the record.

•
•

9.

Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden of proof on this c laim and it

fails on that basis.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
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•
10.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
11.

Petitioners argue that the propane pit flare emissions were overestimated based on

Holly's use of AP-42 emission factors. Petitioners contend the emission reduction must be
overestimated because based on the calculated reduction, the propane pit flare would have been
burning every day of the year.
12.

Petitioners submit no evidence in support of this contention. Specifically,

Petitioners do not address the fact that the emission reduction was based on the 2008 and 2009
historic emission inventory data that Holly submitted to UDAQ as required by Utah Admin.

•

Code R307-150.
13.

Part of this calculation involved the use of AP-42 emission factors to calculate the

emissions from the flares because emission factors are necessary where emissions are generated
from an open flame. [See IR007337, Revised NOT, ("Baseline emissions for the flare at the

•

propane pit were calculated based on the AP-42 emission factors for flares.").]
14.

For purposes of netting, the regulations expressly provide that the historical

inventory information may be used as a baseline for calculating emissions increases and

•

decreases. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(6)(48)(ii).
15.

That Holly used NEI emission factors to calculate emissions from its heaters and

boilers is irrelevant to the question of whether the flare emissions were properly calculated with

•

AP-42 factors . Petitioners have pointed to no statute or regulation that would require Holly or
UDAQ to re-calculate historic inventory information every time new emission factors are
developed.

•
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•

•
16.

•

Petitioners' claim that there is no evidence in the record to support these historic

emission calculations also fails because all parties, including Petitioners, agreed to exclude the
emission inventory calculations from the record given the volume of those files. [See Holly's
Surreply at 28; see also UDAQ's Surreply at 33.] If Petitioners thought there was an error in the

•

calculations, the information could have been made available to them for their review.
Petitioners may not now argue, without having asked to review the calculations, that the lack of
such evidence supports their claim .

•

17.

Petitioners have failed to present any evidence that would undermine the

significant deference afforded to UDAQ in its review of highly technical emission calculations
and review of netting analyses. Moreover, Petitioners have presented no technical evidence that

•

undermines the accuracy of the historical inventory information. Accordingly, Petitioners'
challenge to the propane pit flare emission calculations fails on the merits and should be
dism issed with prejudice.

•

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED ORDER

I.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioners have not met their burden to demonstrate that

UDAQ erred in issuing the Holly AO.
2.

Further based on the foregoing and having satisfied my charge to undertake a

pe1mit review adjudicative proceeding in connection with this matter in accordance with Utah
law, I recommend that the Executive Director deny Petitioners' Request for Agency Action and

•

affirm UDAQ's issuance of the Holly AO .

•
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•
DATED this 1 I th day of March, 20 15.

•
BRET F. RANDALL
Administrative Law Judge

•

•
•
•

•
•
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•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I I th day of March 2015, I served the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
REGARDING THE MERITS via email on the following:

•

•
•

Administrative Proceedings Record Officer
degapro(a),utah.gov
Joro Walker
Charles R. Dubuc, Jr.
WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES

joro.walker@westernresources.org
rob.dubuc@westernresources.org
Christian C. Stephens
Veronique Jarrell-King
Marina V. Thomas
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL

cstephens@utah.gov
vjarrellking(a),utah.gov
marinathomas@utah.gov

•

Steven J. Christiansen
David Reyman
Cheylynn Hayman
Megan Houdeshel
PARR BROWN GEE &LOVELESS, P.C.

•

I 85 S. State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
schristiansen(a),parrbrown.com
dreymann@parrbrown.com
mhoudeshel@parrbrown.com
chayman@parrbrown.com

•

/s/ Bret F. Randall. ALJ
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•
APPENDIX A
Table of Waived Claims Petitioners Raised in T heir RAA But Failed to Br ief on the Merits
RAAPage
Number
27-29

Description of Waived Claim
"The AO Does Not Adequately Address Co Emissions and CO
BACT"

Claim# in
Briefs
8

29-30

"The Director Failed to Respond to Public Comments as Required by
Law"

9

43-44

"It is Impossible to Verify the Facility's SO2 Potential to Emit"

17

47-48

"The BACT for the South Flare is Inadequate"

20

50

"The AO Does Not Comply w ith the Federally Enforceable PM 10
SIP"

24

51

"There is No Adequate Basis in the Record for the AO as the Record
Does Not Reflect Independent Analysis of the Assertions and
Calculations Made in the NOi"

25

51-52

"There is Insufficient Information and Analysis in the Record to
Support the AO"

26

53

"The Netting Analysis is Insufficient and Does Not Support the
Finding that the Expansion Project is a Minor Modification"

28

53-55

"The Holl y Refining NOi is Incomplete for its Failure to address
Hydrogen Sulfide, Total Reduced Sulfur and Sulfuric Acid Aerosal
as Required NSR-Regulated Pollutants"

29

55-57

"The AO is Not Based on PM Emissions During Emission
Characterization, Project Related Emission Increases, Netting and
Net Increase Calculations and in the Requ ired BACT
Determinations; the Refinery Onsite Road Network is an Emission
Unit Not Listed in the AO Approved Installations and Holly
Refining Plans to Increase Site-Road-Related PM, PM 10 & PM2.5
Emissions Through a Physical Change or Change in the Method of
Operation of this Emission Unit"

30

"Table 3-4 and 3-5 NO2 Reference [is incorrect]"

32

59-60

•

•

•

•
•

11 0
ADJ011645

•

•
•

•

60-61

"Facility Configuration and Operations in Compliance with Holly
Refining's Notice oflntent"

33

61-62

"Holly Refining' s NOI Contains Significant Errors on the Matter of
the Specific Start of the Contemporaneous Period"

34

62-63

"The AO is Based on an Jrnproper Characterization of the
Contemporaneous Period"

35

63-65

"The AO is Un lawful Because the Director Failed to Require and
Base his Permitting Analysis on the Necessary Process Flow
Diagrams and New Source Review Forms"

36

65 -67

"The Evaluation and Characterization of Contemporaneous Emission
Increases is Inadequate"

37

67-69

"The Section 2.3. 1 "Fuel Gas" Process Support Group Analysis and
Related Section 3 Emission Tables Do Not Show an Adequate 40
C.F .R. §52.21 (b)(3)(i)(b) Determination of Contemporaneous
Creditable Emission Increases and Decreases"

38

69-70

"The Section 2.3.2 Disclosure of Cooling Tower Changes Fails to
Provide Sufficient Jnformation to Determine Contemporaneous
Creditable Emission Increases from Non-Modified Po1tions of
Existing Cooling Towers"

39

70

"The Section 2.3.3 Disclosure Concerning Flares Does Not Provide
Sufficient Information to Determine Contemporaneous Creditable
Emission Increases at Non-Modified Flare Emission Units"

40

70-71

"The Section 2.3 .6 Discussion of Wastewater Treatment and the
Refinery Wastewater Sewer System Does Not Provide Sufficient
Information to Determine Contemporaneous Creditable Emission
Increases"

41

74-75

"Holly Refining's Section 3 Emission Increase and Net Emission
Increase Tables Contain Erroneous Specification of Volatile Organic
Compound and Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions from Cooling
Tower #I 1"

43

76-77

"VOC Em issions and Waxy Crude Handling, Transfer and Storage"

45

78

"Holly Refining Erroneously Claimed VOC Emission Reduction
from Removal of a Floating Roof'

46

•

•
•

•
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•
79-81

"The Director Fails to Enforce Notice of Intent and Compliance
Report Certification by Holly Refining"

48

81

"Condition ll.B.1.b in the AO is Too Vague to be Enforceable"

49

81

"The AO Production Rates During Compliance Stack Tests Are
Insufficient"

50

81-82

"The AO Fails to Contain a Section Addressing the Regulatory
Status, Method of Emission Control and Monitoring-InspectionRecordkeeping-Reporting Requirements for Tank Sources of VOC
and HAP"

51

83-84

"The AO Fails to Enforce Specific Requirements of the July, 2008
EPA Consent Decree Covering PM Emission Limitations for FCCU
Unit 4 and Fails to Require Sufficient Monitoring Necessary to
Assure Compliance with PM Emission Requirements from FCCU
Units 5 and 25"

53

84-86

"The AO Fai ls to Provide a Best Available Control Technology
Emission Limitation for PM, PM 10 or PM2.5 to Control Emissions
from FCC Unit 4"

54

86-87

"Setting NOx Emission Limitations for 4FCCU and 25FCCU
Catalyst Regenerator Exhaust Must be Explained and Justified on the
Record to Eliminate Error and Ambiguity"

55

87-88

"The AO Omits Oxygen Corrections for NOx and SO2 Emission
Limitations that are Stack Flue Gas Concentration Limits"

56

91 -93

"The Record Does Not Include Maximum Potential to Emit for Short
Term SO2 Emissions from the FCC Unit 25 Wet Scrubber Exhaust
Vent Compliance Detennination Point that are Associated with
Sulfur Recovery Unit/SRU Incinerator Outages"

59

93-94

"The AO Fails to Contain Oxygen Monitoring and Wet Scrubber Outlet
Volumetric Flow Rate Determination at FCC Units 4 & 25 Wet
Scrubber Controlled Vent Stacks"

60

95-96

"The Director Eliminated a Previously Established PM Limits for
FCC Unit 4 Without Replacing Such a Lim it with a Revised BACT
Determination"

62

96-97

"Holly Refining Has Not Demonstrated that the 15% Opacity Limit
for 25 FCCU Constitutes a BACT Visible Emission Limitation"

63

•

•

•
•
•
•
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•
•
•

•
•
•

•

97-98

"The Director Must Regulate the FCC 34" Flue Gas Bypass"

65

98-99

"Nothing Provided by Holly Refining's Final Revised Notice of
Intent Justifies the Claimed 98% Control Efficiency Claimed for
VOC, HAP and CO Destruction Efficiency from the Open Air
Flares"

66

99-100

"The Record Fails to Address All Parts of the Existing and Proposed
Flare Gas System and Fai led to Carry Out a "Top Down" Best
Available Control Technology Analysis"

67

I 00-1 02

"The AO May Not Dismiss Flare Gas Recovery Systems as a BACT
Requirement Without Considering Prevailing Industry Practice in
Favor of Such Systems at Larger Refineries"

68

104-105

" Flare Opacity Limitation is Not a BACT Limitation"

71

106-107

"The AO Fai ls to Adequately Address the SRU Incinerator"

73

107

"The AO Fails to Adequately Address the Controlled Refinery
Process Wastewater Sewers"

74

I 07-108

"Neither the Approval Order Nor Holly Refining's Final Revised
Notice oflntent Contain Any Limitation on Cooling Tower Water
Total Dissolved Solids"

75

108-109

"The AO Fai ls to Incorporate a VOC BACT Determination and Fails
to Address EPA Consent Decree Requirements for LOAR Programs
at Ho lly Refining's Facility"

76

I 09-110

"Condition II.B. l.d Should Require Continuous Total Sulfur
Analyzer"

77

111-112

"The Director Must Address the Heater/Boiler NOx CEM
Requirement"

79

115

"Utah Physicians Reserves the Right to Respond to Any Argument
Data and/or Analys is Which Was Not Available at the Beginning of
the Public Comment Period"

81

•
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Tab F

•

•
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
DIVISION OF WATER QUALITY

•

In the Matter of:
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN101230041-13

•

Holly Refining & Marketing CompanyWoods Cross, LLC
Heavy Crude Processing Project
Project No. N10123-0041

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON THE MERITS

Date: March 31, 2015

On March 11, 2015, the administrative law judge issued a Findings of Fact, Conclusions

•

of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits (proposed dispositive action) in the above
referenced Division of Air Quality permit review adjudicative proceeding, conducted in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Coder. 305-7. When an

•

administrative law judge submits a proposed dispositive action, I may adopt, adopt w ith
modifications, or reject the proposed dispositive action; or return the proposed dispositive
action to the administrative law judge for further action as required. Utah Code Ann.§ 19-1-

•

301.5(13)(a). I am required to uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations
that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann.§
19-1-301.5(13)(b ).
Having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on

the Merits and the accompanying record, I am satisfied that the factual, technical, and scientific
agency determinations are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a
whole .

•
•

•

•
WHEREFORE, I adopt the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lqw, and Recommended Order

on the Merits. For the reasons stated therein, I affirm the Division of Air Quality's decision to
issue the approval order described above and I order the dismissal with prejudice of each of the

•

Petitioners' arguments.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

•

Judicial review of this final order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals in
accordance with Sections 63G-4-401, 63G-4-403, and 63G-4-405 of the Utah Code Ann. and the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by filing a proper petition within thirty days after the date of

•

this order.
DATED this3l_ day of7/knc4 , 2015.

•

AMANDA SMITH
Executive Director
Utah Department of Environmental Quality

•
•
•
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•

•
•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
st

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31 day of March 2015, I served the foregoing

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER

•

ON THE MERITS via email on the following:

Administrative Proceedings Record Officer degapro@utah.gov

•
•
•
•

Joro Walker
Charles R. Dubuc, Jr.
WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES
joro.walker@westernresources.org
rob.dubuc@westernresources.org
Christian C. Stephens
Marina V. Thomas
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL
cstephens@utah.gov
marinathomas@utah.gov
Steven J. Christiansen
David Reyman
Megan Houdeshel
Cheylynn Hayman
PARR BROWN GEE &LOVELESS, P.C.
185 S. State Street, Suite 800 Salt
Lake City, UT 84111
schristiansen@parrbrown.com
dreymann@parrbrown.com
mhoudeshel@parrbrown.com
chayman@parrbrown.com

?fj~ I<. -r3~/mA/V
Shane R. Bekkemellom,
Administrative Legal Secretary

•
•
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Tab G

•
•
•

•

•

FACT SHEET: New Source Review (NSR)

What is New Source Review?
New Source Review (NSR) is a Clean Air Act program that requires industrial facilities
to install modern pollution control equipment when they are built or when making a
change that increases emissions sign ificantly. The program accomplishes this when
owners or operators obtain permits limiting air emissions before they begin construction .
For that reason, NSR is commonly referred to as the "preconstruction air permitting
program."
The purpose of the NSR program is to protect public health and the environment, even as
new industrial facilities are built and existing facilities expand. Specifically, its purpose
is to ensure that air quality:
• does not worsen where the air is currently unhealthy to breathe (i.e. nonattainment
areas)
• is not significantly degraded where the air is currently clean (i.e. attainment areas)

What are permits?
Permits are enforceable legal documents that an industrial facility, or stationary source,
must comply with. Permits may place restrictions on:
• What construction is allowed
• What air emission limits must be met
• How the source can be operated
To assure that sources comply with a permit's em ission limits, a permit almost always
contains monitoring, recordkeeping, and repo1ting requirements.

•

What pollutants are regulated under the NSR program?
The NSR program applies to regulated NSR pollutants. In the PSD program, the
regulated NSR pollutants include the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
pollutants and some other pollutants including sulfuric acid mist, hydrogen sulfide, etc.
In nonattainment NSR, the regulated NSR pollutants are only the NAAQS pollutants.

EPA sets NAAQS for six principal po llutants, which are commonly called "criteria"
pollutants and include: ozone, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, lead,
and nitrogen oxide. The NAAQS are set at levels that protect human health and the
environment.

•
•

For each criteria pollutant, every area of the United States has been designated as one of
the fo llowing categories:
• Attainment: air quality is equal to or better than the level of the NAAQS; these
areas must maintain clean air
• Unclassifiable: there are no data on air quality for the area; the area is treated as
attainment

•
•

Nonattainment: air quality is worse than the level of the NAAQS; these areas

must take actions to improve air quality and attain the NAAQS within a certain
period of time

What are the types of NSR permitting programs and what do they require?
There are three types ofNSR permitting programs, each with a different set of
requirements. A facility may have to meet one or more of these sets of permitting
reg uirements.
1. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program applies to a new major

source or a source making a major modification in an attainment area. The
program requirements include:
• Installation of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT)
o Emission limitation based on the maximum degree of emission
reduction (considering energy, environmental, and economic
impacts) achievable through application of production processes
and available methods, systems, and techniques
• An Air Quality Analysis
o Assesses existing air quality and predicts through modeling the
ambient concentrations that will result from the proposed project
and future growth associated with the project
• An Additional Impacts Analysis
o Assesses the impacts of air, ground, and water pollution on soi ls,
vegetation and visibility caused by any increase in emissions of
any regulated pollutant from the source or modification under
review
• Public Involvement
o Opportunities include public comment period, hearings, appeals,
etc. during the permit issuance process.
2. Nonattainment NSR program applies to a new major source or a source making
a major modification in a nonattainment area. The program requirements include:
• Installation of the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER)
o The rate of emissions that reflects: (I) the most stringent emission
limitation included in the implementation plan of any state for a
similar source unless the facility owner or operator demonstrates
such limitations are not achievable; or (2) the most stringent
emissions limitation achieved in practice, whichever is more
stringent.
• Emission Offsets
o To avoid increases in emissions, proposed emissions increases
from new or modified facilities are balanced by equivalent or
greater reductions from existing sources.
• Public Involvement
o Opportunities include public comment period, hearings, appeals,
etc. during the permit issuance process.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•
•

•

3. Minor NSR program applies to a new minor source and/or a minor modification
at both major and minor sources, in both attainment and nonattainment areas .
Minor NSR may apply to criteria pollutants as well as other pollutants depending
on the state. The program requirements include:
• New sources or modifications at existing sources must comply with any
emissions control measures required by the state.
• The program must not interfere w ith attainment or maintenance of the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards or the control strategies of a State
Implementation Plan (SIP) or Tribal Implementation P lan (TIP).
o An implementation plan is a set of programs and regulations
developed by the appropriate regulatory agency in order to assure
that the NAAQS are attained and maintained.

Who issues the permits?
Usually NSR permits are issued by state or local air pollution control agencies. State,
tribal and local air pollution control agencies may have developed their own NSR permit
programs, as part of their State Implementation Plans (SIP) or Tribal Implementation
Plans (TIP), that are approved by EPA or they may be delegated the authority to issue
permits on behalf of EPA. If a state or a tribe chooses not to develop a SIP or a TIP and
also not seek delegation of the federal NSR programs,, EPA wou ld implement the
programs and issue the NSR permit, as we do for the PSD program in Indian country.

What sources are regulated under NSR?
The NSR permitting program applies to both: major and minor stationary sources.

•

I. Major sources are facilities that have the potential to emit pollutants in amounts
equal to or greater than the corresponding major source threshold levels. These
threshold levels vary by pollutant and/or source category. Major sources must
comply with specific emission limits; which are general ly more stringent in
nonattainment areas.

•

2. Minor sources are facilities that have the potential to emit pollutants in amounts
less than the corresponding major source thresholds.

•

Synthetic minor sources are facilities that have the potential to emit pollutants at
or above the major source threshold level, but voluntarily accept enforceable
limits to keep their emissions below the major source thresholds and avoid the
major NSR requirements .

Where can I find additional information about NSR?
EPA's NSR Web site: http://www.epa.gov/nsr/
The NSR Web site provides links to regulations, publications and state permitting
contacts pertaining to New Source Review

•
•
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Utah Division of Air Quality
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Form 19
Date - - - - - - - - - - - Natural Gas Boilers and Liquid Heaters

1. Boiler Manufacturer:

I 3. Serial Number:

2. Model Number:

•

4. Boiler Rating:

(106 Btu per Hour)

5. Operating Schedule:

hours per day

6. Use:

D Natural Gas

D other hot liquid:
D Methanol

D Butane

D LPG

grain/1 00cu.ft.

D Process Gas - H2S content in process gas
D Other, specify:

D Fuel Oil - specify grade: _ _
Sulfur content
Backup
Fuel

□

Diesel

Days per year during which unit is oil fired:

% by weight

D Natural Gas

weeks per year

days per week

D hot water

D steam: psig

7. Fuels:

•

I

Boiler Information

I

D Butane

D LPG

8. Is unit used to incinerate waste gas liquid stream? Dyes

D Methanol

D Other

D no

(Submit drawing of method of waste stream introduction to burners)

•

Gas Burner Information
9. Gas Burner Manufacturer:
10. No. of Burners:

•

12. Average Load:

%

cu. ft/hr

13. Maximum rating per burner:

cu. ft/hr

14. Performance Guarantee (ppm dry corrected to 3% Oxygen):

NOx:
15. Gas burner mode of control:

•

11. Minimum rating per burner:

Hydrocarbons:

CO:
D Manual

D Automatic on-off

D Automatic hi-low

D Automatic full modulation

I

Oil Burner Information

I
16. Oil burner manufacturer:
17. Model:
18 . Minimum rating per burner:

Size number:

number of burners:
gal/hr

I 19. Maximum rating per burner:

•
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gal/hr

Form 11 - Natural Gas Boiler and Liquid Heater
(Continued)

•

Modifications for Emissions Reduction
20. Type of modification: D Low NOx Burner

D Flue Gas Recirculation (FGR)

o Other (specify)

D Oxygen Trim

For Low-NOx Burners
21. Burner Type:

o Staged air

o Staged fuel

D Ceramic

D Other (specify):

D Internal flue gas recirculation

22. Manufacturer and Model Number:
106 BTU/HR

23. Rating:

•

24. Combustion air blower horsepower:

J

For Flue Gas Recirculation (FGR)
25. Type:

D Induced

o

Forced

Recirculation fan horsepower:

26. FGR capacity at full load:

scfm

% FGR

27. FGR gas temperature or load at which FGR commences:

OF

•

%load

28. Where is recirculation flue gas reintroduced?
For Oxygen Trim Systems
29. Manufacturer and Model Number:
30. Recorder:

o

yes

D no

Describe:

Stack or Vent Data
31. Inside stack diameter or dimensions

OF

32. Gas exit temperature:

Stack height above the ground
Stack height above the building
33. Stack serves: D this equipment only,

D other equipment (submit type and rating of all other equipment
exhausted throuQh this stack or vent)

34. Stack flow rate:

acfm

Vertically restricted?

o

Yes

D No

Emissions Calculations (PTE)

I

I

35. Calculated emissions for this device
PM10

Lbs/hr

Tons/yr

PM2.s

Lbs/hr

Tons/yr

NOx

Lbs/hr

Tons/yr

SOx

Lbs/hr

co

Tons/yr

Lbs/hr

Tons/yr

voe

Lbs/hr

Tons/yr

CO2

Tons/yr

CH4

Tons/yr

N2O
HAPs

Tons/yr
Lbs/hr (speciate)

Tons/yr (speciate)

Submit calculations as an appendix. If other pollutants are emitted, include the emissions in the appendix.
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•
•
•

•
Instructions Form 19 - Natural Gas Boiler and Liquid Heater
•

This application form is applicable to natural gas-fired boilers and liquid heaters. Boiler(s) rated for a total of less than five
million Btu per hr and fueled by natural gas and one million Btu per hour and fired by fuel oil numbers 1-6 are exempt from filing
a Notice of Intent to construct. See Source Category Exemptions R307-401-10 (1) and (2).
NOTE:

•
•

•

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11 .
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

•

•
•

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

•

34.
35.

1. Submit this form in conjunction with Form 1 and Form 2.
2. Call the Division of Air Quality (DAO) at (801) 536-4000 if you have problems or questions in filling out this form.
Ask to speak with a New Source Review engineer. We will be glad to help!
3. Attach specification sheets for all burners, equipment and modifications to boiler.

Company name of manufacturer of boiler (specifically the pressure vessel or shell).
Manufacturer's model number.
Specific identification, serial, number of the boiler.
The maximum heat input for which the boiler is rated. Give the value in million British thermal units per hour.
The operating schedule for which you want to be permitted. The air quality impact will be evaluated according to this
schedule. Note: The approval order will limit operating hours to what you request.
Mark the box indicating the purpose of the boiler.
Mark all fuels that you wish to be approved to use, also list the backup fuel to be used if any.
If a waste stream is burned , answer yes and submit drawings, etc. to characterize the method.
Company name of manufacturer of gas burners. If the boiler is a packaged boiler, list the manufacturer of the boiler.
How many gas burners will be installed in the boiler?
Minimum gas flow rate at which each burner can operate (in cubic feet per hour)
The average load at which you plan to operate each burner, compared to the maximum burner rating.
Maximum gas flow rate at which each burner can operate (in cubic feet per hour)
List the maximum concentration which the manufacturer guarantees the burners will produce in parts per million of
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Carbon Monoxide (CO), and Total Hydrocarbons. If the percentage of Non-methane
hydrocarbons is known, please provide that information.
Indicate the method used to control the flame for the burners.
Company name of manufacturer of oil burners. If the boiler is a packaged boiler, and has duel fuel capability, list the
manufacturer of the boiler.
Manufacturer's model, number (quantity), and size of oil burners to be installed in the boiler.
Minimum oil flow rate at which each burner can operate (in gallons per hour).
Maximum oil flow rate at which each burner can operate (in gallons per hour).
Indicate the type of emissions reduction strategy(ies) used in the proposed boiler.
Indicate the low-NOx strategy used in the burner design.
Company name of manufacturer of the burners. Manufacturer's model number for the burners.
The heat input rating of each burner in million British thermal units per hour.
In a forced draft design, the horsepower of the fan motor used.
Method for delivering the flue gas to the combustion zone. Forced draft indicates the presence of a fan. Give the fan
horsepower if so equipped.
The amount of flue gas which can be recirculated, in standard cubic feet per minute. And the percentage of the flue
gas that can be recirculated at full load.
Generally, flue gas recirculation systems start up at a given load or temperature. Give that specification.
Where in relation to the burner/combustion zone is the flue gas reintroduced to the boiler?
Name of the manufacturer and the model number of the oxygen trim system.
Is there a data recorder? If so, describe it: What is recorded? How is it read?
Give the inside diameter or the dimensions of the stack. List the stack height above the ground and above the
building in which it is located, describe if the gas flow is vertically restricted. This information will be used in modeling
the impact of emissions on the ambient air.
Give the expected gas exit temperature at the end of the stack. Also to be used in modeling.
Indicate if other equipment is also vented to this stack. If other equipment is served by the stack, provide the flow
rates, operating parameters, fuel and combustion information that can be used to characterize the total emissions
from the stack.
Give the gas flow rate out of the stack in actual cubic feet per minute (acfm).
Supply calculations for all criteria pollutants, greenhouse gases and HAPs. Use AP42 or Manufacturers' data to
complete your calculations.
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Tab I

•
Boiler-Natural Gas
Air Emissions
Boiler Emissions - Natural Gas

•

Date: 0-00-00
Company Name:
Facility Name:
Equipment Name:

Test
test
Admin E Boiler

Enter Maximum Heat Rate, (Btu/hr or Btuh) . . . .. . ... .. . . .

•

90000000
90000

Gas Consumption per Hour (cubic feet per hour)

Calculated using a 1000 Btu/cu ft heating value for natural gas and 100% boiler load.

Enter Number Hours Operated per Year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

•

•

The calculated emissions will be :
Emission Factors listed below are for Natural Gas Boilers ...... .
Less Than 100 Million Btuh

b

C

d

Pollutant

Emission Factor

Emission Rate

Emissions

lbs/hr

lbs/cu ft gas
Particulate Material - PM 10

0.0000076

0.684

tons/yr
x hours/2000
0.137

Sulfur Dioxide - SO2
Nitrogen Oxides - NOx

0.0000006
0.0001

0.054
9.000

0.011
1.800

Volitile Organic Compounds - voe

0.0000055
0.000084

0.495
7.560

0.099

c x cubic feet hour

•
•

•
•

•

400

Carbon Monoxide - CO

d

1.512

Note: This calculation chooses the correct set of emission factors , from the table below, based on the
boiler heat rate. The correct emission factor will automatically be choosen to match the
maximum heat rate input. Each boiler must have it's own calculation, do not total the heat rates
for the site and use the one number for emission calculations .

•
Boiler-Natural Gas
Air Emissions
Boiler Emissions - Natural Gas

Instructions
These calculation sheets have been written using Microsoft Excel.

Step 1 Fill in the name and identifying information.
Enter the boiler heat output, in Btu/hour or Btuh, from the boiler name plate. Every boiler needs
an emission calculaton sheet.

•
•

Step 2 Enter the hours the boiler will be operated.

Step 3 Once you have entered in all the values click anywhere on the sheet and the calculation will be
done by the program. Remember the information is being used for permitting purposes, so be
sure the numbers are right and realistic.
Step 4 If this is the only piece of equipment you are done with the calculations.
Save a copy by printing out the page.
You now need to determine what type of permit you need .....
Step 5 If this is one of several emission points, download the Air Emission Summary page and enter the
equipment name and emissions.

Less Than 100
Million Btuh
(lb/cu ft gas)

Particulate Material - PM 10

0.0000076

Greater Than 100
Million Btuh
(lb/cu ft gas)
0.0000076

Sulfur Dioxide - SO2

0.0000006

0.0000006

Nitrogen Oxides - NOx

0.0001

0.00028

Volitile Organic Compounds - voe

0.0000055

0.0000055

Carbon Monoxide - CO

0.000084

0.000084

Emission Factors - Natural Gas
Boilers

Emission factors are from EPA AP 42, 1.4 Natural Gas Combustion, Emission Factors are for an
uncontrolled boiler. Most newer boilers have smaller emission rates, if you have manufacturers
emission rates you should use them. Please include the manufacturers literature as a reference
for why you are using different factors. Emission factors used could become a permit condition,
and the Division of Air Quality can ask for a test to confirm emissions.

•

•
•
•
•
•

Tab J

•
13.5 Industrial Flares
13 .5. I General

•

•

•
•
•

•

Flaring is a high-temperature oxidation process used to burn combustible components, mostly
hydrocarbons, of waste gases from industrial operations. Natural gas, propane, ethylene, propylene,
butadiene and butane constitute over 95 percent of the waste gases flared. In combustion, gaseous
hydrocarbons react with atmospheric oxygen to form carbon dioxide (CO2) and water. In some waste
gases, carbon monoxide (CO) is the major combustible component. Presented below, as an example,
is the combustion reaction of propane.

During a combustion reaction, several intermediate products are formed, and eventually, most
are converted to CO2 and water. Some quantities of stable intermediate products such as carbon
monoxide, hydrogen, and hydrocarbons will escape as emissions.
Flares are used extensively to dispose of (I) purged and wasted products from refineries,
(2) unrecoverable gases emerging with oil from oil wells, (3) vented gases from blast furnaces,
(4) unused gases from coke ovens, and (5) gaseous wastes from chemical industries. Gases flared
from refineries, petroleum production, chemical industries, and to some extent, from coke ovens, are
composed largely of low molecular weight hydrocarbons with high heating value. Blast furnace flare
gases are largely of inert species and CO, with low heating value. Flares are also used for burning
waste gases generated by sewage digesters, coal gasification, rocket engine testing, nuclear power
plants with sodium/water heat exchangers, heavy water plants, and ammonia fertilizer plants .
There are two types of flares, e levated and ground flares. Elevated flares, the more common
type, have larger capacities than ground flares. In elevated flares, a waste gas stream is fed through a
stack anywhere from l O to over l 00 meters tall and is com busted at the tip of the stack. The flame is
exposed to atmospheric disturbances such as wind and precipitation. In ground flares, combustion
takes place at ground level. Ground flares vary in complexity, and they may consist either of
conventional flare burners discharging horizontally with no enclosures or of multiple burners in
refractory-lined steel enclosures.
The typical flare system consists of (1) a gas collection header and piping for collecting gases
from processing units, (2) a knockout drum (disentrainment drum) to remove and store condensables
and entrained liquids, (3) a proprietary seal, water seal, or purge gas supply to prevent flash-back,
(4) a single- or multiple-burner unit and a flare stack, (5) gas pilots and an ignitor to ignite the mixture
of waste gas and a ir, and, if required, (6) a provision for external momentum force (steam injection or
forced air) for smokeless flaring. Natural gas, fuel gas, inert gas, or nitrogen can be used as purge
gas. Figure 13.5- 1 is a diagram of a typ ical steam-assisted elevated smokeless flare system.
Complete combustion requires sufficient combustion air and proper mixing of air and waste
gas. Smoking may result from combustion, depending upon waste gas components and the quantity
and distribution of combustion air. Waste gases containing methane, hydrogen, CO, and ammonia
usually burn without smoke. Waste gases containing heavy hydrocarbons such as paraffins above
methane, olefins, and aromatics, cause smoke. An external momentum force, such as steam injection
or blowing air, is used for efficient air/waste gas mixing and turbulence, which promotes smokeless
9/9 1 (Reformatted 1/95)

Miscellaneous Sources

13.5-1

•
PILOT BURNERS
IGNITOR TUBE
BURNER TIP
STACK SEAL

IGNITOR
ASSIST _ _ __ ,__
STEAM

_

_

_ _ __

7

, __ _ __

_ _ __

_

_ __

IGNITION
GAS
_ _ PILOT GAS

•
PURGE GAS

WATER SEAL
DISENTRA1NMENT DRUM

•
DRAIN

Figure 13.5-1. Diagram of a typical steam-assisted smokeless elevated flare.

flaring of heavy hydrocarbon waste gas. Other external forces may be used for this purpose, including .
water spray, high velocity vortex action, or natural gas. External momentum force is rarely required in
ground flares.

•

Steam injection is accomplished either by nozzles on an external ring around the top of the
flare tip or by a single nozzle located concentrically within the tip. At installations where waste gas
flow varies, both are used. The internal nozzle provides steam at low waste gas flow rates, and the
external jets are used with large waste gas flow rates. Several other special-purpose flare tips are
commercially available, one of which is for injecting both steam and air. Typical steam usage ratio
varies from 7: 1 to 2: I, by weight.
Waste gases to be flared must have a fuel value of at least 7500 to 9300 kilojoules per cubic
3
meter kJ/m (200 to 250 British thermal units per cubic foot [Btu/ft3]) for complete combustion;
otherwise fuel must be added. Flares providing supplemental fue l to waste gas are known as fired, or
endothermic, fl ares. In some cases, even flaring waste gases having the necessary heat content
will also require s upplemental heat. If fue l-bound nitrogen is present, flaring ammonia with a heating
value of 13,600 kJ/m 3 (365 Btu/ft3 ) w ill require higher heat to minimize nitrogen oxides (NOx)
formation.

•

At many locations, flares normally used to dispose of low-volume continuous emissions are
designed to handle large quantities of waste gases that may be intermittently generated during plant
emergencies. Flare gas volumes can vary from a few cubic meters per hour during regular operations
up to several thousand cubic meters per hour during major upsets. Flow rates at a refinery could be

•

13.5-2

•

EM ISSION FACTORS

(Reformatted 1/95)

9/9 1

•
from 45 to 90 kilograms per hour (kg/hr) (I 00 - 200 pounds per hour [lb/hr]) for relief valve leakage
but could reach a full plant emergency rate of 700 megagrams per hour (Mg/hr) (750 tons/hr). Normal
process blowdowns may release 450 to 900 kg/hr (1000 - 2000 lb/hr), and unit maintenance or minor
failures may release 25 to 35 Mg/hr (27 - 39 tons/hr). A 40 molecular weight gas typically of
0.012 cubic nanometers per second (nm 3/s) (25 standard cubic feet per minute [scfm]) may rise to as
high as 115 nm3/s (241,000 scfm). The required flare turndown ratio for this typical case is over
15,000 to I.
Many flare systems have 2 flares, in parallel or in series. In the former, I flare can be shut
down for maintenance while the other serves the system. In systems of flares in series, I flare, usually
a low-level ground flare, is intended to handle regular gas volumes, and the other, an elevated flare, to
handle excess gas flows from emergencies.

13.5.2 Emissions
Noise and heat are the most apparent undesirable effects of flare operation. Flares are usually
located away from populated areas or are sufficiently isolated, thus minimizing their effects on
populations.

•
•
•

•

Emissions from flaring include carbon particles (soot), unburned hydrocarbons, CO, and other
partially burned and altered hydrocarbons. Also emitted are NOx and, if sulfur-containing material
such as hydrogen sulfide or mercaptans is flared, sulfur dioxide (SO2). The quantities of hydrocarbon
emissions generated relate to the degree of combustion. The degree of combustion depends largely on
the rate and extent of fuel-air mixing and on the flame temperatures achieved and maintained.
Properly operated flares achieve at least 98 percent combustion efficiency in the flare plume, meaning
that hydrocarbon and CO em missions amount to less than 2 percent of hydrocarbons in the gas stream.
The tendency of a fuel to smoke or make soot is influenced by fuel characteristics and by the
amount and distribution of oxygen in the combustion zone. For complete combustion, at least the
stoichiometric amount of oxygen must be provided in the combustion zone. The theoretical amount of
oxygen required increases with the molecular weight of the gas burned. The oxygen supplied as air
ranges from 9.6 units of air per unit of methane to 38.3 units of air per unit of pentane, by volume.
Air is supplied to the flame as primary air and secondary air. Primary air is mi xed with the gas before
combustion, whereas secondary air is drawn into the flame. For smokeless combustion, s ufficient
primary air must be supplied, this varying from about 20 percent of stoichiometric air for a paraffin to
about 30 percent for an olefin. If the amount of primary air is insufficient, the gases entering the base
of the flame are preheated by the combustion zone, and larger hydrocarbon molecules crack to form
hydrogen, unsaturated hydrocarbons, and carbon. The carbon particles may escape fut1her combustion
and cool down to form soot or smoke. Olefins and other unsaturated hydrocarbons may polymerize to
form larger molecules which crack, in turn forming more carbon.
The fuel characteristics influencing soot formation include the carbon-to-hydrogen (C-to-H)
ratio and the molecular structure of the gases to be burned. All hydrocarbons above methane, i. e.,
those with a C-to-H ratio of greater than 0.33, tend to soot. Branched chain paraffins smoke more
readily than corresponding normal isomers. The more highly branched the paraffin, the greater the
tendency to smoke. Unsaturated hydrocarbons tend more toward soot formation than do saturated
ones. Soot is eliminated by addi ng steam or air; hence, most industrial flares are steam-assisted and
some are air-assisted. Flare gas composition is a critical factor in determining the amount of steam
necessary.

9/9 1 (Reformat1ed 1/95)
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Since flares do not lend themselves to conventional emission testing techniques, only a few
attempts have been made to characterize flare emissions. Recent EPA tests using propylene as flare
gas indicated that efficiencies of 98 percent can be ach ieved when burning an offgas with at least
3
11 ,200 kJ/m (300 Btu/ft\ The tests conducted on steam-assisted flares at velocities as low as
39.6 meters per minute (m/min) (130 ft/min) to 1140 m/min (3750 ft/min), and on air-assisted flares at
velocities of 180 m/min (6 I 7 ft/min) to 3960 m/min (13,087 ft/min) ind icated that variations in
incoming gas flow rates have no effect on the combustion efficiency. Flare gases with less than
16,770 kJ/m 3 ( 450 Btu/ft3) do not smoke.
Table 13.5-1 presents flare emission factors, and Table 13.5-2 presents emission composition
data obtained from the EPA tests. 1 Crude propylene was used as flare gas during the tests. Methane
was a major fraction of hydrocarbons in the flare emissions, and acetylene was the dominant
intermediate hydrocarbon species. Many other reports on flares indicate that acetylene is always
formed as a stable intermediate product. The acetylene formed in the combustion reactions mar react
further with hydrocarbon radicals to form polyacetylenes followed by polycyclic hydrocarbons.
In flaring waste gases containing no nitrogen compounds, NO is formed either by the fixation
of atmospheric nitrogen (N) with oxygen (0) or by the reaction between the hydrocarbon radicals
present in the combustion products and atmospheric nitrogen, by way of the intermediate stages, HCN,
2
CN, and OCN. Sulfur compounds contained in a flare gas stream are converted to SO2 when burned.
The amount of SO2 emitted depends directly on the quantity of sulfur in the flared gases.

•
•
•

Table 13.5-1 (English Units). EMISSION FACTORS FOR FLARE OPERA TIONSa
EMISSION FACTOR RATING: B

Component

Emission Factor
(lb/106 Btu)

Total hydrocarbonsb

0.14

Carbon monoxide

0.37

Nitrogen oxides

0.068

Soof

0 - 274

•
•

a Reference I. Based on tests using crude propylene containing 80% propylene and 20% propane.

b Measured as methane equivalent.
Soot in concentration values: nonsmoking flares, 0 micrograms per liter (µg/L); lightly smoking
flares, 40 µg/L; average smoking flares, 177 µg/L; and heavily smoking flares, 274 µg/L.

c

•

•
13 .5-4

EMISSION FACTORS
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•
Table 13.5-2. HY DROCARBON COMPOSIT ION OF FLARE EMISSION3

Vol ume%
Composition
Methane

•

•

I

Range

55

14 - 83

Ethane/Ethy lene

8

1 - 14

Acetylene

5

0.3 - 23

Propane

7

0 - 16

25

1 - 65

Propylene

•

Average

a

Reference 1. The composition presented is an average of a number of test results obtained under the
following sets of test conditions: steam-assisted flare using high-Btu-content feed; steam-assisted
using low-Btu-content feed; air-assisted flare using high-Btu-content feed; and air-ass isted flare using
low-Btu-content feed. In all tests, "waste" gas was a synthetic gas consisting of a mixture of
propylene and propane.
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Exhibit ''K'' - Produced in
Electronic Format

